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The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between George 
Orwell and Raymond Williams as reflected in their respective writings on 
politics, letters and language. 
The study aims to provide a close historical reading of exemplary texts 
written by Orwell and Williams. This involves: description of the historical 
context in which the texts were produced; close analysis of the selected 
texts; and summarising their related writings in these three areas in order 
to place the ·exemplary texts' in the context of their work as a whole. 
Finally, having thus provided a synthesis of their respective thoughts on 
politics, letters and language, the similarities and differences between Orwell 
and Williams are derived. 
The conclusion drawn in this study is that notwithstanding several 
important differences, Orwell and Williams share a number of fundamental 
assumptions and beliefs in these defined areas. In their ·political' writings, 
they share a reliance on the evidence of ·experience ; a sense of Britain as a 
society governed ultimately by consensus rather than by conflict; and a 
commitment to similar forms of socialist-humanism. In their work on 
letters, they both resist the dominant definitions of ·literature· ; they both 
explore the relation between ·politics· and 'letters·; and they both seek to 
use 'letters· in the service of (socialist) ·politics'. In their understandings of 
language, both Orwell and Williams assume a ·unified subject' that precedes 
language as the source of meaning ; they both insist on the existence of some 
pre-linguistic 'reality'; and they share a sense of language as being in some 
way constitutive. The differences between Orwell and Williams can be 
summarised as follows: first, they wrote in different contexts; second, they 
j 
represent different constituences of British socialism (Orwell middle-class 
and Williams working-class}; and third, whereas Orwell is a popular 
essayist, Williams is a literary academic, who explores the many concerns 
they share with greater subtlety and care. 
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Introciucuon 
In recent years, several scholars have suggested that there are significant 
similarities between the jdeas of George Orwell and those of Raymond 
Williams. 
The most extended study on the subject is that of Paul Thomas. In his 
essay 'Mixed Feelings: Raymond Williams and George Orwell', he argues 
that although the comparisons should not be pushed too far, Orwell and 
Williams do have a great deal in common. For Thomas, 'the points of 
similarity and areas of overlap ... are largely political' (p. 424) : both 
Orwell and Wi11iams reject the vulgar-Marxist contention that (economic) 
base determines (political and cultural) superstructure; both are concerned 
centrally with removing class barriers to equality; and both are indifferent to 
the mechanics of parliamentary politics, public ad ministration and trade 
union structures, focusing instead on the cultural dimension of the struggle 
for socialism. 
A second similarity Thomas identifies is their shared concern with 'lived 
experience': 
Orwell and Williams frequently refer or appeal to their own 
experiences, perceptions, and recollections and inscribe these 
within accounts of social, cultural, or political events and processes 
that are much more general. (p. 425) 
According to Thomas, this desire to relate personal experience to the society 
as a whole leads to another area of overlap, their exploration of popular 
culture. He quotes with approval George Woodcock's argument ( p. 251) 
that Orwell's essays on boys' weeklies, Donald McGill and detective fiction 
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have formed the foundation for the cultural criticism developed by Williams 
and Richard Hoggart. 
The final area of common interest Thomas discusses is that of language. 
He argues: 
Orwell and Williams share a direct and politically-charged 
preoccupation with the use and meaning of words, a preoccupation 
that links Williams's book Keywords with Orwell's essays on 
language, particularly 'Politics and the English Language' and 'Why I 
Write'. (p. 426) 
Furthermore, in their respective understandings of language both Orwell and 
Williams are in different ways vulnerable to the Althusserian argument that 
'dominant ideologies habitually exploit "imaginary" devices [ including 
language] in various ways in order to bolster up the construct of a relatively 
"fixed" identity' (p. 427). 
Like Thomas, Christopher Norris, in his essay 'Language, Truth and 
Ideology: Orwell and the Post-War Left·, sees Orwell and Williams sharing a 
similar reliance on 'experience' , and a related resistance to 'theory·: 
Williams cannot entirely divest his writing of the homespun 
individualist-empirical style which animates Orwell's prose. He can 
certainly acknowledge the weight of implied ideology which goes 
along with the resistance to theory in its cruder, neo-Orwellian 
forms. But the same resistance is at work in his own way of 
treating theoretical issues as part of an evolving social experience , 
a combination of documentary record and personal 
work-in-progress. (pp. 244-5) 
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Norris employs the perspective of Althusserian ('Continental') Marxism in 
order to contextualise the 'common sense' empiricism he sees in both Orwell 
and Williams's work: 
From the standpoint of 'Continental' Marxism [Orwell's] case can be 
diagnosed as displaying all the blindspots and irrational regressions 
of empiricist ideology. Williams registers the force of this argument 
when he writes of Orwell's plain-man, common-sense style: his air of 
perpetually 'bumping up' against the straightforward facts of 
experience. Yet the commitment to empiricism - as a mode of 
historical experience, if not as a full-blown ideology - continues to 
eiercise a rival claim in Williams's dealings with Continental 
Marxism. For him, as for [E. P. 1 Thompson, it acts as a constant 
qualifying check on the powers of theoretical abstraction. (p. 261) 
In his discussion with john Lukacs and Gerald Graff entitled 'The Legacy of 
Orwell' , Edward Said suggests yet another basis for comparing Orwell and 
Williams: 
I'd like to think of Orwell as simply one actor in a very complicated 
drama which is continuing to unfold. The drama has to do with 
problems of superstructure and base. Are the political and 
economic circumstances more determining 'than the ideological and 
cultural? What is the relationship between them? A person who 
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comes after Orwell - Raymond Williams, for example - can be much 
more interesting on this sort of thing. Williams of course depends a 
great deal on Orwell, and has an Orwellian sensibility, but he takes in 
a lot more than Orwell ever took the time to do, trying precisely to 
gauge the inflection in the relationship between culture and social 
polity. (p. 126) 
In an important overview of Williams in the New Left Review, Anthony 
Barnett emphasizes the significance of Orwell in the development of 
Williams's political understanding: 
Williams's relationship to Orwell is obviously an important one for 
him. Orwell is the last individual to be given a chapter in the roll-call· 
of Culture and Society. If that inheritance has been continued 
by Williams, then he picked up the baton from a writer whose 
conclusions, he states, 'have no general validity' but who was 'brave' 
and 'frank'. (p. 58) 
He traces Williams's argument that in the middle of the 1940s Orwell helped 
to tie the knot binding 'Democracy' and Western capitalism. He continues: 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Williams, despite the 
fact that he was not defeated and never became an 
anti-Communist, in fact retained a kind of left version of the knot 
which Orwell helped to tie. That he, in effect, reproduced in his main 
political works the assumption that there is only one kind of 
democracy - which exists as a human inter-relationship irrespective 
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of its class character. (p. 58} 
According to Barnett, Williams's analysis of Western democracy is flawed in 
that he exaggerates the potential of revolution by 'consensus and argument', 
and also in that he underestimates the coercive power of Western states; his 
analysis of Russia, on the other hand, fails to distinguish the proletarian 
democracy that preceded the manifestly undemocratic Stalinist oligarchy. 
The result is that he tends - like Orwell - to identify 'democracy· with 
bourgeois government. 
Finally, there have been two re-workings of Williams's 
'culture-and-society'_ tradition which have included both Orwell and Williams 
as part of a common problematic or world-view. Lesley Johnson in The 
Cultural Critics : From Matthew Arnold to Raymond Williams pays tribute to 
Williams's pioneering work in the field of culture, and then sets out to 
describe the figures in 'a vital tradition of social criticism which has 
represented the artistic imagination as a moral force in society and as a 
fundamental mechanism for social change' (p. vii}. Johnson identifies the 
three main figures in the tradition as Matthew Arnold, F. R. Leavis and 
Raymond Williams, but includes-a substantial discussion of Orwell as a 
contemporary of Leavis. He concludes the section on Orwell as follows: 
Though neither culture nor education were dominant issues for him, 
Orwell was nevertheless taunted by the same questions [as Leavis 
and Williams] of the role of the literary intellectual, the future of 
aesthetic or creative activities in the society, and the quality of life. 
in modern society. These issues signal the essential lines of Orwell's 
problematic. (p. 144) 
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A more recent study construing Orwell and Williams as part of the same 
tradition is Fred Inglis's Radical Earnestness: English Social Theory 
1880 -1980 . Inglis also opens by acknowledging his debt to Williams's 
Culture and Society 1780 -1950 , and then describes the (similar) tradition he 
wishes to celebrate: 
it is composed of those who, in the teeth of a Jong record of 
British bullying, self-congratulation, hypocrisy and murderous 
cruelty, have also found something to honour in British intellectual 
Jif e as it has resisted the awfulness of its own, dominant culture. 
(p. 4} 
According to Inglis: 
[This tradition] has passed on ways of valuing and imagining 
human virtues which have helped to prevent their being lied out of 
existence, has shown how to criticize and fight off the blatant 
ideologizing of their advantages by the rich, the powerful, the greedy 
and the cruel. (p. 5) 
Central to their mode of social protest is 
a habit of recourse to concrete examples in argument, a calm 
refusal of formal metaphysics, an unexamined criticism of 
'over-abstraction' (which meant other people's abstractions}, and a 
general preference for non-systematized or pluralist theories of 
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political life. (p. 22) 
These broad criteria enable Inglis to trace a tradition that accommodates 
Orwe11 and Wi11iams quite comfortably within its terms; indeed, even more 
unlikely figures - like T. H. Green, E. P. Thompson and Isaiah Berlin - are 
linked in Inglis's reconstituted tradition. 
Taken together, these arguments might seem persuasive. However, before 
trying to derive from them the grounds for comparing OrweU and Wi11iams, 
two objections to such a comparison need to be examined. In the first place, 
Wi11iams's own attitude to Orwe11 must be considered: does Wi11iams see 
Orwe11 as his closest ancestor? 1 
Orwe11 stands as the final figure in Culture and Society 1780-1950 , but 
Williams's treatment of him is hardly that of a disciple. In the opening 
paragraph, Williams writes: 
With us, [my emphasis] he inherited a great and humane tradition; 
with us, he sought to apply it to the contemporary world. He went to 
books, and found in them the detail of virtue and truth. He went to 
experience, and found in it the practice of loyalty, tolerance and 
sympathy. (p. 276) 
. But for Orwell, this tradition· is ·a kind of wry joke', everywhere contradicted 
by the harshness of the actual world. Williams describes the total effect of 
Orwell's work to be a paradox, and sees the key to the paradox as lying in his 
position as an exile deprived of any substantial community. Orwell 
committed himself to the idea of socialism, his most deliberate attempt to 
become part of a believing community being in Spain. Williams's main 
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criticisms of Orwell.are directed at the proliferation of dubious generalisation 
in his work, his emotive abuse of fellow-Leftists, and his paralysing doubts 
(realised in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four) as to the revolutionary 
potential of the working classes. Despite these criticisms, Williams's 
concluding assessment of Orwell contains a note of approval: 
as a man [Orwell] was brave, generous, frank, and good, 
and . . . the paradox which is the total effect of his work is not to be 
understood in solely personal terms, but in terms of the pressures of 
a whole situation. I would certainly insist that his conclusions have 
no general validity, but the fact is, in contemporary society, that 
good men are driven again and again into his kind of paradox. 
(p. 284) 
In 1971, Williams wrote his study Orwell , in which he develops his 
arguments in Culture and Society. Again, it is Orwell's contradictions that he 
foregrounds: 
Indeed the contradictions, the paradox of Orwell, must be seen as 
paramount . Instead of flattening out the contradictions by choosing 
this or that tendency as the 'real' Orwell, or fragmenting them by 
separating this or that period or this or that genre, we ought to say 
that it is the paradoxes which are finally significant. (p. 87} 
He explains the paradox firstly in terms of Orwell's search for identity: 
'Educated as he was to a particular consciousness, the key to his whole 
development is that he renounced it, or attempted to renounce it, and that he 
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made a whole series of attempts to find a new social identity' {pp. 87-8 ). 
Travelling light and often, Orwell encompassed in his life a range of 
contradictory experiences and occupied a range of contradictory positions. 
Williams concludes warmly: 
with great stubbornness and persistence and courage he went to 
the centres of the history that was determining him, so that it might 
be experienced and differently determined. . . . He was the writer 
who put himself out, who kept going and taking part, and who 
learned to write as a precise function of this very precise 
exploration. {p. 90} 
The second key to explaining the paradox of Orwell lies in his historical 
context: according to Williams, the political contradictions (particularly the 
betrayal of the revolution in Russia} and the isolation and abstraction 
involved in them, combined with Orwell's lack of an independent social 
identity to produce a radical pessimism. Both Orwell's illusion as to the 
imminence of social democracy and his accommodation to Western capitalism 
should be read in the light of these contradictions. 
In this study, Williams's discussion follows broadly the chronology of 
Orwell's career. Firstly, he dissects with admirable clarity the myth of 
England created by Orwell, arguing that the crucial weakness of Orwell's 
analysis 
lies in the original image of a family. Orwell hated what he saw of 
the consequences of capitalism, but he was never able to see it, 
fully, as an economic and political system . His great strength in 
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personalising particular injustices was not supported by any 
adequate understanding of the very general forces involved. (p. 26) 
Secondly, he identifies Orwell's perception of himself as a writer who 'under 
normal circumstances' would have practised a purely aesthetic art, but who 
was forced by the age h~ lived in to produce political pamphlets. Relating 
this perception of himself to the pattern of failure repeated in his novels, 
Williams concludes that Orwell chose 'being a writer· as a means of escaping 
the powerful orthodox world: unlike Dorothy Hare, Gordon Comstock and 
Orwell's other modest protagonists, a writer, in the aesthetic sense of the 
term, would not be defeated and re-absorbed into the 'normal' world. 
However, because he was a 'political' rather than an 'aesthetic' writer, 
Orwell's choice 'led him into every kind of difficulty, every tension that the 
choice had seemed to offer to avoid' (p. 40). Thirdly, Williams questions the 
applicability of the conventional separation of 'documentary· and 'fictional' 
writing as regards Orwell. After analysing the role of privileged observer 
assumed by Orwell, Williams concludes that his work before 1937 should be 
seen 'as sketches towards the creation of his most successful character, 
"Orwell" · (p. 52). Fourthly, Orwell's political trajectory is outlined, with 
Williams emphasizing the significance of Orwell's conversion to revolutionary 
socialism in Spain, and excusing his subsequent reversion to patriotism in 
generous terms: 
He had exposed himself to so much hardship and then fought so 
hard; had got a bullet in the throat in Spain; had been severely ill 
with a tubercular lesion; had given so much of his energy to what 
seemed a desert of political illusions, lies, and bad faith. (p. 65) 
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Fifthly, Williams looks at Orwell's final two novels. In discussing Animal . . 
Farm. he acknowledges the 'practical humanity' and 'comradeship of the 
suffering' generated in the novel, but criticizes the way in which the fable 
profoundly denies both the consciousness of the workers and the possibility 
of authentic revolution (pp. 72-4). His most angry criticisms are directed at 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. Not only is Orwell's political analysis - particularly his 
identification of socialism and a centralised economy - a damaging 
misrepresentation, but more importantly for Williams, he has denied the 
resilience of the human spirit under conditions of cruelty and oppression, 
summarily writing off both the revolutionary potential of the 'proles' and 'the 
ordinary resources of personal life' (p. 81 ). Even in this work though, 
Williams finds 'there are stm many elements of the novel which belong to a 
more liberating consciousness' (p. 74}, both in Orwell's creation Newspeak, 
with its assumptions concerning the relation between linguistic and social 
forms of control, and in his convincing vision of power politics. 
Finally, Williams discusses Orwell's diverse influence in post-War Britain. 
First, drawing especially on Nineteen Eighty-Four , Orwell's name has been 
used by conservatives to popularise the belief that any radical initiative 
inevitably leads to authoritarian structures. Second, Labour Party 
revisionists of the fifties and sixties drew on Orwell's arguments for putting 
'the right members of the family in control' in the The Lion and the Unicorn 
to defend their own moderate programmes of modernisation and piecemeal 
reform. Most significantly from the point of view of this study, however, is 
the enormous shadow Orwell cast over the New Left. Since Williams was part 
of this grouping, his response is important: 
This New Left respected Orwell directly, especially in its early years. 
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The invasion of Suez was an open exercise of the British Imperialism 
he had so consistently attacked. The Hungarian revolution, a popular 
and socialist rising against a bureaucratic and authoritarian. 
communism, was at once a confirmation of what he had said about 
Stalinism and a demonstration of the authentic movement to which 
he had paid homage in Catalonia. The danger of the Bomb - 'either 
we renounce it or it destroys us' - was as he had seen it : not only 
the weapon which could destroy civilisation, but the shadow under 
which a new authoritarian war economy would grow and extend. 
And then, closely involved with these political positions, there was 
the Orwell who had written about work, about poverty, about 
popular culture, the Orwell who had tried to live and feel where the 
majority of English people were living and feeling: reporting, 
understanding, respecting, beyond the range of an Establishment 
culture. (p. 85) 
In Orwell therefore, Williams commends Orwell on several points: for his 
persistent and courageous efforts to be at 'the centres of the history that was 
determining him'; for the 'practical humanity' he expresses in Animal Farm: 
and for his anti-imperialism, his anti-Stalinism, and his attempts to challenge 
the 'Establi~hment culture' . Insofar as these indications of approval go, they 
suggest that Williams and Orwell indeed have some.common values and 
beliefs. 
In Williams's next piece on Orwell". Chapter V. 2 of Politics and Letters -
there is no evidence of Williams liking anything about Orwell. He describes 
Orwell's influence in the post-War decades as a serious obstacle to socialist 
enquiry rather than as a source of inspiration : 
13 
In the Britain of the fifties, along every road that you moved, the 
figure of Orwell seemed to be waiting. If you tried to develop a new 
kind of popular cultural analysis, there was Orwell; if you wanted to 
report on work or ordinary life, there was Orwell; if you engaged in 
any kind of socialist argument, there was an enormously inflated 
statue of Orwell warning you to go back. (p. 384) 
Responding to the interviewers· unfriendly attitude to Orwell, Williams 
concedes that in trying to understand Orwell sympathetically, he might have 
let him off rather lightly (p. 386 ). If this is so, he compensates for his 
leniency here. His concluding assessment of Orwell is extremely negative: 
I must say that I cannot bear much of [Orwell's work] now. If I 
had to say which writings have done the most damage, it would be 
what you call the social patriotism - the dreadful stuff from the 
beginning of the war about England as a family with the wrong 
members in charge .... Many of the political arguments of the kind 
of labourism that is usually associated with the tradition of Durbin or 
Gaitskell can be traced to these essays, which are much more serious 
facts than Animal Farm. For all its weakness, that still makes a point 
about how power can be lost and how people can be misled. . . . As 
for Nineteen Eighty-Four its projections of ugliness and hatred, often 
quite arbitrarily and inconsequentially, onto the difficulties of 
revolution or political change, seem to introduce a period of really 
decadent bourgeois writing in which the whole status of human 
beings is reduced. (pp. 391-2) 
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If Orwell contains the most substantial evidence of the similarities between 
Orwell and Williams, the chapter in Politics and Letters points most clearly to 
their differences. 
Williams returns to Nineteen Eighty-Four in 1984, writing an afterword on 
the novel in a second edition of Orwell.2 Perhaps surprisingly after Politics 
and Letters, his tone in this essay is again more sympathetic. He focuses 
firstly on the complexities ot its form - the interweaving of fantasy, 
naturalism and political analysis - and then traces the background to the 
three themes that for Williams dominate the novel: the division of the world 
into three superstates, the brutal processes of control within each state, and 
the use of means of communication to enforce totalitarian rule. Williams then 
scrupulously examines whether these themes anticipated with any accuracy 
contemporary political reality. Of the first two themes, Williams concludes 
that although they might contain elements of truth, it is their limitations that 
are more apparent: the three zones of influence theory is undermined by 
inter alia the growth of multi-nationals and, more importantly for Williams, 
by the record of successful political resistance in the Third World. The 
internal organisation of these states has not followed the pattern of 
oligarchical collectivism: in countries of 'already existing socialism'; the Party 
has proved to be less than monolithic, and in the West, the incredible 
resurgence of capitalism has made Oceania-style repression unnecessary. Of 
the third theme, however, Williams concludes that 'what has really survived 
from Nineteen Eighty-Four, is Orwell's understanding of propaganda and 
thought control' (p. 120 ). The final question Williams considers is, why do 
people seek power? The answer in Nineteen Eighty-Four that people want it 
'for its own sake' is one that Williams rejects firmly, since he argues: 
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There are reasons, as outside the fiction Orwell well knew, why 
there are systems and phases of systems in which, as throughout 
recorded history, opponents and even inconvenients are imprisoned, 
tortured and killed. (p. 125) 
To surrender methods of discriminating historical analysis and replace them 
with theories of irrational power worship - as Orwell does in Nineteen . 
Eighty-Four -
is to show little respect to those many men and women, including 
from the whole record Orwell himself, who have fought and are 
fighting the destructive and ignorant trends that are still so 
powerful (p. 126) 
In this final statement, Williams again pays oblique tribute to Orwell's 
personal courage. 
Reviewing the sum of Williams's writings on Orwell, an ambigious 
impression emerges: on the one hand, there is evidence of Williams endorsing 
certain of Orwell's values and achievements, particularly in sections of 
Orwell; on the other hand, there is far more evidence - as in Politics and 
Letters - of Williams rejecting Orwell in the strongest terms. Although 
Williams's resistance to Orwell does not preclude_the possibility of there 
being significant points of similarity between the two of them, it should alert 
us to the limits of such a comparison. 
The second objection to comparing Orwell and Williams that needs to be 
negotiated and explained is their very different reputations in the post-War 
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British Left. Whereas Williams's stature as a spokesm~n for the Left is hardly 
questioned, the same cannot be said of Orwell. In his review of The Long 
Revolution published in 1961, E. P. Thompson writes of Williams: 
I have no need to insist upon the importance of Raymond Williams' 
achievement. ... His work, over the past ten years, carries an 
authority which commands the respect of his opponents; and the 
positions which he has occupied must be negotiated by critics and by 
historians, by educational theorists, by sociologists and political 
theorists. This is to say that his work is very important indeed, and 
that - so far as we can speak of a New Left - he is our best man.3 
{p. 24) 
Eighteen years later, in the Foreword to Politics and Letters, he is referred to 
by the editorial board of the New Left Review as 'the pre-eminent 
intellectual representative of socialism in contemporary Britain' {p. 9). 
Orwell, on the other hand, has a far more ambiguous reputation. I have 
already discussed the New Left Review interviewers' hostility to Orwell; it is 
worth quoting a short passage to reinforce the dramatic contrast to their 
assessment of Williams: 
Orwell had few or no original ideas, a limited creative imagination, 
and an unreliable capacity to recount information .... In the short 
run, the main charges against Orwell are political - the decline into 
his own versions of social chauvinism and anti-communism. But in 
the long run, the cultural damage done by his lack of literary scruple 
has probably been more lasting. (p. 387) 
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This is an extreme and not entirely representative judgement, but it too 
serves as ample warning against any attempts to identify Williams too closely 
with Orwen.4 
In order to define the points of overlap between Orwell and Williams 
without diminishing their real differences, I have firstly grouped the 
possible bases for comparing them under three broad heads. In Chapter One, 
I explore the suggestions of Thomas, Inglis and Barnett that the similarities 
between Orwell and Williams are essentially of a political nature; in Chapter 
Two I develop the arguments of Said and Johnson that draw attention to their 
common interest in literature and culture; and in Chapter Three, I follow 
through the arguments of Norris and Thomas that stress the significance of 
their shared assumptions about language. 
Secondly, in each chapter I have selected texts from Orwell and Williams 
that I take to be representative of their work in each of the three broad 
areas defined. In selecting the texts I have been influenced by a number of 
factors: the length of the text (texts not conveying sufficient detail have 
generally been rejected); their critical reception (texts that have elicited wide 
critical interest have been favoured); their reciprocal relevance (texts in 
which Orwell and Williams focus most closely on the same issues have been 
preferred - for example, in the second chapter, out of all their work on 
culture and literature I have selected their essays on Charles Dickens). 
Having identified areas of common interest, and selected within these 
areas exemplary texts, I undertake a close historical reading of the texts 
selected. This involves the following. Firstly, I describe the historical context 
in which the texts were produced, drawing on the major histories and 
political analyses of Britain in order to reconstruct the economic, political and 
ideological setting at the times when Orwell and Williams were writing. 
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Secondly, I perform a close reading of the te1ts selected; by focusing carefully 
on specific 'exemplary texts', the danger of lifting arguments and images 
from their discursive context is reduced, and the grounds of the comparison 
can be more precisely located. Thirdly, I summarise their other related texts 
in each of the three main areas in order to place the 'e1emplary texts' in 
context of their work as a whole. The four th and final dimension of this 
study is of course the drawing together of the similarities between Orwell and 
Williams. By this combination of close reading, and social and personal . 
contextualisation, I hope that an accurate articulation of the relationship 
between them might be achieved. 
Finally, this study is pursued in the spirit of Williams's 'cultural 
materialism'. Jonathan Dolli more in Political Shakespeare defines cultural 
materialism as ·a combination of historical context, theoretical method, 
political commitment and textual analysis' (p. vii), and argues that it offers 
the strongest challenge to traditional critical practice. I hope that in choosing 
this topic and exploring it in this manner, I might make some contribution -
however modest - to the expanding body of oppositional literary criticism. 
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Chapter One: Politics 
The te1ts to be analysed in this chapter are: The Lion and the Unicorn by 
Orwell (in Sonia Orwell and Angus, I I, pp. 74-134)1, the final section of The 
Long Revolution and Towards 2000 by Williams. These choices need to be 
e1plained briefly. 
The Lion and the Unicorn conforms to the selection criteria specified in 
the Introduction. It is Orwell's most detailed summary of how he 
conceptualises the transition to socialism in Britain. It has also been 
extremely influential in post-War Britain. Williams, as we have seen, argues 
in Politics and Letters that 'the political arguments of the kind of labourism 
that is usually associated with the tradition of Durbin or Gaitskell' can be 
traced to Orwell's' dreadful stuff from the beginning of the war' (p. 391 ). 
Tom Nairn in The Left Against Europe makes a similar point, describing The 
Lion and the Unicorn as 
the true locus classicus of modern British left-wing 
nationalism in this sense, recording as it does the 'return' of a 
left-wing intellectual to healthy patriotism and his demand for a 
socialism based on it. (p. 69) 
The concluding chapter of The Long Revolution. entitled 'Britain in the 
1960 s, also conforms to the selection criteria. Written at the end of the 
1950 s, it represents a detailed synthesis of WiHiams's political thought at 
this stage, combining an analysis of British society with suggestions as to how 
'the long revolution' - the achievement of a socialist democracy - might be 
accelerated. It has also been influential, particularly in the emergence of the 
New Left. Stuart Hall, for example, in Culture. Media. Language, looks back on 
it as ·a seminal event in English post-War intellectual life' (p. 19). 
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In Towards 2000-, Williams reviews ~nd extends The Long Revolution 
.. ,, 'l 
analysis in ·substantial detail: h~ repeats 'Britain in the 1.~6Q ,sin Part II of 
' • ·, " 4 I [ I .I '• •. ' . • \ ' ' ._: ~ 
the book; in Part III, he devotes.a.chapter to each of- the main themes in the 
,. • c • 
/ 
, ~ 1 _r r ! • .. ·, .,_ • ·.,.- · • • · • • :. · •• - t . i 
earlier essay; he provides an internaiional,P~r~pective in P_a~t IV; anddraws 
' "' • I ' ' • ~ 
together his hopes and fears for a socialist.Britain in the final part. It is too 
'· ~ :~1-~ ,1·~ -·~· . ': t ~ 
early to judge whether Towards _2000 will have an impact of the same order 
as The Lion and the Unicorn and.The Long Revolution.but William~·s 
- - ' - -1. i . ..- - . . • 
enormous stature on the Left will ensure that it will at least be taken 
. • .. ' ;. \ , . . .. • ! I »I 
seriously in discussion of socialist alternativ_es in Britain. Further reasons for 
- • t ,,_1 ... ·.._,_~~.;~ .... '~ ~" .. •\ ..... ·_ 
analysing Towards 2000 are tha!.~t proyid~s _a_~ean~ of explori,ng how 1 
' ' " • '\ • • • • • • ~ •• •• ·~ ~ p 
Williams has responded to changed historical .coilditons, how these changed 
, ....... 1' " ' . ' ,, ~ .: • ' _.. • ) - - • ' j • ' ' 
conditions have informed his work; and how his relation to Orwell might 
• '"' ' . ~ i ' t . .. • • • \ ' t ' f ' r 
have changed in the. t'o/enty years since The Long Revolution. 
- . I , ' - ' - - '.;) \ . • - -, -
Finally, the third criterion for selec!it)g texts is that th~y should be 
. . .. . .. - , ~ ~ ;' -. 
'reciprocally relevant'. In this first chapter, the texts I have chosen conform 
to this criterion in a_very broad sense, in that they are all concerned with 
' , ~ t . ~ ( ' ' ; • • ~I ,, ·• , ' 
understanding Bri~ish society and with fin~ing_way~ in w_hic_h the journey to 
' I ' > ' , I ·.·, 
socialism in Britain might be hastened. 
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1.1 The Lion and the Unicom 
The Lion and the Unicorn was first published in February 1941, at a moment 
during the Second World War when Britain had yet to secure a single 
offensive victory, and had already suffered heavy def eats in North Africa, 
Singapore and Crete. In this 'finest hour', the British state and social polity 
assumed a quite distinct character. 
In the first place, the War Cabinet took on wide powers to regulate the 
economy. Whereas previously the e1change of goods and labour had been 
subject to market forces, during the War the state intervened in the economy 
in a number of ways: it set the prices of certain goods; it controlled the 
amounts bought by rationing; it determined the wages for key industries; and 
it allocated employees to different sectors of industry by means of the 
manpower budget. Laurence Harris in his article 'State and Economy in the 
Second World War', emphasizes the ad hoc nature of these measures: 
These moves in the direction of centralized planning were not 
adopted as a result of administrators and politicians making an 
abstract choice for socialism, deciding in principle that planning was 
superior to the market system for a wartime economy. It was 
brought in, bit by bit, in response to the force of events and 
socialism was not the result. (p. 72) 
Harris explains further why the cumulative effect of these economic 
dispensations still fell short of socialism as he understands it: 
The basic features of a capitalist economy remained intact. The 
wartime economy was one where most factories and commercial 
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enterprises were owned by private capital, where profit was their 
yardstick, and where wages played a central role in the labour 
market .... The normal relationship between the state and civil 
society, in which the state maintains the conditions under which 
capital can generate and accumulate profits, remained. (p. 54) 
The successes of the wartime innovations - full employment, increased 
military production, satisfaction of domestic needs - have been much 
emphasized by British historians. Andrew Marwick in Britain in the Century 
of Total War , for example, writes that 
though [these successes] were the product of a managed 
economy, that economy owed almost as much to the willing 
co-operation of a community faced with a struggle for survival as to 
the elaboration of any fully effective permanent system of national 
planning. (p. 277) 
However, it is clear now that this indulgent image of brilliant organisation 
and British 'character' rests on two major fallacies. Correlli Barnett in The 
Audit of War draws attention to the fact that 
the impressive total figures of war production had only been 
possible because Lend-Lease and Sterling Area credit had relieved 
Britain of the need to earn her own way through exports. (p. 51) 
And secondly, Britain's industrial performance was in fact less impressive 
than had been claimed. Barnett elaborates: 
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The bald fact of Germany's def~at and Britain's victory has served to 
obscure from British minds the truth that German industry 
performed better overall during the War than British industry. 
(p. 60) 
If the economy ultimately did not constitute socialism, the political 
organisation of wartime Britain did not resemble a democracy. Marwick 
emphasizes that the extraordinary powers enjoyed by Churchill's Cabinet 
ensured that the House of Commons was' relegated to a deeper impotence 
than ever' (p. 277). Besides the economic controls, the central government 
imposed substantial limits on freedom of speech and associaiton. In War and 
Social Change in the Twentieth Century, Marwick concludes that 'direction 
and control of life and labour were probably more total (and more efficient) 
than in any other country, save for Russia' (p. 151 ). Harris quotes a 
Guardian reader who remembers the bureaucratic rule of the war years as 
bearing 'a strong resemblance to George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty Four'! 
(p. 51). 
Finally, in describing the historical context of The Lion and the Unicorn , 
an attempt must be made to convey a sense of the cultural and ideological 
atmosphere of the period. I Of particular relevance for this study was the 
emergence during the early part of War of a strong interest in how Britain 
should be restructured after the War. Barnett quotes Sir William Beveridge's 
explanation of this interest: 
Today there is no such prospect of contentment in going back, 
because the times before the Second World War were not good. The 
British people have learned by experience that after this war they 
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must go forward to something new, not back to tne old. (p. 33) 
Beveridge's own Report was the most famous of these investigations. It came 
out in 1942 and was to form the foundation of the welfare state. Other 
similar enquiries included Harold Laski's Where Do We Go From Here? 
( 1940 ), which sold over 80000 copies, and John Strachey's tract A Faith to 
Fight For. which tries to find a socialist .path forward. after the shock of the 
Hitler-Stalin pact. These works share not only the same historical moment as 
The Lion and the Unicorn: they also share a desire to see Nazism vanquished, 
a rekindled patriotism, and an urgent concern to see a non-Stalinist version of 
socialism established in Britain. 
That The Lion and the Unicorn is a product of its own exceptional 
historical moment is further demonstrated in reviewing (and comparing) 
Orwell's earlier, and also his subsequent thoughts on Britain· and socialist 
politics. 
Orwell's first extended consideration of British politics is The Road to 
Wigan Pier. Commissioned by Victor Gollancz in January 1936 to write about 
the condition of the unemployed in the industrial north of England,2 Orwell 
produced a work containing in Part I a record of his impressions of 
working-class life, and in Part II a rambling polemic on the nature of 
socialism and socialists. Part I I also represents a synthesis of Orwell's early 
life-experiences: his schooling at Eton; his imperial service in Burma; his 
'slumming it' in Paris and London; and, of course, this journey to Wigan. 
The image of Britain he presents is of a country divided by massive 
economic inequalities; he lays great stress on the deep roots of the conflict 
between rich and poor, arguing that 
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the meeting of proletarian and bourgeois, when they do succeed 
in meeting, is not always the embrace of long-lost brothers; too often 
it is the clash of alien cultures which can only meet in war. (p. 258) 
His understanding of socialism is expressed in terms of certain emotional 
allegiances rather than as a political programme: 'We have got to fight for 
justice and liberty, and Socialism does mean justice and liberty when the 
nonsense is stripped off it' (p. 292). And: 'What is the mark of a real 
Socialist? I suggest that the real Socialist is one who wishes ... to see tyranny 
overthrown· (p. 292-3). However, perhaps the most famous part of Wigan 
Pier is Orwell's 'analysis' of socialists. He distinguishes between, firstly, the 
working-class socialist, who' is weak on doctrine and can hardly open his 
mouth without uttering a heresy, but he has the heart of the matter in him' 
(p. 293), and secondly, the middle-class socialist, whose insincerity and 
crankishness make him or her a great burden to the cause of socialism. 
Orwell's abuse of the latter category is extreme: 'If only the sandals and the 
pistachio-coloured shirts could be put in a pile and burnt, and every 
vegetarian, teetotaller, and creeping Jesus sent home to Welwyn Garden City 
to do his yoga exercises quietly!' (p. 293).3 And yet he still ultimately 
argues that' it is desperately necessary for left-wingers of all complexions to 
drop their differences and hang together' (p. 292). 
In Orwell's next piece on 'politics', Homage to Catalonia , he describes his 
experiences during the Spanish Civil War. Although of only indirect 
relevance to his understanding of Britain, Homage to Catalonia reflects a 
substantial development in his commitment to Socialism. In the first place, 
·.:::. ... }'~· 
his socialism, which in Wigan Pier had been defined negatively ~, 
(anti-oppression and only therefore socialist), became a positive ideal. He 
records: 
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For the Spanish militias, while they lasted, were a sort of microcosm 
of a classless society .... And, after all, instead of disillusioning me 
it deeply attracted me. The effect was to make my desire to see 
Socialism established much more actual than it had been before. 
(p. 376) 
Secondly, his opposition to Communism, which had before been based on 
his emotional distance from fellow middle-class socialists, hardened into a 
political position. Fighting with Trotskyist/ Anarchist and P.O.U.M. militias, 
Orwell became exposed to the ruthless repression and concerted propaganda 
directed against rival left-wing groups by the Stalinist-backed P.S.U.C and its 
British Communist Party supporters. In a favourable review of Franz 
Borkenau's The Spanish Cockpit (I, pp. 309-11 ), he concludes: 
The most important fact that has emerged from the whole business 
is that the Communist Party is now (presumably for the sake of 
Russian foreign policy) an anti-revolutionary force. So far from 
pushing the Spanish Government further towards the Left, the 
Communist influence has pulled it violently towards the Right. 
(p. 310) 
Thirdly, the Spanish War reinforced Orwell's internationalist perspective 
on the struggle for socialism. In 'Looking Back on the Spanish War.' (II, 
pp. 286-311), he argues: 
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The hatred which the Spanish Republic excited in millionaires, 
dukes, cardinals, play-boys, Blimps and what-not would in itself be 
enough to show one how the land lay. In essence it was a class war. 
If it had been won, the cause of the common people everywhere 
would have been strengthened. It was lost, and the dividend 
drawers all over the world rubbed their hands. That was the real 
issue; all else was froth on its surface. (p. 300) 
Despite the betrayals and suffering he witnessed during the Civil War, 
Orwell returned from Spain a revolutionary socialist. In a kind of manifesto, 
'Why I joined the Independent Labour Party' (I, pp. 373-S), he declared: 
It is not possible for any thinking person to live in such a society as 
our own without wanting to change it .... At a moment like the 
present writing books is not enough . . . . One has got to be actively a 
Socialist, not merely sympathetic to Socialism. (p. 374) 
This conviction was to fade soon afterwards. The war with Germany 
confronted him with a choice between pacificism (on the gounds that this was 
to be yet another imperialist war in which the workers of all countries would 
ultimately Jose), and joining the patriotic clamour 'to wipe the curse of Hitler 
from the brow of mankind'. Although he acknowledged the cogency of 
internationalist arguments, Orwell was obliged to concede the residual force 
of his own thorough schooling in the myths of ruling class culture. In 'My 
Country Left or Right'(I, pp. 587-92), he writes: 
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a time comes when the sand is sodden red and what have I done 
for thee, England, my Sngland. I was brought up in this tradition . 
myself ... and also sympathise with it, for even at its stupidest and 
most sentimental it is a comelier th.ing than the s~allow 
self-righteousness of the left-wing intelligentsia. {p. 587) 
The Lion and the Unicorn and 'The English People' (III, pp. 15-56) are 
products of this phase, as is his essay in Victor GoUancz's Betrayal of the 
Left.4 
In the final years of his life, although Orwell wrote several essays dealing 
with socialism in Britain, his political ideas at this stage were expressed most 
powerfully in his novels. In Animal Farm, his opposition to Stalinism is 
realised in the fable depicting the revolution of the farm animals against the 
rule of Jones. He explains his intention in the Pref ace to the Ukrainian Edition 
of Animal Farm OH, pp. 455-9): 
for the .past ten years I have been convinced that the destruction 
of the Soviet myth was essential if we wanted a revival of the 
Socialist movement. On my return from Spain, I thought of exposing 
the Soviet myth in a story that could be easily understood by almost 
anyone and could be easily translated into other languages. (p. 458) 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four. Orwell's misgivings about the Soviet state are 
reinforced by his perception that totalitarian tendencies were on the increase 
in fill modern societies. Influenced by a group of writers he refers to as The 
Pessimists·S. he blends in Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopian fantasy, 
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naturalism and political history (Goldstein's testimony) in order to serve a 
grim warning as to the dangers of totalitarianism. In a letter to Francis A. 
Henson of the United Automibile Workers (IV, p. 564), he clarifies his aims 
in Nineteen Eighty-Four: 
My recent novel is NOT intended as an attack on Socialism or on the 
British Labour Party (of which I am a supporter} but as a show-up of 
the perversions to which a centralized economy is liable and which 
have already been partly realized in Communism and Fascism .... 
The scene of the book is laid in Britain in order to emphasize that the 
English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone else and 
that totalitarianism, if not fought against , could triumph 
anywhere. (p. 564} 
The main elements in Orwell's final conception of socialist politics in 
Britain can be drawn out of these two novels. They include: first, his 
continuing commitment to the ideals of democratic socialism (as he 
understood it); second, his loss of faith in the capacity of 'ordinary people' to 
act as the agents of socialism: the proles in Nineteen Eighty-Four and the 
animals in Animal Farm are virtuous, but lack the political intelligence to 
seize power; third, his perception of nationalism as an emotion generated 
quite cynically by ruling elites: Winston Smith and the writer of The Lion and 
the Unicorn would differ profoundly as to the 'comely' aspect of patriotism; 
fourth, his view of the state as a powerful instrument of ruling-class 
domination, rather than as an institution reflecting the will of the majority: in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. 'public opinion' is simply a creation of the Ministry of 
30 
Truth.6 
Having described the context in which The Lion and the Unicorn was 
written, and summarised Orwell's other main 'political' writings, we are now 
able to turn to the arguments in The Lion and the Unicorn in more detail. 
The first point of interest is the position-as-observer that OrweH assumes 
in the text. In the opening two paragraphs, OrweH describes his experience of 
the War in persona! terms: 
As I write, highly civilized human beings are flying overhead, trying 
to kiH me. They do not feel any enmity against me as an individual, 
nor I against them. They are 'only doing their duty' as the saying 
goes. (p. 74) 
On the basis of this experience, he moves to the general conclusion that 
patriotism is a for mid able force, that 'Christianity and i~ternational Socialism 
are as weak as straw in comparison with it' (p. 75). From this, it is a short 
step for OrweH to argue the analytical value of establishing national or racial 
stereotypes: 
rm recently it was thought proper to pretend that au human beings 
are very much alike, but in fact anyone able to use his eyes knows 
that the average of human behaviour differs enormously from 
country to country. (p. 75) 




The identity of the narrator is substantially established in this first page : 
T connotes a stout-hearted Englishman speaking out on behalf of his 
fellow-countrymen. Confident as to the authenticity of his own experience, 
the narrator feels quite comfortable leaping rapidly from the specific (his 
personal experience of the bombing) to the general (his theories about the 
overriding force of patriotism). Further, 'anyone [else] able to use his eyes' 
must inevitably agree with his perceptions and generalisations about national 
identity, since they are derived from the (privileged) experience of the 
narrator himself. In Politics and Letters, Raymond Williams describes this 
narrative persona employed by Orwell in his essays as' the successful 
impersonation of the plain man who bumps into experience in an unmediated 
way and is simply telling the truth about it' (p. 385). In The Lion and the 
Unicorn, the plain man bumps into the experience of war, and he 'uses his 
eyes' in order to tell the truth about Britain's present plight and future 
prospects. 
Although Williams is correct to stress Orwell's lack of self-consciousness 
vis-a-vis his position as observer, it should be added that Orwell is not 
unique in this respect. The failure on the part of British (and metropolitan 
writers generally) to foreground their own formation as members of a ruling 
class is deeply embedded. The economic and political hegemony enjoyed by 
Britain during the eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries was accompanied by 
the philosophies of liberal humanism and common sense empiricism, which 
took for granted the privileged point-of-view of the British observer I 
narrator. E. H. Carr's discussion of British empiricism in What is History 77 
brings this point into focus : 
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The empirical theory of knowledge presupposes a complete 
separation between subject and object. Facts, like 
sense-impressions, impinge on the observer from outside and are 
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independent of his consciousness. The process of reception is 
passive. (p. 9) 
There is no doubt in the mind of the subject (in this case, the English historian 
of the nineteenth century) that the object ('the real world out there') might 
determine or in any way influence his perceptions; there is no possibility 
entertained that his way of seeing might be limited, the product of a 
particular and partial world view. In similar fashion, Orwell (the plain man) is 
a privileged subject, who also suppresses his own history as he 'uses his eyes· 
to observe the 'objective reality' (Britain in World War 11). 
In The Lion and the Unicorn. the confidence of the plain man in setting out 
to describe 'the real England' is reinforced by the unusually warm 
relationship he is able to conceive with his audience as a result of the war. In 
the opening passages, Orwell constitutes as the reader a decent sensible 
Briton able to see the common sense of his arguments. He uses the 'I-you· 
forms of personal dialogue to 'create' this figure: ·w~en you come back to 
England from any foreign country, you have immediately the sensation of 
breathing a different air' (emphasis added) (p. 75). Not surprisingly, the 
Germans - although '[m}ost of them. I have no doubt, are kind-hearted 
law-abiding men' (emphasis added) (p. 74) - are excluded from this dialogue. 
Writing for this sympathetic and homogeneous English audience, Orwell 
expects they wi11 share his way of seeing. However, this relation with the 
undifferentiated decent English soul breaks down in the course of the essay. 
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Later, the ruling-class are excluded from the dialogue Orwell conducts -
'There they [the ruling class] sat, at the centre of a vast empire and a 
world-wide financial network' (emphasis added) (p. 89). The working-class 
too are excluded: 
At some point or another you have got to deal with the [working-
class) man who says 'I should be no worse off under Hitler·. But 
what answer can you give him - that is, what answer can you · 
expect him to listen to - while common soldiers risk their lives for 
two and sixpence a day, and fat women ride about in Rolls Royce 
cars, nursing pekineses? (emphasis added) (p. 109) 
And: 'They can stand all that the Spanish workers stood, and more. But they 
will want some kind of proof that a better life is ahead for themselves and 
their children· (emphasis added) (p. 109). The plain man therefore sets out 
to establish a common bond with all his feUow Britons, but in the course of 
the essay his position as middle-class observer is revealed by these 
(unconscious) exclusions. The audience he ultimately addresses is one of the 
same class background and formation as himself - the 'educated' middle class .. 
Orwell's main project in the first and longest section of The Lion and the 
Unicorn. entitled 'England Your England', is' to try and determine what 
England is , before guessing what part England can play in the huge events 
that are happening' (p. 76) .. His search for 'what England is' starts with a list 
of provocative but quite unrelated generalisations, which include: the English 
are not musical; they are not intellectual in the sense that they have a horror 
of abstract thought; they love flowers; they cherish their privacy; they 
34 
believe in the liberty of the individual; the 'common people' of England live 
against the dominant order, participating in a popular culture that goes on 
beneath the surface; the most marked characteristic of the English, however, 
he concludes, is their gentleness. 
After this dubious list of national traits, Orwell questions the value of 
generalising in this fashion about a nation of forty-five million individuals. 
He asks,· is not England notoriously two nations, the rich and the poor?' 
(p. 83). The answer he had given in Wigan Pier was firmly in the 
affirmative: the world of the coal-miners is entirely distinct from the 
comfortable world of Southern England. In The Lion and the Unicorn. 
however, he argues that there is a stronger force transcending class 
differences, namely patriotism: 'the vast majority of the people feel 
themselves to be a single nation and are conscious of resembling one another 
more than they resemble foreigners' (p. 84). He describes this patriotism as 
an 'invisible chain' binding the nation together. At moments of crisis, the 
people of England act as one; sometimes their herd instinct might be sound -
as was the case in Dunkirk, but sometimes it might be awry - 'in the 1931 
General Election, for instance, we all did the wrong thing in perfect unison· 
(emphasis added) (p. 86). From this, Orwell concludes that there is indeed a 
degree of democracy in Britain. He e1plains: 
between 1931 and 1940 the National Government represented the 
will of the mass of the people. It tolerated slums, unemployment 
and a cowardly foreign policy. Yes, but so did public opinion. 
(p. 86) 
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Orwell's concluding image of England combines these qualities of latent 
unity, incomplete democracy and apathetic consensus: 
England is not the jewelled isle of Shakespeare's much-quoted 
message, nor is it the inferno depicted by Goebbels. More than 
either it resembles a family, a rather stuffy Victorian f amity, with 
not many black sheep in it but with all its cupboards bursting with 
skeletons. It has rich relations who have to be kow-towed to and 
poor relations who are horribly sat upon, and there is a deep 
conspiracy of silence about the source of the f amity income. It is a 
f amity in which the young are generally thwarted and most of the 
power is in the hands of irresponsible uncles and bedridden aunts. 
(p. 88) 
The England Orwell presents here is the natural correlative of the unified 
audience he constitutes in the opening pages: the identity of the 'you· he 
addresses is established as referring to his 'family' , bedridden aunts and 
impoverished cousins alike. This identification of nation and family reflects a 
fundamental shift away from his conception of Britain in Wigan Pier. where 
Orwell presents - with minor qualifications - a conflict model of society. In 
the Lion and the Unicorn. Orwell re-discovers 'the invisible chain' of 
patriotism, whiCh causes him to relinquish the conflict model, and turn to a 
liberal-pluralist or consensual model of society in which the different classes 
ultimately agree on how affairs of state should be conducted. The 
government genuinely represents 'the will of the mass of the people', and 
there is 'real consensus· as to the form and structure of society. 
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Williams has argued that Orwell's principle failing was his in~bility to see 
British society as an economic and political system; that Orwell was able to go 
no further than personalising particular injustices.8 The family analogy bears 
this out, but the criticism needs to be taken further: Orwell failed to see the 
society characterised by irreconcilable class conflict. A theoretical or 
systematic elaboration of the analysis in 'England Your England' would not 
'correct' Orwell's shortcomings as long as it continued to build upon his 
assumptions of consensus; such analysis would still be paralysed by the 
absence of any sense of endemic conflict and struggle. 
The next step Orwell takes in .trying to determine what England is, is to 
examine the history of its ruling class: 
After 1832 the old land-owning aristocracy steadily lost power, but 
instead of disappearing or becoming a fossil they simply 
intermarried with the merchants, manufacturers and financiers who 
had replaced them, and soon turned them into accurate copies of 
themselves .... England was ruled by an aristocracy constantly 
recruited from parvenus. And considering what energy the 
self-made men possessed, and considering that they were buying 
their way into a class which at any rate had a tradition of public 
service, one might have eipected that able rulers could be produced 
in some such way. (p. 89 )9 
Despite these historical advantages, the ruling class 'somehow' decayed, and 
by 1930 their usefulness was at an end. They grasped what was 'clearly the 
only escape' for them - they retreated into stupidity. After citing several 
examples of ruling class stupidity, Orwell moderates his attack by conceding 
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that they are at least 'morally fairly sound' - the deaths of dukes in Flanders 
' 
proved that 'these people were [not] the cynical scoundrels that they are 
sometimes declared to be' (p. 93). He concludes: 'They are not wicked, or 
not altogether wicked; they are merely unteachable' {p. 93). 
Orwell's indulgent caricature of the British ruling classes is a product of his 
own formation within the Eton network. His description is also consistent 
with his consensual conception of society; it is an elaboration of the 
bed-ridden aunts image, although there are further aspects that reveal his 
conservative strain more clearly. First, there is the remarkable suggestion 
that 'able rulers' should have been produced by the fusing of a 'caring 
aristocracy' and 'dynamic entrepreneurs' ; the issue of political leadership is 
thus presented as one of genetic rather than socio-political concern: how do 
we breed good leaders? With the Nazis literally engaged in such enquiries at 
the time, Orwell's flippant observation jars somewhat. Second, there is the 
clear assumption that the ruling-class in fact had a useful function at some 
stage in the past; that only by 1930 did they become parasites. On a slightly 
different tack, his perception of them as stupid and 'unteachable' is 
demonstrably false: although there are moments in British history - like 
during the First World War - when members of the ruling-class displayed 
extraordinary political and military ineptitude, to dismiss them as a class 
ignores the fact that they have maintained uninterrupted control of the 
means of production. 
After dealing with the ruling class, Orwell continues by looking at the 
other classes in his society. He discusses firstly the imperialist middle-class, 
'the Blimps', whose admirable vitality has been sapped by the 
bureaucratisation of the colonial service: 
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Men like Clive, Nelson, Nicholson, Gordon would find no place for 
themselves in the modern British Empire .... The one-time empire 
builders were reduced to the status of clerks, buried deeper and 
deeper under the mounds of paper and red tape. (pp. 93-4) 
This barely disguised nostalgia for the golden days of Empire throws into 
question Orwell's earlier claims in Wigan Pier that · ·I hated the imperialism I 
was serving with a bitterness which I probably cannot make clear· (p. 244). 
If there is inconsistency in Orwell's perception of the Blimp class, his 
discussion of the left-wing intelligentsia, a related sub-section of the middle 
class (according to Orwell), is a faithful repetition of earlier arguments: 'There 
is little in them except the irresponsible carping of people who have never 
been and never expect to be in a position of power· (p. 95). And further: 
'In left-wing circles it is always felt that there is something slightly 
disgraceful in being an Englishman and that it is a duty to snigger at every 
English institution' (p. 95). Despite the obsolescence of the Blimps and the 
shallowness of the intellectuals, Orwell argues that they should bury their 
differences and draw together. The contradictions and compromises involved 
in this rapprochement are occluded by the bluff common sense of the plain 
man, who relies again on the external threat of the war as his main argument: 
The Bloomsbury highbrow, with his mechanical snigger, is as 
out-of -date as the cavalry colonel. A modern nation cannot afford 
either of them. Patriotism and intelligence will have to come 
together again. It is the fact that we are fighting a war and a very 
peculiar kind of war, that may make this possible. ( p. 96) 
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Orwell was at different periods closely identified with these antagonistic 
fractions of the middle-class, and his own identity as a patriotic socialist was 
forged by 'reconciling' the values of both fractions. What he proposes here as 
a viable political alliance is therefore an e:rtension of his own (partially 
resolved) identity crisis. 
Orwell concludes his search to find 'what England is' by describing the 
dissolution of the class system. He argues that: 
the upward and downward extension of the middle class ... has 
happened on such a scale as to make the old classification of soci~ty 
into capitalists, proletarians and petit bourgeois (small property 
owners) almost obsolete. (p. 96) 
He substantiates this by outlining the general improvement in living 
standards; the drawing together of the tastes, manners and outlook of the 
working-and middle-class; and the rapid emergence of a new indeterminate 
social class trained to manage the 'modern world'. He concludes that: 'This 
war, unless we are defeated, will wipe out most of the existing class 
privileges. There are every day fewer people who wish them to continue· 
(p. 98-9). 
In trying to explain these optimistic predicitons, it must be acknowledged 
firstly that, although limited in e:rtent, there was indeed a narrowing of the 
differences in wealth and income during this period. This was largely the 
result of the special demands of the war-time economy. IO However, it must 
be noted that after the War, these trends were reversed: inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth, opportunity and income increased after this brief. 
boom. Furthermore, the myth of a classless society propagated here by 
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Orwell was cynically used by the right-wing of the Labour Party in particular 
·to obscure the de facto widening of the gulf between rich and poor. 
The unique historical juncture at which Orwell was writing can, however, 
only partly explain his mistaken conclusions. Orwell's conception of class is 
tied centrally to factors like dress, accent and choice of newspaper, and 
accordingly he sees a change in these differentiated cultural patterns leading 
inevitably to a classless society: people simply need to relinquish their 
outdated class identities in order to dissolve the present system; that navvy 
and stockbroker should learn to accept and respect each others' cultural 
differences is for Orwell more central than that their respective relations to 
the means of production be radically changed. This argument represents 
another manifestation of Orwell's inability to understand British capitalism as 
a system made up of groups with irreconcilable material interests. By 
focusing his analysis on cultural differences, Orwell fails to appreciate the 
structural nature of these inequalities; the very survival of the system 
depends upon the existing differences in wealth etc. being maintained. 
Further, it is naive to imply - as Orwell does - that the dominant class would 
acquiesce in the abolition of class privileges because 'fewer people every day 
wish them to continue.' The struggle and resistance involved in such a 
transformation would clearly be a great deal more complex and painful than 
this polite projection suggests. 
Orwell applies the finishing touches to the England he creates in Part I in 
the concl~ding paragraphs of The Lion and the Unicorn. He conveys a sense 
of the 'real England' as some mythical entity latent within the existing 
reality. He identifies the idea of human equality with the English speaking 
world, arguing that 'from the English-speaking culture, if it does not perish, a 
society of free and equal human beings will ultimately arise' (p. 130). It is 
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this ideal that makes English civilisation - for all its sloth, hypocrisy and 
exploitation - preferable to the totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia. 
It is by building on this tradition of equality and eliminating the injustices 
that the 'real England' might emerge, since England' is not being true to 
herself while the refugees who have sought our shores are penned up in 
concentration camps, and company directors work out subtle schemes to 
dodge their Excess Profits Tax' (p. 133). These hopes are built into Orwell's 
~ understanding of socialism, which he elaborates in the second and third parts 
of The Lion and the Unicorn. 
In Part II, entitled 'Shop.keepers at War', Orwell argues: 
What this war has demonstrated is that private capitalism - that is, 
an economic system in which land, factories, mines and transport are 
owned privately and operated solely for profit - does not work. 
(p. 99) 
What the War has also shown, according to Orwell, is that the competing 
systems of Socialism and Fascism do work, and the key to their superior 
eff eciency is that they are planned economies. He digresses briefly to define 
Fascism and Socialism, insisting in the case of the latter that political 
democracy, approximate equality of income and the abolition of privilege are 
as essential as.the common ownership of the means of production. He then 
concludes by emphasizing the positive effect of the War. 
It was a great step forward. From that time onwards the ghastly job 
of trying to convince artificially stupefied people that a planned 
economy might be better than a free-for-all in which the worst man 
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wins - that job will never be so ghastly again. (p. 105) 
Several features of Orwell's socialism can be derived from this. First, he 
sees socialism as by definition a highly centralised economic system, and, 
basing his views on the successes of the German, Russian and British 
war-time economies, he argues further that superior efficiency is an 
inevitable benefit. The considerable problems with planned economies in 
countries of ·existing socialism· have been extensively described 11 ; in 
particular, the structural constraints imposed by such economies upon 
democratic values and practices have been highlighted. Further, the elements 
of planning in the German and British economies stopped well short of 
adjusting the distribution of wealth; indeed the material power base of the 
ruling class was in no way threatened. Secondly, and in line with his myth of 
'the real England', Orwell emphasized that existing democratic ideals and 
freedoms must be embraced and extended because a socialism relinquishing 
them (as in Soviet Russia) becomes synonymous with fascism. It is this 
libertarian dimension of Orwell's socialism that provides the moral basis of 
his attacks on totalitarianism in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four. 
Thirdly, and extending from his consensual model of Britain, he places 
enormous faith in the power of reason: the plain man will undertake 'the 
ghastly job of convincing artificially stupefied people' that the solution lies 
with socialism. By reasoned argument, capitalism might thus be discredited 
and ultimately destroyed. 
In the third and final part, 'The English Revolution' he sets out a six-point 
programme of socialist reform. The measures he suggests are: nationalisation 
of all major industries; equalisation of incomes; democratisation of the 
education system; granting independence to India; forming a genuinely 
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representative Imperial General Council; and declaring alliances with nations 
subject to Fascist powers. He recognizes there will be bitter political struggle 
I 
over these policies, but he insists that: 
• 
because the English sense of national unity has never 
disintegrated, because patriotism is finally stronger than 
class-hatred, the chances are that the will of the majority will 
prevail. (p. 118) 
This programme of reform takes the existing structure as immutable: the 
state is seen merely as a neutral arena in which opposing interest groups 
work out their differences so that the will of the majority might be imposed. 
Orwell 's understanding here coheres entirely with the dominant myth of 
parliamentary legitimacy. Perry Anderson argues in 'The Antimonies of 
Antonio Gram sci' : l 2 
the general form of the representative State - bourgeois 
democracy - is itself the principal ideological lynchpin of Western 
capitalism, whose very existence deprives the working class of the 
idea of socialism as a different type of State , and the means or 
communication and other mechanisms of cultural control thereafter 
clinch this central ideological ·effect'. (p. 28) 
Orwell's failure to penetrate this myth means he is blinp to the ract that the 
bourgeois state, 'the government' in his terms. represents its population 
abstracted from its distribution into economic classes. The judicial parity 
between exploiter and exploited in the electoral process reassures him in his 
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belief that 'British governments ... represent the will of the people'. By 
arguing for socialist reform without insisting on new democratic structures, 
Orwell fails to appreciate that a new form of state would be integral to the 
struggle for socialism. The policies he suggests would leave the existing state 
intact, and could comfortably be assimilated within a reformist social 
democracy in which control of the means of production remains substantially 
in the hands of the traditional ruling class. 
In 'The English Revolution·, Orwell also sets out who the agents of 
socialism will be. He attributes the failure of socialism in Britain in the 1930 s 
to the fact that' no one genuinely wanted any major change to happen' 
(p. 116). He argues further that the success of his six-point programme 
'depends entirely on ourselves' (p. 124). He elaborates who 'ourselves· are: 
'we·, the potential agents of the English Revolution, are ordinary people who 
do not earn 'more than £2000 a year· (p. 108 )', 'whole classes of necessary 
people· (p. 116 ), who have the skills to ad minister the modern industrial 
state. The capacity to direct the course of history still lies with people, but a 
different class of people: 
The heirs of Nelson and Cromwell are not in the House of Lords. 
They are in the fields and the streets, in the factories and the armed 
forces, in the four-ale bar and the suburban back garden. (p. 133) 
According to Orwell, the existing socialist parties are not equal to the task 
of mobilising this alliance of worker and petit-bourgeois, and are therefore 
inadequate agents of socialism. The Labour Party 
was and is primarily a party of the trade unions, devoted to 
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raising wages and improving working conditions. This meant that 
through all the critical years it was directly interested in the 
prosperity of British capitalism. (p. 113) 
He also dismisses the British Communist Party: they have a pathetically small 
support base; they preach an anachronistic political doctrine; and they eschew 
patriotism. He sees the War as having provided a unique opportunity to form 
a new Socialist party which overcomes the crippling defects of the existing 
alternatives: 
A Socialist movement which can swing the mass of the people 
behind it, drive the pro-Fascists out of positions of control, wipe out 
the grosser injustices and let the working class see they have 
something to fight for, win over the middle classes instead of 
antagonizing them, produce a workable imperial policy ... bring 
patriotism and intelligence into partnership - for the first time, a 
movement of such a kind becomes possible. (p. 117) 
Orwell's account of British history and also here of the struggle for 
socialism is in terms of the human actors: 'the ruling class lost their nerve·, 
and 'the people will overcome·. As such, his arguments represent a limited 
response to the question of agency. Philip Abrams in his article 'History, 
Sociology, Historical Sociology', formulates this problem as follows: 
It is the problem of finding a way of accounting for human 
experience which recognizes simultaneously and in equal measure 
that history and society are made by constant, more or less 
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purposeful, individual action and that individual action, however 
purposeful is ~ade by history and society. (p. 7) 
The underlying assumption in The Lion and the Unicorn is that since the state 
reflects the will of the people, and the economy too is obedient to the wishes 
of those controlling it. It is the consciousness of (English) people that must 
be analysed rather than the economy or state. For Orwell, change of 
consciousness always initiates economic and political change rather than 
vice versa. 
The results of seeing 'the system' as secondary are crippling: most 
obviously, Orwell underestimates the economic, political and ideological 
constraints acting upon 'the people', and as a result projects a mood of 
unfounded optimism. Corelli Barnett's sober analysis of the war-time 
economy demonstrates the specious basis of Orwell's projections (and those of 
his contemporaries). Further, when 'the real England' fails to emerge in 
response to the pressure exerted by the agents of socialism, he blames 'the 
people' for the failure, instead of looking to the structural constraints acting 
upon them and adjusting his strategic goals accordingly. 
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1 -2 Britain in the 1 960 s 
The Britain in which Williams wrote The Long Revolution was very different 
to the nation Orwell addressed in The Lion and the Unicorn: the austerity of 
the war years had rapidly been replaced by a more affluent order. Due to the 
world-wide economic boom which was to last until the 1960 s, and the 
temporary absence from world markets of economies destroyed by the War, 
Britain enjoyed in the 1950 s a period of unprecedented economic growth: 
output grew by 3Si between 1951 and 1961, and real average earnings rose 
by 2,71 a year. A second difference was that laissez faire capitalism was 
replaced not by a planned economy - as Orwell had anticipated - but by a 
'mixed economy·. Attlee's government nationalised certain (unprofitable) 
industries, set up the basic institutions of the welfare state, and ensured the 
maintenance of full employment with a series of Keynesian budgets. These 
reform measures, however, left the essential configuration of British capital 
unchanged. A third difference was that Britain's position as an independent 
imperial power was eroded; in return for substantial assistance in post-War 
reconstruction, Britain was forced to cede imperial preference to the United 
States. This was brought home harshly during the Suez crisis. A fourth 
development that warrants mention was the revival of London as a financial 
and commercial centre after the War. The British economy came to be 
controlled increasingly by finance - as opposed to industrial and 
manufacturing capital. l 
In this period, there existed a remarkable degree of consensus between 
the two major political parties as to the shape Britain should assume. The 
Conservative government was content to claim the credit for the new 
prosperity and uphold the modest institutions of the welfare state, while the 
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Labour Party saw the thriving capitalist economy as providing the basis for a 
. more caring society. Both parties failed to register the weaknesses of British 
capitalism and the temporary nature of this affluence. Colin Leys concludes 
his analysis of this era by observing: 
For twenty years after 1945 the Conservatives had not dared, and 
mostly had not wished, to advocate restoring high unemployment, 
dismantling the welfare state or ending public ownership of the 
principal nationalised industries; any more than the Labour Party 
had seriously advocated any significant extension of public 
ownership or new measures of popular control of industry. Over the 
next twenty years, this consensus disappeared. (p. 63) 
Also prominent in the political context of the Fifties were certain 
extra-Parliamentary groupings, notably the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament, which sprang up after the first Aldermaston march of 1958, 
and the New Left, which was created by the twin crises of Hungary and Suez. 
Perry Anderson2 pays tribute to these formations, as well as to the Labour 
Left, in his overview of the decade: 
[These were] the three living sources of opposition within British 
society, unsilenced by prosperity or fear .... Separately and 
together, it was the vitality of these forces which prevented England 
in this period from becoming anything like a replica of North 
America or West Germany. (pp. 17-18) 
The two main strands of the dominant ideology were 'affluence' and 
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anti-Communism. Associated wi~h the obj~ctive rise in living standards was 
an unprecedented consumerism, and with it ~he myth ~hat.,the class system 
was 'withering away·. The new affluence was projected as ;a vindication of 
welfare capitalism and a crushing refutation of ob_solete fo~_ms of c.lass 
analysis. The second component was anti-Communism, which although never 
reaching the hysterical extremes of Mc Carthyism in the U.S.A., acted as an 
ideological check on socialist activism in Britain. 
Anderson describes the patter.n of English culture at the time .in his 
influential essay, 'Componen~s of a Nat~onal Culture.' His conclusions are 
scathing: 
The various traditional disciplines discussed cluster about an absent 
centre - what should have been the emergence of a classical 
sociology or a national Marxism. Lacking this centre, they form a 
vicious circle of self-reproducing fragm~ntation and limitation. 
(pp. 46-7) 
This state of affairs is attribute~ to the failure of the bourgeoise to achieve a 
. ' ' .. 
social or political revolution; .this failure meant they never generated a 
' ' ' . 
'revolutionary ideology' which called society as a whole into question; instead, 
its thinkers were confined within a bourgeois corporatism which never 
sought to challenge conservative assumptions about society underlying each 
discipline. Although Anderson·s arguments have sin~ been .subject to 
' , .. ,, 
formidable criticism3, his map of the social sciences provides a sense of the 
humble resources Williams bad to draw upon in trying to develop a theory 
and strategy for an authentic soc_i_alist culture. E~ward Th9~pson makes this 
~ ' I , ' , 




With a compromised tradition at his back, and with a broken 
vocabulary in his hands, he did the only thing that was left to him; 
he took over the vocabulary of his opponents, followed them into the 
heart of their arguments, and fought them to a standstill in their 
own terms. (p. 27) 
This then is the context in which Williams sets out to describe the process 
of 'the long revolution'. Before moving on to analyse 'Britain in the 1960 s', 
however, we need to mention Williams's 'political' writing that precedes The 
Long Revolution. The main contribution is his Conclusion of Culture and 
Society. in which he first traces the meanings and implications of 'masses', 
'mass-communication· and 'mass-observation·, and then proceeds to argue 
that: 
. 
The inequalities of many kinds which still divide our community 
make effective communication difficult or impossible. We lack a 
genuinely common experience, save in rare and dangerous moments 
of crisis. What we are paying for this lack, in every kind of 
currency, is now sufficiently evident. We need a common culture, not 
for the sake of it, but because we shall not survive without it. 
(p. 304) 
He then looks more closely at the cleavages in British society, and 
expresses them in the following terms: 
The primary distinction [between working-class and bourgeois) is to 
be sought in the whole way of life, and here, again, we must not 
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confine ourselves to such evidence as housing, dress and modes of 
leisure .... The crucial distinction is between alternative ideas of the 
nature of social relationship. (p. 311) 
According to Williams, the bourgeois idea of social relationship is founded on 
an ethic of service and of individualism, whereas the working-class emphasis 
is on community. He extends his discussion of working class values to culture 
and politics: 
The working-class, because of its position, has not, since the 
Industrial Revolution, produced a culture in the narrow sense. The 
culture which it has produced, and which it is important to recognize, 
is the collective democratic institution, whether in the trade unions, 
the cooperative movement, or a political party. (p. 313) 4 
The ultimate challenge is to develop from these distinct forms of 
consciousness a common culture, with the working-class ethic of solidarity 
acting as a guiding principle. This involves centrally the struggle to develop a 
common vocabulary and common meanings. Williams concludes: 
To take a meaning from. experience, and to try to make it active is in 
fact our process of growth. Some of these meanings we receive and 
re-create. Others we must make for ourselves and try to 
communicate. The human crisis is always a crisis of understanding: 
what we genuinely understand we can do. (p. 323) 
Since Williams elaborates upon these ideas substantially in 'Britain in the 
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1960 s·, I will incorporate criticism of this co:nclusion in the analysis to 
follow. 
The personal pronoun that directs discussion in The Long Revolution is 
'we·, but the character of the narrative persona and of the audience implied 
by the 'we' shifts substantially. In Part I, Williams writes: 
No word in English carries a more consistently positive reference 
than 'creative·, and obviously we should be glad of this, when we 
think of the values it seeks to express and the activities it offers to 
describe (emphasis added). (p. 19) 
And: 'The best aesthetic definitions can seem quite unreal as we turn back to 
the latest novel, the new book of poems, the current play or film, the 
ordinary exhibition' (emphasis added) (p. 45). The persona adopted here is 
of the concerned man of culture, and the audience constituted is highly 
literate, concerned with esoteric enquiries into the positive connotations of 
'creative', and the unreliability of aesthetic definitions. It resembles the elite 
audience F. R. Leavis refers to in For Continuity , the ·very small minority 
(upon whom] the discerning appreciation of art and literature depends' (p. 
13). 
However, this is not the only persona connoted by ·we'; nor is it the only 
audience that Williams addresses. In 'Britain in the 1960 s', 'we· is used in a 
wider sense: 'we reject the idea of this kind of (planned] economic system 
controlling our lives. True, we are controlled now and will continue to be 
controlled by a qu~te different system' (emphasis added) (p. 321 ). The 
persona here is the representative citizen, bewildered by the great and 
mysterious social forces that control his life, and the audience he projects is 
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an undefined group of decent folk; they share his concerns and he promises 
to show them the way to a just programme for social change. 
The identity of the 'we' acquires further connotations when Williams 
refers cautiously to socialism: 
What is the alternative to capitalism? Socialism. What is a socialist 
culture? State control. There are many good liberals, and many 
an1ious socialists, who draw back if this is the prospect .... Here is 
the deepest difficulty in the whole development of our democracy: 
that we seem reduced to a choice between speculator and 
bureaucrat, and while we do not like the speculator, the bureaucrat 
is not exactly inviting either. (p. 367) 
Williams tries here to nudge his audience of decent folk in the direction of 
socialism. His appeal rests heavily on the reasonableness of his stance; 
unlike, for example, the irresponsible rejection of the Establishment by the 
'Angry Young Men' of the time, Williams's protest is considered and rational. 
His persona becomes in the process that of 'the reasonable socialist' , and his 
audience are constituted as 'ordinary people sympathetic to socialist ideas·. 
In the Introduction to The Long Revolution, Williams sets out the structure 
of his argument. He explains what he means by 'long revolution': 
It is a genuine revolution, transforming men and institutions; 
continually extended and deepened by the actions of millions, 
continually and variously opposed by explicit reaction and by the 
pressure of habitual forms and ideas. (p. 1 O) 
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Emphasising the extreme complexity of this process,,he goes on to separate 
three levels: first, the democratic revolution, in which 'people' are registering 
their determination to govern themselves and make their own decisions; 
second, the industrial revolution, in which scientific development is producing 
the impetus for rapid economic changes; and third, the cultural revolution, in 
which the processes of learning are being made more widely available. The 
key to understanding the long revolution lies in recognising the complicated 
interaction between these three levels; no one level should be abstracted and 
afforded priority: 
My own view is that we must keep trying to grasp the process as a 
whole, to see it in new ways as a long revolution, if we are to 
understand either the theoretical crisis, or our actual history, or the 
reality of our immediate condition and the terms of change. (p. 13) 
In Part I of The Long Revolution, Williams examines certain key 
principles in his conception of the cultural process, and in Part I I, he traces 
the history of particular institutions and forms in British culture. In Part III, 
'Britain in the 1960 s', he: 
returns to the theme of the long revolution, which I have 
outlined in this introduction, by attempting a description of our 
contemporary culture and society in terms of what I see as a pattern 
of change. Briefly I attempt to assess the progress of the long 
revolution in Britain, and to consider its next stages. (p. 14) 
He then refers obliquely to his proposed method of analysis: 
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I do not confine myself to British society because of any lack of 
interest in what is happening elsewhere, but because the kind of 
evidence I am interested in is only really available where one lives. 
(p. 14) 
In the first section of 'Britain in the 1960 s' , Williams repeats his 
conviction that 'quite different forms of analysis' (p. 320) need to be 
developed in order to understand the complexities and contradictions in the 
economic, political and cultural dimensions of the long revolution. He then 
proceeds to focus on the economy, and although he refers to Britain's 
industrial decline and the dubious basis of the proclaimed affluence, his main 
concern is with the images used to present the total process of production and 
distribution. He argues that the way in which capitalist images of the 
'consumer' and 'market' are projected onto society has led to a situation 
where 'our modes of thinking habitually suppress large areas of our real 
relationships, including our real dependencies on others' (p. 325}. The 
solution lies principally in developing an alternative conception of the 
economy: 
if we started not from the market but from the needs of persons, 
not only could we understand this part of our working activity more 
clearly, but also we should have a means of judging the 'ordinary' 
economic activity itself .... The danger now ... is of fitting human 
beings to a system, rather than a system to human beings. (p. 326} 
Central to Williams's proposal is the need to cultivate ·a realistic sense of 
community' (p. 326}, and in this light he reviews his argur;nent in Culture and 
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Society that the institutions of the working-class are the bearers of the 
values of community, demO\..-Yacy and solidarity. He concedes that he had 
failed to register the extent to which they are subordinated to the 
institutions of capital, but nonetheless insists: 
If I seem eccentric in continuing to look to these institutions for 
effective alternative patterns, while seeing all too clearly their 
present limitations, I can only repeat that they can go ejther way, 
and that their crisis is not yet permanently resolved. (p. 329) 
He concludes the section by repeating the need 'to create new meanings· 
(p. 332) that might displace 'the consumer' and 'market' from the centre of 
the social order. 
In discussing the economic or industrial aspect of the long revolution, 
Williams maintains a sense of the 'total social process', and in so doing he 
fails to analyse economic production as a separate instance. He makes no 
attempt to differentiate or describe the forms and relations of production in 
the 'Affluent Age', choosing instead to concentrate on how the economy is 
expressed in corresponding modes of culture. Richard Johnson makes this 
point in his essay 'Three problematics': 
As literary critic and cultural theorist, Williams does stress certain 
kinds of practices, all of them broadly cultural and, within that. 
mainly literary. Other practices tend to be marginalized or defined 
away. There is no check on this from theoretical controls. Thus the 
early works are particularly inattentive to political processes .... 
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Though some of this is repaired in later work, there is a persistent 
neglect of the particular character and force of economic relations 
and therefore of economic definitions in relation to class. (p. 218) 
The cost of this inattention can perhaps best be illustrated by ref erring 
again to the kinds of economic data ignored by Williams: between 1951 and 
1961, while Britain's economic output increased by 3si, France's rose by 
100%, Italy and Germany's by 200i, and japan's by .<fOOi.5 Had Williams 
attended more closely to these details he might have predicted the crisis 
faced by British capital in the late 1960 s, and suggested more concrete 
socialist strategies to take advantage of it. 
In the second section, Williams explores the progress of the democratic 
revolution. His discussion is based on his own experiences of struggling for 
democratic practice: 'I know from my own experience, in helping to work 
out such ways [of establishing democracy} in my own job, some of the 
difficulties yet also some of the real gains' (p. 332). He recalls how his own 
encounters with local committee politics have shown that democracy can be 
frustrated by the practice of 'man-management', an insidious style of 
ruling-class co-option. A second potential obstacle to democracy is the tone 
of discussion: both the tentative statement of the graduate and the blunt 
assertion of the trade unionist can exclude the necessary participation of all. 
He concludes that 'we do not get enough practice in the working of 
democracy, even where its forms exist' (p. 337). The absence of 
democracy at local level is reinforced at the national level. Although 'the 
general influence of public opinion counts for something, since in the long 
run the court has to be re-elected', the tightly organised party system and 
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parliament ensure that it is difficult for 'any of us to feel even, the smallest 
share in the government of our affairs· (p. 336-7). From the evidence 
assembled at this immediate level, Williams moves on to expose the absence 
·of genuine democracy in Britain generally. He then suggests ways in which 
the undemocratic nature of existing political structures might be challenged. 
These include: a two-year interval between elections for the House of 
Commons; a reform of the electoral process so that the will of the people 
(rather than that of a narrow majority) might be reflected; a democratising 
of the procedures of consultation and decision-making in the work-place; 
and a revision of the procedures for the development of communities. He 
concludes: 
The pressure now, in a wide area of our social life, should be 
towards a participating democracy, in which the ways and means of 
involving people much more closely in the process of 
self-government can be learned and extended. (p. 343) 
Williams's method, his procedure of moving from the particular 
(man-management) to the general (parliamentary 'democracy'), should be 
understood in the light of Anderson's thesis about the 'absent centre' of 
British culture. With no sociology, with no totalising perspective for 
Williams to use to structure his analysis, he is obliged, in Fred Inglis's 
phrase, 'to start from where people really are and ask what may be done 
with that' (p. 158). In Marxism and Totality, Martin jay amplifies 
Anderson's point that any notion of totality was alien to English Marxism: 
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One very important distinction between continental and English 
Marxism was, in fact, the far greater importance afforded by the 
former to the concept of totality. Aside from several references to 
culture as a "whole way of life" in the early work of Wiliam~. 
totality did not really enter the English debate until the 
Althusserian wave of the 1970 s. Many English Marxists were 
historians with the discipline's characteristic distaste for 
generalising concepts. (p. 4, note 7) 
The 'Althusserian wave·, as jay terms it, with theoretical concepts' like 
'totality' and 'ideology', challenged the assumptions and practices of British 
critics like Williams. These concepts call the social system as a whole into 
question, and thus highlight Williams's tendency to assess the system in its 
own terms: public opinion, rather than 'counting for something', is seen as 
the creation or reflection of ruling-class ideology, and 'feeling 11 share in the 
government of our affairs' is seen not as positive emotion, but as an 
instance of the successful functioning of ideology. 
Williams's failure to appreciate the role of ideology (in the Althusserian 
sense), and particularly the ideological function of the state, is evident in his 
reform proposals. Williams embraces the existing 'bourgeois freedoms' as 
essential building blocks for socialism and tries to extend them in order to 
make them more active. The measures he suggests involve reforming the 
existing structures so that all might be represented and participate 
effectively in the decision-making procedures. Crucially, he does not call 
into question the existing form of the state. Indeed, instead of seeing 
parliament and the party system as a formidable ideological weapon of the 
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dominant class, Williams tends to see the existing structure as a neutral, and 
therefore adequate arena in which opposing interest groups resolve their 
differences. Ultimately therefore, these strategies fail to threaten the 
material power base of the dominant class; they are the measures of 
co-option and concession which run quite counter to the ideals of the long 
revolution. 
· The third section of 'Britain in the 1960 s' focuses on the meaning of 
class. Williams argues that the present confusion about class is based on the 
fact that economic and social conceptions of the word have been conflated, 
and then traces briefly the history of the present class system. Drawing 
also on his own experience, he concludes '[i]t is then less the injustice of the 
British class system than its stupidity that really strikes one' (p. 348); 
further, the resentments and confusions arising from the class system are a 
serious barrier to developing an organised and unified opposition to 
capitalism: 
The true description is one that recognizes that the traditional 
definitions have broken down, and that the resulting confusion is a 
serious diminution of consciousness .... Our true condition is that 
in relation to a complicated economic and social organisation which 
we have not learned to control, most of us are factually servants. 
(p. 352-3) 
He then demonstrates the analytical weakness of the middle/working class 
distinction by showing how it fails to explain voting patterns in Britain from 
the thirties to the fifties: the Labour Party - the representatives of the 
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working-class - in fact received more support in the 1950 s when class 
barriers were supposedly 'withering away· than ihey did in the 1930 s 
when the working class was still intact. For these many reasons, Williams 
proposes that the middle/working class differential be abolished. Two 
related emphases should replace it: first, we need to identify the 'hard 
economic centre· (p. 363) which sustains the class system i.e. we need to 
know who controls the means of production. Secondly, a real feeling of 
community - the 'true knowledge that we are working for ourselves and for 
each other' (p. 363) should be developed. He concludes: 
With that basic inequality isolated we could stop the irrelevant 
discussion of class, of which most of us are truly sick and tired, and 
let through the more interesting discussion of human differences, 
between real people and communities living in their valuably 
various ways. (p. 363) 
WiUiams's conception of society oscillates between a consensual and 
conflict model? The emphasis on conflict is retained in his perception of 
'the hard economic centre': he recognizes that in Britain the means of 
production are owned 'by a small part of [society} which then employs the 
rest' (p. 363 ); the interests of 'the rest' are thus in fundamental conflict 
with those of the owners. His description of the economic dimension of the 
long revolution is largely premised on this notion of society. However- in his 
. discussion of the democratic revolution, and more particularly here in the 
section on class and politics, it is images of consensus that predominate. 






which differences between classes can be.reconciled or resolved within the 
; 
existing framework; his understanding of 'the cultural revolution' (to be 
discussed beiow) also implies that class differences need not be seen as 
structural. His most potent image of consensus, of shared interest, however, 
remains that of the community. 
Based upon his own deeply-felt experience of community, Williams 
projects a vision of society in which 'we are working for ourselves and for 
each other.' There are several difficulties with this formulation.8 First, 
Williams fails to historicise sufficiently his own experience of comm unity. 
Instead of foregrounding the objective conditions which enabled ·welsh 
working-class communities to establish an alternative culture, he abstracts 
their sense of community and seeks to re-create it in very different social 
contexts. This leads to a second difficulty, namely confusion as to the 
question of scale: the complex mediations involved in moving from a local -
to a national level are no.t taken into account: 'Community' conceived on a 
national level involves particularly severe problems since it coheres at 
many points with Orwell's myth of the united English family, and as such 
denies the irreconcilable economic conflict at the basis of the society. 
Thirdly, even on a local scale the term 'community' acts as a shorthand for a 
superficially homogeneous gro.up united by certain interests. Within any 
such group, there will inevitably be contradictory interests and degrees of 
exploitation. In Williams's own experience, these differences might have 
appeared slight, but to deny them would be to misrepresent the actual set 
of relations within the group. Further, this might well deflect attention 
from other forms of oppression in working-class communities, notably 
sexism and racism. 
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In the final two sections, Williams focuses on the 'cultural revolution'. In 
the fourth section he addresses the ownership and organisation of cultural 
organisations, and argues: 
Instead of the ritual indignation and despair at the cultural 
condition of 'the masses' (now increasingly uttered even by their 
supposed friends} it is necessary to break through to the central 
fact that most of our cultural institutions are in the hands of 
speculators, interested not in the health and growth of the sociey, 
but in the quick profits. (p. 366} 
He continues: ·we should be much clearer about these cultural questions if 
we saw them as a consequence of a basically capitalist organization, and I at 
least know no better reason for capitalism to be ended' (p. 367). He 
concedes that the alternative to this - a socialist organisation of the arts -
has the dangers of censorship and bureaucracy, but pledges his belief that 
public control of cultural institutions can be compatible with democracy, 
since' if we can agree that this end is desirable, no society is better 
qualified from experience to devise adequate practical methods' (p. 368). 
He then illustrates how drama, cinema, publishing and broadcasting might 
be organised by the 'sensible application of public resources' in a way that 
would guarantee the freedom of cultural producers. Although not 
anticipating overnight transformation, Williams sees these cultural 
interventions as being crucial catalysts in the long revolution: 
My whole case about social change is, moreover, that the 
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interdependence of elements which I described as a matter of 
theory is an argument for conceiving change on the widest possible 
front: the changes in emphasis in our economy, in our ordinary 
working relationships, in our democratic institutions, and in 
education are all relevant to cultural change in this more explicit 
field. (p. 374) 
He commences section V with the resounding affirmation that: 
The human energy of the long revolution springs from the 
conviction that men can direct their own lives, by breaking through 
the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society, and by 
discovering new common institutions. (p. 375) 
He then proceeds to distinguish three kinds of thinking 'by which the long 
revolution is continually limited and opposed' (p. 377). These are: the 
resistance of privileged groups to an extension of wealth and opportunity to 
all; the co-option of opposition figures into the ruling bloc; and, most 
importantly, the apathy of 'the masses·. However, he concludes by restating 
his optimistic conviction that these attitudes (and ultimately society) can be 
transformed, since '[c)onsciousness really does change, and new experience 
finds new- interpretations' (p. 381 ). 
In Politics and Letters. Williams confesses that in The Long Revolution he 
failed to appreciate the limited potential of cultural intervention: 'What I 
was wrong about was to assume that a cultural and educational programme 
alone could revitalise the left' (p. 364). This error of judgement, he 
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continues, was the result of: 
a radical underestimate of the political power of the capitalist 
state. By our very closeness to the ways in which the society was 
changing culturally, we overestimated the possibilities of action by 
cultural change on the left. (p. 364)9 
Williams's failure to appreciate the structural constraints acting upon 
cultural activism should be read in the same light as his analyses of the 
economy, the political process, and the role of class and community in 
British society; that is, it should be read as symptomatic of New Left politics 
in the 1950 s, with its (inherited) antipathy to theory, including Marxist 
theory of the state and economy. A closer engagement with Marxism at 
that stage. might, for instance, have acted as a check on his exaggerated 
hopes for 'culturalist' strategies. 
We are now in a position to try and draw together the similarities in the 
'political' writings of Orwell and 'early' Williams, but before doing so certain 
central differences need to be foregrounded. In the first place, and most 
obviously, they write at different moments in British history; as a result, 
they confront different issues and direct their political strategies in 
appropriately different ways. Secondly, The Lion and the Unicorn and 
'Britain in the 1960 s' differ in that the former is written in the lively 
register of the popular essay, whereas the latter employs a more 'academic' 
vocabulary and style of argument: in differentiating the economic, political 
and cultural dimensions of the long revolution, Williams deals with the 
question of socialism in Britain at a level of abstraction some distance from 
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the anecdotal and loosely-structured discussion Orwell offers. 
Thirdly, and at a more substantive level, Orwell and Williams have 
different attitudes towards the working class. Gareth Stedman Jones in 
Languages of Class identifies the working-class and (professional} 
middle-class components of the Labour Party, and differentiates their 
associated forms of consciousness. The consciousness of the working-class is 
one of solidarity, and is summed up in the common (shared) culture of the 
music hall, football, pubs, and in distinctions of dress and accent; it asserts 
the separateness of a caste rather than 'the hegemonic potentialities of a 
particular position in production· (p. 247). He characterises the 
consciousness of the professional middle-class as: 'an ethic of service , of 
intelligence and expertise, in the pursuit of humanitarian ends' (p. 247). 
According to Stedman Jones, the success of the Labour Party up to 1950 lay 
in its ability to assimilate these two quite distinct constituencies into a 
single political discourse of reform. That Orwell and Williams represent 
these two different constituencies and forms of consciousness is evident 
from their respective perceptions of the working-class in The Lion and the 
Unicorn and 'Britain in the 1960 s·: Orwell typically poses the question 
'what can we do to help them ? ; whereas Williams's enquiry might be 
summed up as, 'how do we help ourselves ?' Where Orwell sees the need 
for a new (managerial) class of rulers, Williams sees within the existing 
working-class institutions adequate forms of political organisation and 
leadership. 1 O 
The first area of similarity between Orwell and Williams is in the 
observer status they both assume. Both 'the plain man· in The Lion and the 
Unicorn and 'the reasonable socialist· in 'Britain in the 1960 s' are 
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priveleged figures telling the truth about their respective experiences of 
Britain. In Orwell. Williams writes that all of 'orwell's writing until 1937 
should be seen 'as sketches towards the creation of his most successful 
character, "Orwell". (p. S2t 'Orwell', as we have noted, is the plain man, the 
voice of truth and reason in a confused world. By the same token, it could be 
argued that Williams's most successful creation has been the character 
'Williams·.11 'Williams' is the reasonable socialist, an astute and reliable 
observer of contemporary reality. In other words, he is a more intellectual 
version of the plain man, occupying a similar position-as-observer, but, in 
Said's words, '[taking) in a lot more than Orwell took the time to do.' 
The second similarity is closely related. Both Orwell and Williams rely 
heavily on the evidence of their experience: the plain man 'uses his eyes' to 
discern England's national character, while the reasonable socialist is 
interested primarily in using 'the evidence available where one lives· in his 
description of Britain. In thus privileging the evidence of the senses, they 
ignore the processes (particularly linguistic) by which the evidence is 
constructed in terms of their particular way of seeing. ·Theory·, which has 
the potential to foreground these processes, is absent from their work: Orwell 
indulges (and exemplifies) the 'English horror of abstract thought', and 
Williams, although he works towards a theory of the 'total social process', 
typically moves from the specific to the general in his discussion. 
Thirdly, Orwell and Williams conceptualise 'Britain' in a similar way: both 
Orwell's image of the family and Williams's image of the community have 
strong connotations of co-operation, mutual respect, and latent unity; they 
both imply a consensual rather than a conflict model of society, a model in 
which membership of the same family or community ultimately overrides all 
differences of class, gender and race. This impression of potential consensus 
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is also created by the absence - in both Orwell and Williams - of any detailed 
analysis of the economic conflict at the core of British society. 
The four th area of overlap is in their respective understandings of 
socialism. There are certain important differences: Williams does not espouse 
English nationalism, which is such a prominent part of Orwell's creed in The 
Lion and the Unicorn 12 ; and, whereas Orwell identifies socialism with a 
centralised economy and argues that it is a more efficient form of 
government, Williams, having seen the costs and failures of Soviet centralism, 
looks to a flexible socialist alternative to Stalinism. 
However, there are also several important similarities. They both insist 
upon the sanctity of 'bourgeois freedoms· in the struggle for socialism, Orwell 
in his identification of the idea of human equality with the English-speaking 
world (p. 130 ), and Williams in his proposals for making democracy more 
actual in Part II of 'Britain in the 1960 s.' 13 They both see 'reasonable 
argument', change of consciousness and cultural activism as central to 
socialist strategy: Orwell writes of 'the ghastly job of convincing artificially 
stupefied people' (p. 105), and Williams that 'consciousness really does 
change, and new experience finds new interpretations' (p. 381 }. They both 
propose relatively modest reform measures as first stages in the journey to 
socialism: both Orwell's suggestions for internal reform - nationalisation of 
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industries, equalisation of income and educational improvement - and 
Williams's arguments for cultural - and electoral reform fail to recognise the 
hegemony of the. capitalist state and its capacity to assimilate such proposals· 
without adjusting the relations of production. Finally, both Orwell and 
Williams constitute in their respective tetts audiences of 'ordinary people' 
who (they argue} have the potential to act as the agents of socialism.14 
Orwell writes about the success of the English Revolution depending 'entirely 
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on ourselves· (p. 124), the ordinary people earning no 'more than £2000 a 
year' (p. 108), and Williams believes that 'nien can direct their lives, by 
breaking through the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society' 
(p. 375). In terms of political organisations, although Orwell is far more 
cynical about the Labour Party, they both effectively argue for the creation of 
a working-class and petit bourgeois alliance united in the fight for socialism. 
Thus far I have identified the similarities between Orwell and 'early' 
Williams; in looking at Towards 2000, I trace the changes in Williams's 
relation to Orwell. 
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1.3. Towards 2000 
In order to establish how Williams's relation to Orwell changed in the next 
twenty years, I first review Williams's writings on politics during this period; 
I then describe the context in which he wrote Towards 2000; and finally, I 
examine whether the similarities between Orwell and 'early' Williams can be 
eitended to Towards 2000. 
Wi11iams's first major contribution to political debate in Britain after The 
Long Revolution was Communications 1, a short book in which he develops 
his analysis of the cultural revolution. Focusing on the media and mass 
communications, he elaborates proposals for 'a cultural organisation in which 
there would be genuine freedom and variety, protected alike from the 
bureaucrat and the speculator· (p. 178). Williams thus sought to initiate a 
new kind of left politics in the field of communications, and this remained a 
central emphasis in the years to follow: Communications went through 
three editions and several reprints; in 197 4, Williams extended his 
arguments in Television: Technology and Cultural Form, where he continues 
to insist that 'the battle for free communications is then necessarily part of a 
much wider social struggle' (p. 150); and in 1978, he wrote 'Means of 
Communication as Means of Production' 2, in which he contests the Marxist 
view of communications as part of the ·superstructure', and argues that 
'means of communication are themselves means of production' (p. SO). 
In 1965, responding to the election of the Labour government, he :w-rote 
'The British Left', in which he develops his earlier arguments about the 
Labour Party. He describes the four defining ideologies of the Labour Party 
as: the moral critique of capitalism; religious nonconformity; utilitarianism; 
and moral paternalism. He also refers with some optimism to the potential 
of C. N. D. and the New Left as contributors to the struggle for socialism. 
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In 1966, he repeated substantially his 'Long Revolution· arguments in an 
essay 'Towards a Socialist Society'. His tone here is more polemical: 
In this struggle for freedom of communications ... we are making 
one of the major demands of a humanism which, to be realised, 
must become socialism. The fight in communications is not a 
competitor without other kinds of struggle for peace: for the ending 
of poverty and disease. It is at once a necessary part of all these 
struggles, and one of the permanent conditions and claims of the 
dignity of man. (p. 394) 
Williams's next major intervention came in 1967 in collaboration with 
other members of the New Left : May Day Manifesto edited by Williams, 
Edward Thompson and Stuart Hall, was written in response to the policies of 
the second Wilson government, which was seen as betraying the socialist 
cause: 
The party created, as it was thought, to transform society, and still 
the party of the great majority ... of the working people of Britain, 
faces us now in this alien form: a voting machine; an effective 
bureaucracy; an administration claiming no more than to run the 
existing system more efficiently. (p. 155) 
The Manifesto is more detailed than 'Britain in the 1960 s'. It expands 
considerably on a number of issues, including the inequalities of wealth and 
specious claims of a new classless society; Britain's international position 
vis-a-vis its trading competitors and its former colonies; the threat of 
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nuclear war; the dubious strength of British capital; lhe role of the State in 
the economy; and the organisational weakness of the Labour Party. But 
certain essentials remain intact: the authority of 'experience' is frequently 
invoked; there is confidence in the potential of cultural activism; and 
'socialist humanism' is the rallying call for resisting capitalism: 
The problems of whole men and women are now habitually 
relegated to specialized and disparate fields, where the society 
offers to manage or adjust them by this or that consideration or 
technique. Against this, we define socialism again as a humanism: a 
recognition of the social reality of man in all his activities, and of 
the consequent struggle for the direction of this reality by and for 
ordinary men and women. (p. 16) 
After the Manifesto. there is a lapse of a number of years before Williams 
considers British politics directly again. The failure of the Manifesto to make 
any significant political impact doubtless played a part in enforcing this 
silence. In 1975, Williams reviewed and drew together the main aspects of 
his political position in You're a Marxist, Aren't You?' 3 After recording his 
sense of the vagueness of the term 'Marxist', and his objection to reducing 
the entire history of democratic struggle to the name of one thinker, 
Williams considers the main forms of 'Marxism' in twentieth century Britain. 
He argues that the two traditions - of Stalinism and Fabianism - had broken 
down: 
Neither Stalinism nor Fabianism, which in the 1930 shad seemed 
the two main competitors in the socialist political tradition, any 
longer offered us either an acceptable intellectual system or a 
viable mode of political action. (p. 233) 
In discussing the Labour Party, the major political agency of Fabianism, 
Williams emphasizes its antipathy to Marxism and its theoretical 
impoverishment: 
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The positive and complacent exclusion [of Marx] was a very much 
more serious matter for it was a deliberate exclusion of theory : not 
so much of this theory as of any theory; and the real reason for this 
was that in practice the Labour leadership shared the ruling class 
view of the world. They did not need theory; they had their world, 
and there were only practical arguments about their place in it. 
(p. 236) 
Williams then sums up what he takes to be the central propositions of 
Marxism, of historical materialism, and declares his agreement with them: 
Now as I think through the basic positions of historical materialism, 
the basic definition of capitalist society and its evolution, and then 
the need to supersede it, to go beyond capitalist society, so that a 
socialist society, as apart from isolated measures of a socialist 
tendency, demands the destruction of capitalist society; as I think 
through these three propositions and try to define myself in 
relation to them, I have no real hesitation. These are all positions 
from which I now see the world and in terms of which I try to 
order my life and my activity. (p. 238) 
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Further, while insisting that revolutionary activity can take many for ms, he 
acknowledges the place of violent struggle in challenging a repressive 
system. Finally, he argues that although the industrial working-class 
constitutes 'the fundamental resistance to capitalist state power' (p. 239), 
the key site of struggle is not so much the economy as the cultural domain. 
This is the distinguishing mark of Williams's socialism: 
in understanding cultural hegemony and in seeing it as the 
crucial dimension of the kind of society which has been 
emerging since the war under advanced capitalism, I felt the break 
both from mainline Marxism and even more from the traditions of 
social democracy, liberalism and Fabianism, which had been my 
immediate inheritance (emphasis added). (p. 241) 
Williams's rapprochement with Marxism is further reflected in 'Notes on 
British Marxism since 1945 ·, written for the hundredth edition of the New 
Left Review in 1976. In this short piece, he discusses the Rightward shift of . 
the term 'Marxist' in British political debate; identifies three types of Marxist 
theory - legitimating, academic and operative, and examines the complex 
meanings of 'populism', 'culturism · and 'reformism·. He acknowledges the 
contributions of Althusser and Gramsci to British Marxism, and concedes the 
theoretical weakness of the analysis in The Long Revolution and the 
Manifesto. particularly with respect to the relation between the cultural and 
general economic and social processes within society. At the same time, he 
resists the 'ultra-Left' position of theoretical purity: 
To adopt a theoretical position from which, for example, the trade 
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unions are seen as merely reformist, and the perceived pol~tical Left 
is dismissed as incurably reformist, is to go into a very dangerous 
kind of internal exile. (p. 93) 
He concludes: 
there have been and still are as many failures of theory as of 
practice, and it is by respecting the struggle, as something lived and 
not as something assigned or assessed, that new operative theory 
and practice will be attained. (p. 93) 
'Notes on British Marxism' can be read as a defence of Williams's earlier 
arguments, since the labels of populist/culturalist/reformist have often been 
attached to him.4 
In Politic:5 and Letter:5 a :5erie:5 of interview:5 with the editorilll boa.rd of 
the New Left Review , he takes the opportunity to explain and develop those 
earlier positions further. There are several passages in this valuable book 
dealing with the assumptions shared by Williams and Orwell. Firstly, with 
regard to the epistemological priority of 'experience·, Williams insists that in 
expanding his conception of the economic to include cultural production, the 
category 'experience' is shifted to surer ground: 
once cultural production is itself seen as social and material, 
then this indissolubility of the whole social process has a different 
theoretical ground. It is no longer based on experience, but on the 
common character of the respective processes of production. 
(p. 139) 
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Pressed by the interviewers to dispense entirely with 'experience', Williams 
refuses: 
Experience becomes a forbidden word, whereas what we ought to 
say about it is that it is a limited word .... That is a necessary 
correction. But I find that just as I am moving in that direction, I 
see a kind of appalling parody of it beyond me - the claim that all 
experience is ideology, that the subject is wholly an ideological 
illusion, which is the last stage of formalism - and I even start to 
pull back a bit. (p. 172) 
Also interesting in the context of Williams's critical method is his confessing 
that in The Long Revolution 'I could see the connections across, but I did not 
know how I could totalize them· (p. 153 ). This remark confirms 
Anderson's analysis of the 'absent centre' of British culture: starting from the 
immediate experience - as dictated by his intellectual heritage - it is not 
surprising that the totalised perspective remained for Williams so elusive. 5 
Secondly, the broadly consensual, pluralist conception of British society 
found in Orwell and early Williams is replaced here by a more Marxist or 
conflict-based orientation. Williams acknowledges his prior neglect of the 
economic in favour of the cultural: 
I can see that the effort to establish a new emphasis led me, I don't 
think to deny, but not sufficiently to state that historical causation 
must be seen primarily in terms of production and changes in 
modes of production. (p. 145) 
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However, this concession to the Marxist principle of economic determinacy is 
qualified by his insistence that 'production· be understood as referring to all 
productive activities (including cultural processes). He refuses the grading of 
these activities into a rigid hierarchy of cause and effect. 
I would not be willing to say that at the top of the hierarchy is 
productive industry, then come political institutions or means of 
mass communication, and then below them the cultural activities of 
philosophers or novelists .... The hierarchies, while in general 
following a line from activities which answer to basic physical needs 
down through to those of which you at least can state negatively 
that if they were not performed, human life would not be 
immediately threatened, are not immutable. (p. 355) 
His conception of the state and the functioning of the dominant ideology also 
reflects a shift away from the received notions of parliamentary democracy 
expressed in The Long Revolution. He concedes that: 
I certainly had not at that time developed a full critique of the 
notion of representation, which now seems to me in its common 
ideological form fundamentally hostile to democracy. (p. 41 S) 
Thirdly, and in keeping with the adoption of a conflict model, Williams 
records how his socialism acquired a 'revolutionary· rather than a 'reformist.' 
character as a result of the disillusion of the late sixties: 
If one has in the end, and to me it was in the end after fifteen to 
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twenty years of hesitation between the two possibilities, decided 
that the revolutionary path is the only way, then one really does 
have to think in a quite new fashion how to prepare for it. (p. 424) 
Thinking in a quite new fashion involved above all recognising the limited 
potential of cultural intervention. The hope - expressed in Modern Tragedy 
- of achieving socialist revolution 'by a process of argument and consensus' 
(p. 78) was destroyed by political reverses which brought home the 
for mid able strength of the existing capitalist structures. 
A sense of the historical changes between The Long Revolution and 
Towards 2000 can be derived from these brief summaries of Williams's 
various articles. However, it nonetheless remains necessary to spell out the 
socio-political context confronting Williams in the 1980 s more explicitly. 6 
The first and most important change has been the shift from the welfare 
state consensus of the 'affluent age', to the revitalised monetarism of 
Thatcher; the 'mixed economy' is to-day being dismantled as quickly as 
possible, and an undiluted and vigorous capitalism encouraged in its place. 
Policies dedicated to this end have included public spending cuts; 
deregulation of private capital; reduction in trade union power; privatisation 
of significant parts of the public sector; tax reduction for top income groups; 
and the introduction of commercial criteria into the remaining state 
institutions. Second, instead of following The Long Revolution projections 
towards greater democracy, the political system is being restructured to 
entrench Right-wing interests. The removal of borough councils is the most 
dramatic instance of this growing centralisation of state power. Third, the 
ideologies of affluence and classlessness propagated in the Fifties have been 
replaced by a more aggressive ideology described in 'Authoritarian 
. Populism· by Stuart Hall as a fusion of: 
the resonant themes of organic Toryism - nation, family, duty, 
authority, standards, traditionalism, patriarchalism - with the 
aggressive themes of a revived neo-liberalism - self-interest, 
competitive individualism, anti-statism. (p. 122) 
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The nature of leftist opposition has also changed since the 1950 s. We 
noted how in the late sixties Williams perceived for the first time that the 
Labour Party was no longer just an inadequate agency for socialism, but was 
an active collaborator in the process of reproducing the capitalist state. In 
the years since then the Labour Party has undergone changes under the 
prolonged pressure of Thatcher rule: the conservative reformist faction has 
been weakened by the forming of the S. D. P. Alliance, and also by the 
emergence of a substantial Tar left' lobby within the party itself; where 
these fermenting divisions will lead is an open question. Second, there has 
been an increase of extra-Parliamentary opposition organised around issues 
broadly compatible with socialism - nuclear disarmament, feminism and 
immigrant protection are the most visible examples. Third, largely as a 
result of the efforts of the 'new' New Left Review. Marxism has established 
itself firmly on the academic agenda at British universities; Williams came 
into contact with continental Marxist writing for the first time in the early 
1970 s, and his subsequent work on politics, letters and language is marked 
by his engagement with it? 
The setting then in which Williams sets out to review and revise his 'long 
revolution' analysis of Britain is especially bleak. He reveals that what 
prompted this project 'is that there can be some sharing of this process of 
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consideration, reconsideration and revision of outlook· (p. 21 ). In the same 
way that 'Britain in 1960 s' was written'in a spirit of optimism, Towards 
2000 is intended as 'an examining but also a deliberately encouraging 
argument' (p. 21 ). Towards 2000 is accordingly structured in a way that 
demonstrates clearly the development of the earlier arguments. After 
reprinting 'Britain in the 1960's', Williams takes its four main themes and 
reconsiders them in separate chapters. They are: the economic/industrial 
configuration of Britain; the problems of political participation; the potential 
for cultural intervention; and the role of class in British politics. In Part Four, 
he provides the international perspective, previously absent, in chapters 
entitled 'The Culture of Nations', 'East-West, North-South' and 'War: The Last 
Enemy·. In the final section, he distils what he considers to be the possible 
resources for the journey towards 2000. 
The first similarity between Orwell and 'early' Williams I listed was their 
assumption of the identity of a reliable observer: Orwell 'the plain man', and 
Williams 'the reasonable socialist'. In Towards 2000. although Williams 
continues to occupy the position of privileged observer in the text, his tone of 
infinite reasonableness in The Long Revolution is replaced by a more angry 
voice. Williams continues to assume a common identity with a wide 
community of fellow-readers: ·we all think about the future, but in very 
diverse ways· (p. 3 }. But 'the reasonable socialist' is clearly less concerned 
with observing the doubts and sensitivities of 'the good liberal' or the 
wavering petit bourgeois: 'It is an outrage that this [capitalist development} 
has happened and been allowed to happen· {p. 187}. And: 'It [capitalism} is 
an evil system, by all fully human standards' (p. 190}. This shift to a more 
angry register is symptomatic of the deeper changes in British society from 
welfare consensus to Thatcherism. 
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The second characteristic shared by Orwell and 'early' Williams was their 
reliance on experience: Orwell 'used his eyes', while Williams was 'only 
interested in the evidence available where one lives'. In the twenty years 
since The Long Revolution. British 'common sense' empiricism has been 
subjected to intense criticism from a structuralist position: the attempt by the 
interviewers in Politics and Letters to get Williams to dispense with the 
category 'experience' is indicative of this. However, perhaps the most famous 
structuralist critique of Williams is that of his former student, Terry Eagleton. 
In Criticism and Ideology 8, Eagleton employs the conceptual framework of 
Althusser and Pierre Macherey in order to 'place' Williams. He identifies the 
importance of 'experience' in Williams's work: 
it is precisely this insistence on experience, this passionate 
premium placed on the 'lived', which provides one of the centrally 
unifying themes of Williams's oeuvre - which supplies at once the 
formidable power and drastic limitation of his work. (p. 22) 
Eagleton argues that this reliance on experience is intrinsic to Williams's 
'Romantic populism· (p. 27), which is further characterised by an 'organicist 
aesthetics and corporatist sociology' (p. 27). As a result, Williams is guilty of 
'consistently over-subjectivising ... the social formation· (p. 32) and, at the 
same time, of displaying an excessive disdain for theory, including Marxist 
theory. Eagleton concedes, however, that: 'The intellectual synthesis which 
Williams undertook was one forced upon him by the non-availability of a 
revolutionary tradition and the paucity of working-class ideology' (p. 34). 
In 'Cultural Studies; Two Paradigms', 9 Stuart Hall elaborates the 
differences between the 'culturaJist' and 'structuralist' notions of experience: 
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Whereas in 'culturalism', (Williams·s tradition} experience was the 
ground - the terrain of 'the lived' - where consciousness and 
conditions intersected, structuralism insisted that 'experience' could 
not, by definition, be the ground of anything, since one could only 
'live· and experience one's conditions in and through the 
categories, classifications and frameworks of the culture .... 
'[E}xperience' was conceived, not as an authenticating source, but as 
an effect: not as a reflection of the real but as an 'imaginary relation'. 
(p. 42) 
From this perspective, Williams·s determination not to relinquish ·experience· 
as a valid analytical category would be read as a f allure on his part to 
perceive the way in which he himself and his own experience have been 
constituted by ideology. Or, as Hall put it, '[t)he authenticating power and 
reference of "experience" imposes a barrier between culturalism and a proper 
conception of "ideology"· (p. 45). 
In Towards 2000 , although Williams criticizes what he perceives as the 
confusions of late bourgeois subjectivism - presumably because it privileges 
or generalises its own ideological formation - he continues to appeal to 
experience, which is itself a form of subjectivism. 1 O For example, he 
introduces his discussion of 'Class, Politics and Socialism· as follows: 
Ideologies have to engage with some otherwise observable elements 
of reality, if they are to retain plausibility. The new current forms 
. . . engage with some real situations and some real changes, though 
they then overstate and distort them. We can see these processes as 
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we look into the evidence. (p. 153) 
Although the term 'experience' is not mentioned, it is implied in the 
separation Williams perceives between 'observable reality' and the 
'ideologies' trying to represent that reality: 'experience' is part of the stuff 
that makes up reality, whereas 'ideologies· are intellectual frameworks that 
explain or misrepresent 'experience·. The visual meiaphors - observable 
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elements of reality', 'we can see these processes' - recall Orwell's 'using his 
eyes'. And, as was the case with Orwell, they suggest an unmediated access 
to 'reality', a way of seeing that escapes the strictures of ideology. The 
conception of ideology ref erred to by Hall would involve at all times 
foregrounding the fact that 'experience' is not an independent category 
anterior to ideology, but is rather something constituted by ideology. 
However, it would be a gross distortion to argue that Williams continues to 
analyse Britain in the same way as he did in 1959, having ignored all the 
criticisms of crude empiricism and Britain's intellectual parochialism. In the 
first place, Williams's reliance on 'experience' is greatly reduced. Whereas in 
'Britain in the 1960 s', the analysis was typically from the individual 
experience (e.g. man-management) to the general social process, in Towards 
2000 the discursive pattern is less easy t.o characterise. Francis Mulhern in 
his review article makes this crucial point: 
Demanding in range, the book is also variable in analytic focus, 
moving from the abstract (capitalist production as such) to the 
concrete (the international economic system), the general 
(bourgeois-democratic representative practices) to the particular 
(the British Labour Party), sometimes without notice. (p. 8) 
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As a result there are lengthy sections of the book where historical, theoretical 
and statistical modes of discourse displace entirely the empiricist forms of 
analysis: Part IV, the international perspective, for example, does not refer to 
'experience· as a touchstone at all. 
Secondly, and closely related to the first development, in Towards 2000 
Williams's sense of the 'whole social process' is considerably enlarged; as a 
result of his engagement with Marxism particularly, his analysis displays - to 
use Anderson's term - a more comprehensive 'totalising perspective.' To 
demonstrate: in revising his understanding of the economic dimension of 'The 
Long Revolution ·, he concedes that - contrary to his earlier projections -
there is in fact very limited space to introduce socialist institutions of 
production within the interstices of the capitalist order: 
There was never any way in which the genuinely new ideas and 
provisions for a caring society could persist as an exceptional sector, 
· contradicted by systematic inequality and competition everywhere 
else. (p. 100) 
He reaches a similar conclusion vis-a-vis the potential for socialist 
intervention in the cultural domain. (Recall his proposals for organising 
theatre, cinema, publishing etc. according to socialist principles). 
He acknowledges: 'It is now clear that it is impossible to identify any 'public 
service' institution without at once relating it to the social order within 
which it is operating· (p. 134). With respect to the 'democratic revolution', 
he attaches a more accurate emphasis to the ideological function of 
parliament; he is particularly sensitive to the way in which the limited 
democratic freedoms (including free speech, candidature and election) in the 
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bourgeois state are used 'as a cover for its retention of economic and 
associated political power over its citizens' (p. 120 ). A fourth way in which 
his analysis is extended is, of course, in the provision of an international 
perspective on British socialist alternatives. Ultimately, although he never 
disavows his commitment to certain empiricist assumptions, Williams 
overcomes many of their limitations by absorbing (and practising) other 
modes of social analysis. The use of theoretical categories provided by 
Marxist discourse - the 'dominant ideology', the 'state', the 'economic base' -
has been a particularly prominent supplement. 
The third point of comparison between The Lion and the Unicorn and 
'Britain in the 1960 s' was their common assumption of a consensual model of 
British society; notwithstanding certain contradictory aspects (like Williams's 
more conflict-orientated perception of the economy), Orwell's family and 
Williams's community both expressed the belief in a society ultimately united. 
by common interests rather than one divided by irreconcilable class conflict. 
In The Long Revolution. Williams argues that class differences have to be 
overcome by nurturing 'a real feeling of community' (p. 362). In Towards 
2000 despite the radical additions to his analysis, the term 'community' again 
occupies a central position. In the chapter 'Class, Politics and Socialism·, he 
repeats his plea: 
There is only one good way out of all this. A practical and possible 
general interest, which really does include all reasonable particular 
interests, has to be inquired into, found, negotiated, agreed, 
constructed. (p. 165) 
There are adjustments to the concept of community. In 'Democracy Old and 
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New', Williams acknowledges the omission in his earlier study of a developed 
appreciation of the necessary scales of decision-making: 
It is then a matter of urgency to discuss and identify the appropriate 
scales of decision-making, through a range of size of communities 
from the parish or ward to the country or city, on through the 
minority nation or region to presumed national levels, and beyond 
these again to any wider international community. (p. 125) 
The solution he offers is two-pronged : on the local level, communities should 
attain the highest degree of self-management; on the broader level, 'a 
practical and possible general interest' should be cultivated - this could be 
paraphrased as the developing of a broad sense of community. 
In 'The Culture of Nations', the notion of community acquires further 
content. According to Williams, the last natural communities were in the 
process of being destroyed during the lifetime of William Cobbett: 'In all later 
periods, the kind of continuity which Cobbett still saw as ideal, from home 
and birthplace to county and country - none in tension with or cancelling the 
other- was increasingly unavailable' (p. 185). What has replaced these 
communities is artificial: private small-family units, and a zealous patriotism 
inculcated by the ruling class. 
Williams, however, does not see this process as irresistible. He draws 
inspiration from the examples of the 'remarkably solid and mutually loyal 
communities' established under extremely harsh conditions in the Welsh 
mining villages and Clyde shipping centres during the last century. Although 
he does not say as much, he no doubt also draws on the memory of his own 
boyhood experience of community in Wales. He concludes: 
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These are the real grounds of hope. It is by working and living 
together, with some real place and common interest to identify with, 
and as free as may be from external ideological definitions, whether 
divisive or universalist, that real social identities are formed. 
(p. 196) 
Although Williams has tried to make appropriate changes to accommodate 
communities from a local to an international level, most of the criticisms of 
his use of 'community' in The Long Revolution stiU obtain: that in abstracting 
'community' as a political goal, he fails to recognise the historic specificity of 
past communities; that he diminishes the contradictory interests within any 
community, and that he does not account for other for ms of oppression - like 
sexism and racism - that occur in working class communities. 
To those - two further criticisms can be added. Firstly, the dubious basis of 
Williams's distinction between natural (good) and artificial (bad) communities 
in Towards 2000 becomes clear when the oppressive and exploitative aspects 
of 'natural' communities are recognised. Indeed, there is no reason why other 
factors of importance in socialist strategy should not be more in evidence in 
artificial orders. Second, Williams's quest for 'real social identities' and 
·natural communities' needs to be related to the residual empiricism in his 
analysis. The acquisition of 'real social identities' by membership of 'natural 
communities' far away from 'external ideological definitions' is the experience 
Williams privileges above all; it remains in some way 'authentic', unmediated 
by the confusing representations of the dominant ideology. Therefore, 
although in Towards 2000 Williams perceives to a greater extent the 
ideological nature of social formations, this experience of natural community 
still represents to him a realistic means of defying the ideological onslaught of 
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the dominant class. Besides the obvious practical objection as to where such a 
community might be created, it is Williams's limited notion of ideology - as 
something communities can partially escape - that is ultimately disabling. 
The role of ideology in constituting social identities and communities, whether 
in Cobbett's time or the year 2000, will remain the same. 
The fourth area of overlap between Orwell and 'early' Williams was in 
their respective understandings of socialism. I argued that Williams's 
socialism resembles that of Orwell in his insistence on the importance of 
'bourgeois freedoms'; his commitment to 'reasonable argument'; the reformist 
nature of his policy suggestions; and in his faith in 'people' as the agents of 
socialism. These similarities can be extended, with qualifications, to Towards 
2000. 
First, Williams retains his commitment to existing democratic freedoms in 
the struggle for socialism. As was the case with Orwell, he sees these 
victories of bourgeois revolution as indispensable: 
It is my belief that the only kind of socialism which now stands any 
chance of being established, in the old industrialised 
bourgeois-democratic societies, is one centrally based on new .kinds 
of communal, cooperative and collective institutions. In these the 
full democratic practices of free speech, free assembly, free 
candidature for elections, and also open decision-making, of a 
reviewable .kind, by all those concerned with the decision, would be 
both legally guaranteed and, in now technically possible ways, 
active. (p. 123) 
Second, as in The Lion and the Unicorn and 'Britain in the 1960 s', in 
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Towards 2000, the struggle of ideas, of trying to change consciousness, 
. remains a central focus. This is evident in Williams's insistence on the need 
to recognise and move beyond the ideological constraints imposed by the 
capitalist categories of 'employment', 'skilled' and 'overmanning' (pp 85-91 ). 
It is also evident in his argument that for a socialist programme to succeed, 
certain patterns of thought would have to change: first, the tendency to see 
everything - the earth, people, the self - as raw material for schemes of profit 
or power; the second and related type of thinking is that which abstracts and 
generalises 'production' as a central priority over all other natural and human 
processes; the third is thinking which elevates rational intelligence 
(conventionally associated with dominant systems and institutions) and 
denigrates the validity of emotion (associated with the new social 
movements). (pp. 260-7). Finally, the stress on change of consciousness is 
strongly realised in his desire to see a culture of general (comm unity) interest 
nurtured (pp. 193ff). 
Thirdly, notwithstanding Williams's claim in the concluding pages of 
Politics and Letters that the politics of reform belong to a distant phase of his 
political development, it is difficult to discern in Towards 2000 a new and 
distinctive revolutionary socialism. Indeed, the different levels of discourse 
Williams uses in Towards 2000 make it difficult to distil his socialist 
strategy: suggestions relating to possible strategies are interspersed with 
theoretical discussion, and even in the final part he describes resources 
available for building a socialist future rather than a socialist strategy as 
such. In addition to the 'cultural' strategies suggested above, at various 
points in the book he proposes: creating parallel representative institutions 
capable of increasing democracy (pp. 126ff); appropriating new technologies 
for alternative use in media and education (pp. 147 ff); and developing 
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maximum self-management in industry within an ethos of general interest 
(p. 193). The continuity from The Lion and the Unicorn to Towards 2000 in 
this context is perhaps best demonstrated in their shared interest in 
education as an area of struggle: Orwe11's appeal for educational reform is 
repeated in Williams's proposal that new technology be used to extend the 
scope of alternative education. 
The final similarity - that they both see 'people' as the agents of history -
can be extended to Towards 2000. Williams repeats this central affirmation 
several times: 'We have to begin again with people and build new political 
forms· (p. 199). And: 'The difficult business [is] of gaining confidence in our 
own energies and capacities· (p. 269). And: 'But if we look at the whole 
process we have also to blame ourselves, for letting politics be like this' 
(p. 9). 
Recall that both Orwell and Williams in The Long Revolution argued that 
the existing class barriers between worker and petit bourgeois should be 
broken down in the forming of a broad front against capitalism.. In Towards 
2000 Williams refines this argument. Perceiving on the one hand the 
compromised state of the traditional labour movement and on the other, the 
emergence of substantial oppositional groups like the peace, women's and 
ecology movements, he concludes: 
The real struggle has broadened so much, the decisive issues have 
been so radically changed, that only a new kind of socialist 
movement, fully cont.emporary in its ideas and methods, bringing a 
wide range of needs and interests together in a new definition of 
general interest, has any real future. (p. 17 4) 
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Francis Mulhern ( pp. 26-30) argues that the danger with this kind of 
programme is that - as with the broad fronts proposed in the earlier 
arguments - it can diminish the strategic role of the traditional working-class. 
The issues have not changed so radically that working-class activism has lost 
the capacity to place the capitalist system under profound pressure. The 
def eat of the Conservatives in 197 4 was evidence of the decisive political 
intervention British trade unionism could make. Perry Anderson puts that 
victory into perspective in his essay 'Figures of Descent' : 
A bourgeois government had been brought down by the direct action 
of a strategic group of industrial workers - the only time in modern 
. European history that an economic strike has precipitated the 
political collapse of a government. (p. 64) 
Therefore, although Williams's renewed calls for a broader and more 
democratic front should be heeded, it would be a mistake to suggest, as he 
does, that the political leadership of such a movement be shifted from the 
working-class. 
In conclusion, in this opening chapter I have established that there are 
several important similarities in Orwell and Williams's respective 
understandings of politics in Britain. In the next chapter, I propose to 
examine how they understand literature, and particularly the relation 
between politics and literature. 
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Chapter Two: Letters 
I have argued thus far that in their respective understandings of 'politics' 
Orwell and Williams employ a similar problematic: that they share an 
identity of privileged observer in their teits; that they rely on the evidence 
of 'experience'; that they hold to a 'consensual' conception of Britain; and that 
they are committed to similar versions of socialist-humanism. In this 
chapter, I hope to show that this common problematic informs their ways of 
conceiving the study of letters. 
In order to demonstrate this, I undertake as in the first chapter 'a close 
historical reading of exemplary teits', focusing here on their work on letters. 
Again, there will be four threads in the discussion: description of the 
historical context in which the texts were produced; a locating of the selected 
texts within the broader conteit of their work; a close reading of the texts 
chosen; and a synthesis of their common assumptions and arguments. 
The texts selected are: OrweU's essay on Charles Dickens (I, pp. 454-
504); Williams's chapter on Dickens in The English Novel: From Dickens to 
Lawrence ; and the essay on Dickens in Writing in Society. 
These tetts satisfy broadly the selection criteria ref erred to in the 
Introduction. First, and most obviously, both Orwell and Williams have 
written in detail about Dickens. Where these texts do not convey sufficient 
detail - as in the case of Williams's essay in Writing in Society - I draw on 
their other work on letters in order to define their positions more clearly. 
Second, their work on Dickens has been singled out from their literary 
criticism as a whole for particular praise. Of Orwell's essay, George 
Woodcock concludes: 
the essay on Dickens is, though the earliest, one of the best of 
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Orwell's major critical pieces, humane, informed, pleasantly discursive 
and unusually balanced between the sociological, the historical, the 
personal and the aesthetic. (p. 247) 
In his review of The English Novel, Bernard Bergon writes: 'in the best of 
these chapters - the one on Dickens - he, is more than merely interesting. It 
offers a brilliant account of Dickens' response to new modes of urban life' 
(p. 742). And, in an otherwise unfriendly review of Writing in Society. 
Denis Donoghue distinguishes Williams essay on Hard Times: 'The essay I 
like best is a dogged effort to make sense of Hard Times and of the "two 
incompatible ideological positions it articulates"· (p. 20). 
The third criterion, that the texts have 'reciprocal relevance' is 
self-evident. From the wide range of topics dealt with by both Orwell and 
Williams in their literary and cultural criticism, I have selected their work 
on Dickens in order to define the area of overlap between them as precisely 
as possible. 
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2.1 'Charles Dickens' 
Having described in the first chapter the general context in which Orwell 
produced his work, here I focus specifically on the dominant literary /critical 
practices against which he was writing. 
In trying to reconstruct the dominant patterns of literary criticism in 
Britain in the 1930 s through Orwell's writing, it is striking how little 
attention he pays to major critics like I. A. Richards, T. S. Eliot and F. R. 
Le av is. 
He refers only once to Richards in his Collected Essays. Journalism and 
Letters ( I pp. 171-2), in a scornful review of Practical Criticism , a book he 
recommends 'for anyone who wants a good laugh' (p. 171). He 
concentrates on Richards's experiment with his English students in which he 
gave them thirteen poems to criticise without revealing the authorship of the 
poems. What the experiment confirms for Orwell is that: 'many people who 
would describe themselves as lovers of poetry have no more notion of 
distinguishing between a good poem and a bad one than a dog has of 
arithmetic' (p. 171 ). 
Orwell shows no knowledge of the critical 'revolution' Richards's work 
represented. In his article 'Practical Criticism, Critical Practices' 1, john 
Bowen sets out the difference between Richards and his predecessor at 
Cambridge, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch: 
It is not merely a difference of class position - the cultivated 
gentleman-amateur against the petit-bourgeois state professional, but 
an entire shift of discourse and practice. Quiller-Couch ... appeals to 
those great nineteenth century totalising discourses - the classics, the 
Bible, ancestry; Richards to science, to medicine, to psychology. It is a 
95 
shift too of practices, from the unified discourse of a master sensibility 
to the 'piece of field-work in comparative ideology·. Against 'Q's' 
breeding we set Richards' training. (pp. 84-S) 
For Orwell, however, the term 'literary criticism· in 1940 still connotes the 
genteel belle lettrism of Quiller Couch and Saintsbury's generation, and 
Richards' work is seen as no more than a continuation of their style of 
criticism. The reason for Orwell's ignorance as to the unique nature of 
Richards's project can be located partly in his choice of Burma rather than 
Cambridge as his place of 'tertiary education', and partly in the fact that at 
this stage this 'critical revolution · was largely limited to students, who had 
yet to form the dominant school of criticism. 
Orwell's interest in T. S. Eliot is substantial, although it is Eliot's poetry 
rather than the impact of his literary criticism that attracts Orwell's 
attention. He lists Eliot as one of his favourite writers ( II, p. 39 ), in spite of 
his rejection of the central conservative impulse in Eliot's work. One piece, 
however, that does have a. bearing on Eliot's literary criticism is Orwell's 
review of Notes Towards a Definition of Culture (IV, pp. 514-7).2 
Orwell first summarises Eliot's argument that 'culture' depends on the 
existence of a hierarchical society with distinct classes and elites, and then 
raises two main objections: that 'class privilege has ceased to be defensible' 
(p. 516), and secondly, that· (Eliot's] pessimism seems to be exaggerated' 
(p. 517). He concludes: 'Cultures are not manufactured, they grow of their 
own accord. Isit too much to hope that the classless society will secrete a 
culture of its own?' (p. 517 ). Orwell thus makes it clear that Eliot's 
proposals run counter to his own more democratic hopes for society and 
culture. Orwell sees Eliot's conception of culture as elitist, but also 
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anachronistic, and looks forward himself to a culture that is both popular 
and humane. 
As regards the Leavises and Scrutiny. there is only one reference to them 
in his collected works, and it is contained in a generalised attack on the 
literary establishment. In an early essay, 'In Defence of the Novel' (I, 
pp. 281-7), he argues: 
But the novel is a popular form of art, and it is no use to approach it 
with the Criterion -Scrutiny assumption that literature is a game of 
back-scratching (claws in or out according to circumstances) between 
tiny cliques of highbrows. (p. 285) 
As in the case of Richards, so here too Orwell displays no knowledge of 
Cambridge literary politics and the unique nature of the Leavises' project. 
However, several years later, in a review of The Great Tradition published in 
The Observer 3 shortly before his death, Orwell provides a more focused 
response. He criticises firstly Leavis's desire to induce in the reader 'a 
feeling of due reverence towards the "great" and of due irreverence towards 
everybody else' {p. 22), and secondly, he objects to the school-masterish 
tone of Leavis's criticism. He detects behind the authoritative grading of 
authors a voice which says: 
'Remember boys . . . I was once a boy myself' .... But though the boys 
know that this must be true, they are not altogether reassured. They 
can still hear the chilly rustle of the gown, and they are aware that 
there is a cane under the desk which will be produced on not very 
much provocation. (p. 22) 
As was the case with Eliot, so here too it is the elitist and also the 
authoritarian strain in Leavis that off ends Orwell. 
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What then for Orwell were the dominant literary/critical formations of 
his age? He gives the answer in a broadcast talk given on the B.B.C in 1941 
entitled 'The Frontiers of Art and Propaganda' ( II, pp. 149-53), where he 
distinguishes the 'art for art's sake' school and the p()litical criticism of the 
English Marxists. His starting premise is: 'Both the aesthetic and the political 
attitude to literature were produced, or at any rate conditioned by the social 
atmosphere of a certain period' (p, 151 ). 
The period between 1890 and 1930 had, according to Orwell, been one of 
exceptional comfort and security, and accordingly: 
in that kind of atmosphere intellectual detachment, and also 
dilettantism, are possible. It is that feeling of continuity, of security, 
that could make it possible for a critic like Saintsbury ... to be 
scrupulously fair to books written by men whose political and moral 
outlook he detested. (p. 152) 
Since 1930, however, that sense of security had dissolved entirely, and 
literary criticism had therefore also changed: 
In a world in which Fascism and Socialism were fighting one another, 
any thinking person had to take sides, and his feelings had to find their 
way not only into his writing but into his judgements on literature. 
Literature had to become political, because anything else would have 
entailed mental dishonesty. (p. 152) 
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IQ the process of literature 'becoming political', the illusion of pure 
aestheticism was destroyed. This advance - in Orwell's terms - was, 
however, achieved at some cost: 'because it caused countless young writers 
to try to tie their minds to a political discipline which, if they had stuck to it, 
would have made mental honesty impossible' (p. 152). The result is a 
critical impasse: 'Aesthetic scrupulousness is not enough, but political 
rectitude is not enough either' (p. 153 ). This opposition Orwell establishes 
between 'political' and 'aesthetic' criticism is clearly an immense and 
inaccurate oversimplification. The 'political' critics can be identified easily 
enough: they would be the English Marxists, who 'praise or dispraise a book 
because its tendency is Comqiunist' ( I, p. 289). But the 'aesthetic' critics. 
defined simply by their refusal to judge literature in terms of its political 
content, do not form a similarly homogeneous group. On Orwell's definition, 
they would include everyone else, from Saintsbury to Richards and 'the 
Scrutineers·. The artificiality of Orwell's distinction is best illustrated by 
reference to the work of L. C. Knights, an 'aesthetic' critic in Orwell's terms, 
who saw himself as a Marxist, and who applied Marxist categories to 
literature in his major work Drama and Society in the Age of Jonson. 
However, it should be emphasized that Orwell was not alone in his 
(unsuccessful} struggle to discern the terms of the literary critical debates in 
the 1930 s. Graham Pechey concludes his valuable analysis of Scrutiny and 
English Marxism in the 1930 s by observing: 'with the participants talking 
past each other in this way, discussing in effect different things, its not 
surprising that the dialogue came. to nothing' (p. 69 ). By offering simplistic 
definitions of the 'types of criticism', Orwell no doubt contributed to the 
failure of this dialogue. But, it should be added that he shared in the cost of 
this failure, since his own literary and cultural criticism bears witness to 
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the absence of genuine radical debate. 
Perhaps more significant than the absence of 'real dialogue' between the 
different fractions of radical critics, was the absence of critical theory. In 
discussing The Lion and the Unicorn. I noted how Orwell's conception of the 
British state and of socialism was limited by the 'absent centre' of British 
culture. This absence of a theoretical framework or vocabulary imposed 
similarly severe constraints in the context of literary criticism. Perry 
Anderson argues in 'Components' that in the thirties, Leavis's effort to 
make English the 'chief of the humanities· was ·a symptom of the objective 
vacuum at the centre of the culture' (p. SO). Anderson argues further that 
the absence of a classical sociology or a theoretical Marxism meant that 
Leavis was unable to explain the cultural decline he denounced: 'Lacking 
any sociological formation, registering a declin~ but unable to provide a 
theory of it, Leavis was ultimately trapped in the cultural nexus he hated' 
(p. SS). Orwell shared the same 'cultural nexus' as Leavis, and in trying to 
write a 'semi-sociological literary criticism', 4 he came up against the same 
intellectual barriers that circumscribed Leavis's cultural criticism. For 
Orwell, the problem can be stated quite simply: how does one write a 
'semi-sociological literary criticism' without a sociology? 
In describing the context in which Orwell wrote his literary criticism, it 
is necessary finally to identify the broad trends in Dickens criticism during 
the period. In his study, Dickens and his Readers , George H. Ford 
emphasizes the difficulty in generalising about Dickens criticism in the 
early 1940 s. Nonetheless, he sketches two broad sets of opinion. The first, 
with its roots in the nineteenth century, is what Ford refers to as 'the high 
aesthetic line': deriving their standards from the Henry James - type 
novel, these critics (including G. H. Lewes, George Saintsbury and Robert 
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Graves) saw Dickens variously as childish, sentimental, melodramatic, 
superficial and unconvincing. The second group of Dickens critics sought to 
refute these charges, often overstating their arguments in their zeal to 
defend Dickens. They included H. G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw, 
G. K. Chesterton and George Gissing. They perceived many appealing 
qualities in Dickens: a penetrating social criticism; an enormous ability to 
entertain; an eye for realistic detail; and an underrated capacity to use 
symbols (like the fog in Bleak House). Although he makes numerous and 
substantial criticisms of Dickens in his essay, Ford groups Orwell in this 
second category of critics. Indeed, Ford sees him as an exceptionally astute 
def ender of Dickens: 
The most perceptive essay on the subject which has so far 
appeared was written, appropriately, by George Orwell. Orwell is 
one of the few critics who has recognised some of the complexities 
and contradictions of the social criticism in Dickens' novels and yet 
retained a respect and love for them. (p. 237) 
Having described the intellectual context of Orwell's essay on Dickens, 
we now need to place this particular essay in the context of Orwell's work 
on 'letters' as a whole. To summarise all of Orwell's work on culture and 
literature is beyond the scope of this study,5 but for our purposes it is 
possible to identify three very broad categories of interest. 
The first is his criticism of 'literature' specifically. This group can be 
sub-divided further, because Orwell's interest in 'literature' ranges from 
Shakespeare to P. G. Wodehouse. The first sub-category might be his 
essays on 'recognised writers of the past' : this would include the 
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discussions of Dickens, Shakespeare and Tolstoy (II, pp. 153-7; IV, pp. 
331-48 ), and of Swift (IV, pp. 241-61). The second sub-category might 
be his essays on contemporaries and near-contemporaries he perceives as 
worthy additions to the canon of 'good writers': this would include the 
essays on Henry Miller (I, pp. ·178-80; 259-61; 540-78), T. S. Eliot (II, 
pp.272-9),W. B. Yeats(Il,pp. 311-17),D. H. Lawrence(III,pp. 50-3), 
Joseph Conrad (Ill, pp. 439-41; IV, pp. 550-1), and George Gissing (l_Y, 
pp. 483-94). The third sub-category might be the essays on writers of 
uncertain reputation; those whose work, for whatever reason, stands on the 
border between 'good' and merely 'interesting' literature: this would 
include his essays on Rudyard Kipling (I, pp. 183-4; II, pp. 215-29) , 
Charles Reade (II, pp. 50-4), H. G. Wells (II, pp. 166-72), Arthur Koestler 
(Ill, pp. 370-82), P. G. Wodehouse (III, pp. 388-403), and jack London 
(IV, pp. 41-8 ). In the critical analysis of the essay on Dickens to follow, I 
will draw on these essays to reinforce the distinctive features of Orwell's 
criticism. 
The second group of essays reflects his interest in diverse forms of 
'popular culture'. It includes: 'Boys· Weeklies' (I, pp. 505-31); 'Benefit of 
Clergy: Some Notes on Salvador Dali' (I II, pp. 18 5-9 5 ), and 'Raffles and 
Miss Blandish' (III, pp. 246-60). Here Orwell introduces previously 
neglected forms of cultural production for serious consideration, and 
analyses them from the same 'semi-sociological' perspective as he uses in 
the essays on 'literature'. In 'Boys Weeklies', for example, he gives a 
detailed account of Gem and Magnet , and then focuses on the silences in 
these magazines: 
The working classes only enter into the Gem and Magnet as 
comics or semi-villains (race-course touts etc.). As for 
class-friction, trade unionism, strikes, slumps, unemployment, 
Fascism and civil war - not a mention. (p. 517) 
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In 'Raffles and Miss Blandish', he again pays careful attention to these 
forms .of popular fiction, and speculates about the different worlds for 
which Raffles and No Orchids for Miss Blandish were written. Of No 
Orchids, for example, he writes: 
the book has not the smallest connexion with politics and very 
little with social or economic problems. It has merely the same 
relation to Fascism as, say, Trollope's novels have to nineteenth-
century capitalism. It is a day-dream appropriate to a totalitarian 
age. In his imagined world of gangsters Chase is presenting, as it 
were, a distilled version of the modern political scene. (p. 259) 
The third group of essays are those Orwell wrote in the 1940 s dealing 
with the relation between 'literature' and the modern age. They include: 
'Inside the Whale' (I, pp. 540-78), 'The Frontiers of Art and Propaganda' 
(discussed above); Literature and Totalitarianism' (II, pp. 161-5); 
'Literature and the Left' (II, pp. 334-7); 'Propaganda and Demotic Speech' 
(III, pp. 161-8); 'The Prevention of Literature' (IV, pp. 81-95); and 
'Writers and Leviathan· (IV, pp. 463-70). In 'Inside the Whale', Orwell 
argues the connection between the gloomy introspection of pre-1930 
literature and the relatively comfortable living standard enjoyed by those 
writers: 
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Why always the sense of decadence, the skulls and cactuses, the 
yearning after lost faith and impossible civilizations? Was it not, 
after all, because these people were writing in an exceptionally 
comfortable epoch? It is just in such times that 'cosmic despair' 
can flourish. People with empty bellies never despair of the 
universe, nor even think about the universe,_f or that matter. 
(p. 558} 
With the Great Depression and the rise of Fascism, however, the political 
context changed, and the literary patterns changed accordingly. In Orwell's 
words: 
The typical literary man ceases to be a cultured expatriate with a 
leaning towards the Church, and becomes an eager-minded 
schoolboy with a leaning towards Communism. If the keynote of 
the writers of the twenties is 'tragic sense of life', the keynote of 
the new writers is 'serious purpose' . (p. 559) 
Orwell concludes the section on the Auden-generation by voicing a fear 
which haunts his subsequent writings: that in the intensely politicised 
atmosphere of the thirties and forties the integrity of the individual 
creative writer will be compromised, even destroyed, by the political 
demands made upon him: 
there remains the psychological fact that without this 
'bourgeois' liberty the creative powers wither away. In the future 
a totalitarian literature may arise, but it will be quite different 
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from anything we can no~ imagine. Literature as we know it is an 
individual thing, demanding mental honesty and ~ minimum of 
censorship. (p. 568) 
He repeats the fear with greater urgency in the radio broadcast 
'Literature and Totalitarianism; ( 1942) : 
I believe the hope of literature's survival lies in those countries in 
which liberalism has struck its deepest roots, the non-military 
countries .... I believe - it may be no more than a pious hope -
that though a collectivised economy is bound to come, those 
countries wilt know how to evolve a form of Socialism that is not 
totalitarian, in which freedom of thought can survive the 
disappearance of economic individualism. That, at any rate, is the 
only hope to which anyone who cares for literature can cling. 
(p. 164) 
In his most extensive treatment of the theme in 'Writers and Leviathan' 
( 1948), he suggests a defensive strategy for protecting the writer's creative 
integrity against either the 'party' or the totalitarian state: when a writer 
engages in politics, 'he should do so as a citizen, as a human being, but not 
as a writer' (p. 468) .. To 'split his life [thus} into two compartments' 
(p. 469) is the only possible path Orwell sees. And indeed, it is the path 
(unsuccessfully} taken by Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four: as a 
citizen, he re-writes history for the Ministry of Truth, but as a writer, he 
keeps the personal diary for recording his 'true· feelings. 
Finally, one essay that does not fall clearly into these three categories, 
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but which is nonetheless of relevance to Orwell's critical work, is 'Why I 
Write' (I, pp. 23-30). In this essay, Orwell argues that all writers are 
driven by various combinations of the following four motives: sheer 
egoism, aesthetic enthusiasm; historical impulse; and political purpose. He 
declares that in his case the first three would in a peaceful age have 
predominated, but that the politically-charged atmosphere of the thirties 
had 'forced' (p. 26) him to become a 'sort of pamphleteer· (p. 26). As a 
result, his work is defined by its political purpose, which he explains thus: 
'Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been 
written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic 
socialism, as I understand it' (p. 28 ). Although Orwell is writing here 
primarily about fiction, his work on 'letters' after 1936 is also informed 
(perhaps 'indirectly') by this explicit political commitment. 
Orwell opens his essay on Dickens with the observation that 'Dickens is 
one of those writers who are well worth stealing' (p. 454). He notes that 
Marxists claim Dickens as 'almost' a Marxist, Catholics as 'almost' a Catholic. 
Orwell then tries for the remainder of the first section to define Dickens's 
'position' or 'message' in order to understand why he is appropriated by 
such diverse tendencies. He asks: 'Where exactly does he stand, socially, 
morally and politically?' (p. 455); and decides that the easiest way to 
answer this would be to decide what Dickens was not. 
Firstly, he was not, according to Orwell, a 'proletarian' writer, because 
quite simply he did not write about the working-classes. Secondly, he was 
not, 'in the ordinarily accepted sense of the word ... a 'revolutionary' 
writer' (p. 456). Orwell elaborates upon this second negative definition: 
although Dickens' novels reflect 'a consciousness that society is wrong 
somewhere at the root' (p. 456) , his criticism of society is 'almost 
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exclusively moral' (p. 457). Orwell continues: 
For in reality his target is not so much society as 'human nature'. 
It would be difficult to point anywhere in his books to a passage 
suggesting that the economic system is wrong as a system. 
(p. 457} 
As a result: 'His whole 'message' is one that at first glance looks like an 
enormous platitude: If men would behave decently the world would be 
decent' (p. 457). 
Orwell backs up this argument by referring first to Dickens' novels 
which describe revolutions: A Tale of Two Cities and Barnaby Rudge. The 
descriptions of mob violence in these novels reveal 'how deep was 
Dickens's horror of revolutionary hysteria' (p. 463). He then refers to 
David Copperfield and Nicholas Nickelby , in which Dickens depicts the 
edu'cation system; Orwell sums up Dickens's implied argument as follows: 
As always, what he appears to want is a moralized version of the , 
existing thing - the old type of school, but with no caning, no 
bullying or under-feeding, and not quite so much Greek. (p. 467) 
In concluding his assessment of Dickens as 'a change of spirit' rather 
than ·a change of structure' thinker, Orwell makes a crucial qualification. 
Although Orwell concedes that 'in the accepted sense [Dickens is not] a 
revolutionary writer' (p. 468), he insists that 'the strongest single 
impression one carries away from his books is that of a hatred of tyranny· 
(p. 468), and further, that the dichotomy between 'revolutionary· and 
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'moralist' is not as simple as it seems: 
two viewpoints are always tenable. The one, how can you 
improve human nature until you have changed the system? The 
other, what is the use of changing the system before you have 
improved human nature? They appeal to different individuals, 
and they probably show a tendency to alternate in point of time. 
(p. 469) 
Despite his criticisms of Dickens's 'unsystematic' turn of mind, Orwell 
concludes by defending the moralist position that Dickens embodies: 
The central problem - how to prevent power from being abused -
remains unsolved. Dickens, who had not the vision to see that 
private property is an obstructive nuisance, had the vision to see 
that. 'If men would behave decently the world would be decent' is 
not such a platitude as it sounds. (p. 469) 
What emerges here is that despite the opening disclaimer, Orwell is as 
eager as any Marxist or Catholic to 'steal' Dickens. The 'Dickens' that Orwell 
constitutes here is a rather muddled ancestor of 'the plain man': like 
'Orwell', Dickens believes that change of consciousness ('change of spirit') 
must necessarily precede any change in the poli~ical or economic system 
('change of structure'); and, also like 'Orwell', he expresses the deep hatred 
of tyranny that represents the indispensable emotional basis of socialism. 
Orwell's criticisms of Dickens arise from Orwell's (misguided) confidence in 
his own understanding of 'the system· : Dickens does not in effect satisfy 
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Orwell's standards of political analysis. 
In the next three sections, Orwell defines Dickens's attitudes to various 
issues, and tries to explain them in terms of his context. 6 In the first section, 
Orwell indicates in an aside that Dickens's attitude to the London mob and to 
children should be understood in the light of prevailing opinion in Victorian 
England. In the second section, however, Dickens's milieu and its effect 
on his ideas moves into more central focus. He observes: 'More completely 
than most writers, perhaps, Dickens can be explained in terms of his social 
origin' (p. 469); and then proceeds to show how Dickens's formation as a 
member of the urban petit bourgeoisie influenced his attitudes to the poor 
(generalised sympathy) ; to the rising bourgeoisie (more keenly focused 
sympathy) ; and to the landed gentry (bitter scorn). 
In the third section, Orwell continues to list what Dickens thought and felt 
about various issues. The discussion ranges from Dickens's horror of 
proletarian roughness, to his snobbish treatment of criminals (vide 
Magwitch), to his prudish attitude to sex across the class barrier, and finally 
to his uncritical depiction of servants. His explanation of these - sometimes 
quite offensive - attitudes is offered briefly: 
.Given his origins, and the time he lived in, it could hardly be 
otherwise. In the early nineteenth century class-animosities may have 
been no sharper than they are now, but the surface differences 
between class and class were enormously greater. (p. 478) 
In the fourth section, he insists on the importance of Dickens having lived 
in London, since London 'is a city of consumers, of people who are deeply 
civilized but not primarily useful' (p. 483). This explains for Orwell Dickens's 
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failure to write about work: 
What exactly went on in Gradgrind's factories? How did Podsnap 
make his money? How did Merdle work his swindles? .... As soon as 
he has to deal with trade, finance, industry or politics he takes refuge 
in vagueness, or in satire. (p. 484) 
Dickens's distance from the productive centre of nineteenth century England 
leads him to see people 'always in private life, as 'characters', not as 
functional members of society' (p. 485). 
Although Orwell refers liberally to Dickens's novels to reinforce his 
arguments, his discussion of Dickens's relation to his milieu remains 
fragmentary and anecdotal. Furthermore, he does not historicise the 
particular novels discussed, thus creating an impression of 'the essential 
Dickens', a static figure who changed little during his lifetime as a writer. For 
example, in discussing Dickens' attitude to servants, Orwell does not attempt 
to trace any development or changes from Pickwick Papers to Our Mutual 
Friend : Sam Weller and Sloppy are cited simply to confirm Orwell's argument 
that Dickens could not conceive a social system without servants, and 
therefore did no more than 'reach out for an idealised version of the existing 
thing' (p. 483).7 
In section five, Orwell moves from examining Dickens's message to 
assessing his aesthetic or 'literary· qualities. He makes an important 
qualification at the outset: 
But every writer, especially every novelist, has a 'message', whether 
he admits it or not, and the minutest details of his work -are influenced 
by it. All art is propaganda .... On the other hand, not all 
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propaganda is art. (pp. 491-2) 
He repeats his doubts as to the independence of the 'aesthetic' in the next 
paragraph: 
As a rule, an aesthetic preference is either something inexplicable or it 
is so corrupted by non-aesthetic motive as to make one wonder 
whether the whole of literary criticism is not a huge network of 
humbug. (p. 492) 
Despite these hesitations, Orwell proceeds to examine Dickens's literary 
qualities, and his conclusions are generally unfavourable. Dickens's style is 
described as 'florid' (p. 494); his 'imagination overwhelms everything, like a 
kind of weed' (p. 495); and he is ·a writer whose parts are greater than his 
wholes' (p. 497). According to 'aesthetic' or 'literary· standards, Dickens is 
therefore not a 'greatwriter'. 
However, Orwell refuses this line of argument, and for two quite different 
reasons. Firstly, he insists that 'for any work of art, there is only one test 
worth bothering about - survival' (p. 499 ); and according to this test, 
Dickens succeeds handsomely. Secondly, he rejects the whole process of 
'grading' authors itself. Referring to Dickens and Tolstoy, he observes: 
The truth is that it is absurd to make comparisons of 'better' and 
'worse' .... [O)ne is no more obliged to choose between them than 
between a sausage and a rose. Their purposes barely intersect. 
(p. 500) 
Two quite contradictory aesthetics are expressed in unresolved tension in 
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this section. The first, the 'radical' aesthetic, is introduced in Orwell's refusal 
to privilege 'art' or 'literature·; the first half of the aphorism - 'all art is 
propaganda' - might be paraphrased as: 'all forms of cultural production 
have political origins and consequences'. This is developed in his perception 
of Dickens as having been 'stolen' by different types of readers. The 
implication is that the texts, rather than being inviolable repositories of 
meaning, are reconstituted ('stolen') in the act of reading; and hence Dickens 
the Marxist, the Catholic or Conservative. Therefore, not only the production 
of texts, but also their subsequent reproduction, are by definition political 
processes. This line of argument is taken yet further in his comments about 
the literary/critical industry - ·a huge network of humbug.' According to 
Orwell, the claims that aesthetic criteria are 'innocent' are quite spurious: 
definitions of 'literature· and in particular 'good literature' are determined by 
non-aesthetic motives; political considerations govern these purportedly 
'artistic' or 'literary' questions. Finally, in refusing to compare Dickens and 
Tolstoy, Orwell clears the way for an aesthetic which judges texts in terms of 
their context instead of in terms of a (mystified) set of transcendent criteria. 
The contrary, 'conservative' aesthetic is implied in the second half of the 
aphorism: 'on the other hand, not all propaganda is art'. This might be 
paraphrased as : 'although all texts have a political dimension, not all texts 
have that special quality which elevates them into the category of "art".' The 
sense of 'art' (and aesthetic values) as in some way transcending the political 
is further suggested in Orwell's use of the verb 'corrupted' in describing the 
presence of a political component in all aesthetic preference; the implication 
is that if it were not for the 'corrupting' influence of politics, 'pure' aesthetic 
judgements might prevail. This privileging of 'art' is taken further in 
Orwell's separation of 'message· and 'style' , content and form. It is suggested 
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that it is not the content (propaganda) but the form (artistic skill) that 
determines whether a text is art or not; according to 'pure' aesthetic 
standards, the content is largely irrelevant, and it is quite possible to have 
'good' literature with poor or offensive content. 8 This line of reasoning is 
concluded in Orwell's perception of 'survival' as the only aesthetic standard 
'worth bothering about.' Instead of seeing a text's survival as the result of 
continuities in cultural reproduction, Orwell sees it as proof of the text's 
intrinsic (artistic) value : 'great art' will establish its superiority by rising 
above the petty (politically-motivated) objections of its own day, and will 
survive into future generations. 
In the concluding section of the essay, Orwell repeats his view of Dickens 
as the def ender of the underdog; he argues that such '[a] good-tempered 
antinomianism rather of Dickens's type is one of the marks of western 
popular culture' (p. 503); and it is in this that the key to Dickens popularity 
is to be found: 'But in his own age and ours he has been popular chiefly 
because he was able to express in a comic, simplified and therefore 
memorable form the native decency of the common man· (p. 503 ). In the 
same way in which he equates democratic freedoms with the 
English-speaking world in The Lion and the Unicorn. so here Orwell identifies 
'the idea of freedom and equality' (p. 504) with Dickens. In the final 
sentence, the identification of 'Orwell' with 'Dickens' is extremely close, as 
Orwell contemplates the place of Dickens (and the values he stands for) in the 
middle of the twentieth century: 
It is the face of a man [Dickens] who is always fighting against 
something, but who fights in the open and is not frightened, the face 
of a man who is generously angry - in other words, of a nineteenth 
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century liberal, a free intelligence, a type hated with equal hatred by 
all the smelly little orthodoxies which are now contending for our 
souls. (p. 509) 
Orwell thus tries to relate Dickens to the context in which he is reproduced 
(the 1930 s), and more specifically, tries to enlist him as a close ally of the 
plain man.9 
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2.2 Chapter One of The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence. 
The cultural landscape of post-War Britain was dominated by the work of 
F. R. Leavis and Scrutiny. They had discredited the genteel amateurism of 
Saintsbury's generation, and had more than withstood the forays into the 
field of culture undertaken by the English Marxists. In an article, 'Our Debt to 
Dr. Leavis', Williams registers Leavis' overwhelming presence: 
In my own case, I have both learned from him and criticized him, and 
though I do not know whether he would want me to do so, I repeat 
what I have written over the past twelve years: that he is the most 
interesting critic of his generation, that his educational influence has 
been central to the best work of his period, and that his life's work is a 
major contribution to our culture. (p. 245) 
This then was the context in which Williams conceived and wrote The 
English Novel: From Dickens to Lawrence. and looking back, he recalls the 
particularly powerful influence exerted by Leavis's The Great Tradition in 
the area of novel-criticism: 
by this time, (Leavisl had completely won. I mean if you talked 
to anyone about the English novel, including people who were hostile 
to Leavis, they were inf act reproducing his sense of the shape of its 
history. So I couldn't but talk to that situation. (Politics and Letters, 
p. 245} 
In The Great Tradition , Leavis argues that the only English novelists 
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worthy of the epithet 'great' are: Jane Austen, George Eliot, Henry James, 
Joseph Conrad and D. H. Lawrence. Dickens fails to make the grade, although 
Hard ·nm es is singled out as an exceptional work. Leavis describes what 
distinguished 'the few really great' (p. 10) as follows: 
And: 
the major novelists ... count in the same way as the major poets, 
in the sense that they not only change the possibilities of the art for 
practitioners and readers, but that they are significant in terms of that 
human awareness they promote; awareness of the possiblities of life. 
(p. 10) 
The great novelists in that tradition are all very much concerned with 
'form'; they are all very original technically, having turned their 
genius to the working out of their own appropriate methods and 
procedures. (p. 16) 
A further sense of what is meant by 'great' can be derived from the 
adjectives he attaches to these select few: George Eliot is praised for her 
'intellectual weight and moral earnestness' (p. 18) ; Henry jam es because in 
his work 'certain human potentialities are nobly celebrated' (p. 21) ; and 
Conrad for being 'an innovator in 'form· and method (and) the servant of a 
profoundly serious interest in life' (p. 27). 
Dickens's exclusion is explained thus: 
That Dickens was a great genius and is permanently among the 
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classics is certain. But the genius was that of a great entertainer, and 
he had for. the most part no profounder responsibility as a creative 
artist than this description suggests .... The adult mind doesn't as a 
rule find in Dickens a challenge to an unusual and sustained 
seriousness. (p. 29) 
Hard Times is an exception because it is 'a completely serious work of art' 
(p. 249 ). Leavis praises the novel for, among other things, its 
comprehensive vision: 'one in which the inhumanities of Victorian civilisation 
are seen as fostered and sanctioned by a hard philosophy, the aggressive 
formulation of an inhumane spirit' (p. 250). He also praises the presentation 
of the circus people who embody a 'vital human impulse' (p. 255). According 
to Leavis, the novel's flaws - the sentimental depiction of Stephen Blackpool 
and dubious descriptions of trade unionism - in no way diminish its stature, 
since: 'Dickens's understanding of Victorian civilisation is adequate for his 
purpose; the justice and penetration of his criticism are unaffected' (p. 271 ). 
From this summary of The Great Tradition, several important 
characteristics of Leavis's criticism can be discerned. The first is the narrow 
definition of literature and even narrower definition of 'great' literature. 
Unlike Orwell, Leavis sees a clear and unbreachable line between 'art' and 
'propaganda' : 'Art' or 'Literature' for the latter are terms to be conferred 
occasionally and with great caution on certain privileged texts. The second 
characteristic that is evident is the theoretical impoverishment of Leavis's 
work. In The Great Tradition, Leavis's critical vocabulary rests on a very 
limited stock of terms: 'serious', 'vital', 'possibilities of life', 'humane', and 
one or two others. The third characteristic is related to the second: The 
absence of 'politics· in Leavis criticism. Mulhern emphasizes the significance 
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of this silence in the conclusion of his study, The Moment of Scrutiny: 
the basic and constant discursive organization of the journal, the 
matrix of its literary and cultural criticism and of its educational 
policies, of its radical and conservative manifestations alike, was one 
defined by a dialectic of 'culture' and 'civilization' whose main and 
logically necessary effect was a depreciation, a repression and, at 
the limit, a categorial dissolution of politics as such. Nothing could ~e 
more disorienting for socialist cultural theory than the ingestion of a 
discourse whose main effect is to undo the intelligibility of its ultimate 
concern: political mobilization against the existing structures of society 
and State. (pp. 330-1) 
For Mulhern, the major challenge facing the socialist critic is therefore to 
resurrect the category of politics in literary criticism by systematically 
exposing the obfuscation produced by the discourse of Scrutiny. 
Regarding specifically Dickens criticism, I noted that Orwell's essay falls in 
the broad category of those def ending Dickens from critics arguing 'the high 
aesthetic line'. By the time Williams writes, the need to defend Dickens from 
this quarter has passed. According to Williams: 
Dickens certainly is now more admired, more respected, more 
carefully studied than he has ever been, and especially within a 
minority critical public; the majority of readers he has of course 
always kept. ( p. 29) 
Despite this change in critical fashion since Orwell's essay - and particularly 
118 
the amelioration in the reception of Dickens - there continue to be critics that 
find fault with Dickens. There are those, Williams argues, that criticise him 
for failing to satisfy 'the standard of one kind of novel, ... the fiction of an 
educated minority' (p. 31 ). Leavis is present here in all but name, and in this 
chapter Williams defends Dickens from such negative judgements with even 
more zeal than Orwell does. 
Another development in Dickens criticism with a bearing on Williams's 
work was the emergence in the late 1950 s of more rigorous efforts to read 
Dickens in his context. In the introduction to John Gross' collection of essays 
on Dickens, Gabriel Pearson summarises the main contributions: 
[John] Holloway ... makes an effort to see [Dickens] as involved, 
however inarticulately, in the ideological debates of his age. His essay 
on Hard Times makes a salutary corrective to Dr. Leavis's perhaps too 
Lawrentian account .... [Jack] Lindsay is mostly concerned with the 
way in which profound social forces interact with the lives of 
individuals; [Arnold} Kettle with Dickens's conscious rejection of 
capitalist social relationships. (p. xxiv) 
Finally, in outlining the context of The English Novel ... it should be noted 
that it was based on Williams's lectures on the novel given at Cambridge 
between 1962 and 1968. 1 In Politics and Letters (pp. 244-5), he describes 
The English Novel as partly the product of institutional pressure: employed 
as a literary critic, he was expected to produce books of literary criticism. 
It is now necessary to place The English Novel in the context of Williams's 
work on literature during his 'early' phase. His first major work on literature 
was Reading and Criticism , in which he sets out 'to offer suggestions and 
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material for the development of responsive and intelligent reading of 
literature' (p. 1 ). He argues in the introductory chapter that criticism should 
be concerned not with 'books for pleasure', but with books that 'have value'; 
criticism, according to Williams, 'is concerned with evaluation, with 
comparison, and with standards. It is mature reading' (p. 3). At present he 
notes that the 'public for serious literature' (p. 4) remains small, but insists 
that there are remedial reasons for this state of affairs. He argues further 
that 'serious literature' is primarily important as ·a record of human 
experience' (p. 8), and that to appreciate it requires training. There is no 
short cut in this training: 'through attentive reading, through orderly 
discussion under a capable tutor, and through regular reference to examples 
of good written criticism, progress may be made' (p. 8). He concludes that it 
is only by 'contact with actual literature rather than with abstractions· (p. 8), 
that the exercise of judgment and value might be developed. 2 In the second 
chapter, he reviews current reading habits, and finds them to be superficial 
and slovenly. The reason for this is 'that much of our reading has become 
dissociated from experience that is important to us in our directly personal 
living' (pp. 17-18 ). In Chapter Three, he goes on to assess the role of the 
critic, and argues: 
the importance of the critic's function hardly needs stressing. He is 
the mediator between the artist and the serious reading public; his 
criticism is the articulation of adequate response and trained 
evaluation. (p. 21) 
He considers the competing types of criticism available to the 'ordinary 
reader', and then sets out what he believes criticism should encompass. In the 
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first place, in ord.er to read adequately, one should 'set one's reading in order 
with relation to one's personal experience and to the experience of the culture 
to which one belongs' (p. 26 ). By fallowing this method, by the 'application 
of intelligence and sensibility' (p. 26), the resulting criticism will contribute 
ultimately to the emergence of 'an organic and contemporary body of 
judgment' (p. 29).3 
In Chapter Four, Williams demonstrates how critical analysis should be 
performed by giving a close reading of selected passages. He concludes: 
Analysis will lead us to judgments of particular pieces of writing and 
will develop a capacity for close reading. From a number of such 
judgments certain general ideas about reading will be constructed, so 
that in our normal reading of complete works our response is more 
aware and more controlled. (p. 44) 
The next four chapters deal in turn with the analysis of verse, prose, a novel 
(Heart of Darkness) and drama as Williams puts into practice the critical 
method outlined in the opening chapters. 
In the final chapter, Williams considers the relation between literature 
and society. He concedes that 'in one important sense the arts can only be 
fully understood when they are examined within the context of the society in -
which they were produced' (p. 100), but argues nonetheless that literature 
should not be treated as merely a reflection of its age: those who do ·are too 
often persons whose training has been exclusively sociological and who are in 
many ways unfitted for the reading of creative literature· (p. 100). He 
concludes: 'It is not that the relation of literature to society ought to be 
ignored, it is simply that the relation is a great deal more complicated than is 
121 
good for tidiness' (p. 102). 4 
Further, literature should not be judged in terms of its 'message' or 'ideology·, 
since the true test of literary value is: 
the width of exploration, the depth of response . . . . And this width 
and depth, since they exist primarily in words, can only be measured 
by literary analysis. Language is the scale. (p. 106) 
In the Preface, Williams acknowledges his debt to among others Leavis, 
Richards and Eliot, and although there are differences in detail S, Reading and 
Criticism reproduces in succinct form the assumptions and practices of these 
critics. The influence of Eliot is evident in the expressions of cultural 
pessimism; of Richards in the exposition of 'practical criticism·; and of Leavis 
in the narrow definition of 'serious literature' , in the suspicion of sociology 
(which can be read as 'Marxism' ), and in the repression of politics. The 
extent to which Williams - the committed socialist - was constrained by this 
intellectual inheritance is perhaps best illustrated by reference to the 
complete absence of 'politics' in his discussion of Heart of Darkness: 
throughout the chapter on the novel he deals only with textual strategies and 
ignores the history of colonialism entirely. 
In the twenty years between Reading and Criticism and The English Novel. 
Williams did not produce another book on literature as such, writing instead 
about drama (Drama From Ibsen to Brecht and Modern Tragedy), culture 
(Culture and Society and The Long Revolution} and politics (May Day 
Manifesto). However, there are two short texts Williams wrote during this 
period that have a bearing on his understanding of literature and of Dickens 
particularly. 
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The first text is Culture and Society , in which Williams traces the changing 
meanings of the word 'culture·, which he sees as: 
a record of a number of important and continuing reactions to 
these changes in our social, economic and political life, and may be 
seen, in itself, as a special kind of map by means of which the nature 
of the changes can be explored. (p. 16) 
He records the major shift in the meaning of 'culture' as follows: 
the recognition of a separate body of moral and intellectual 
activities, and the offering of a court of human appeal, which comprise 
the early meanings of the word, are joined, and in themselves 
changed, by the growing assertion of a whole way of life. 
(pp. 17-18} 
He traces this shift by examining 'particular thinkers and their actual 
statements' (p. 18 }, from Burke and Cobbett to Orwell. In his Conclusion, he 
endorses the sense of culture as 'a whole way of life' , and argues for the 
development of a common culture based on values of solidarity, community 
and democracy. 
Although Williams does not carry the argument through here, his 
democratic definition of culture .has implications for the meaning of 
'literature'. If the meaning of 'culture' is to be democratised and is not to 
refer only to the activities of a privileged elite, so 'literature· - a part of 
culture - should refer not only to 'serious' works of fiction but to all forms of 
writing; or, at the very least, 'literature' should not be separated off from 
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other forms of writing and held up for special veneration. 
One of the figures Williams discusses in Culture and Society is Dickens. He 
focuses on Hard Times. and like Leavis, he praises Dickens for providing 
·a thorough-going and creative examination of the dominant philosophy of 
industrialism' (p. 104), and also for preserving in his novels the positive 
values traced in the 'Culture and Society' tradition. In Hard Times, they are 
dramatised in the spontaneous, unorganised life of the Circus; Williams argues 
that Sleary's faith: 
'that there ith a love in the world, not all Thelf -interetht after all' 
... is a characteristic conclusion, in a vitally important tradition which 
based its values on such grounds. It is the major criticism of 
Industrialism as a whole way of life, and its grounds in experience 
have been firm. (p. 106) 
Williams's positives - 'tradition' , 'values' , 'way of life' and 'experience' -
closely echo those of Leavis. However, unlike Leavis, Williams is not able to 
overlook the flaws in Hard Times. According to Willia.ms, Dickens locates 
these positive values exclusively in individual experience, thus establishing a 
limiting opposition between individuals - seen as passive repositories of 
virtue - and the evil system. The most paralysing consequence of this is that 
Dickens could not see any way of expressing positive values in the 
organisation of society: in Hard Times, for example, there are no social 
alternatives to Gradgrind and Bounderby, and Dickens goes outside 
industrialised society to the Circus to give expression to his values. Williams 
further criticises Dickens's depiction of the working-class alternately as 





perverse agitators if they try to improve their condition (Slackbridge). 
Williams also describes Dickens's tone as that of ·an adolescent'; with a 
combination of patronising compassion for the meek and suffering, and a 
self righteous sense of having seen through society and found everyone out, 
Dickens 'shames the adult world, but also rejects it' (p. 107). Williams's 
concluding assessment is severe: 'As a whole response, Hard Times is more a 
symptom of the confusion of industrial society than an understanding of it, 
but it is a symptom that is significant and continuing' (p. 107). 
Although there is still evidence of Williams's debt to Leavis in Culture and 
Society (notably in his critical vocabulary and methods of textual analysis), 
there are several important changes in his position as expressed in Reading 
and Criticism. Besides the explicit rejection of Leavis' elitist conception of 
culture there is also the overtly 'political' standards used in the discussion of 
Dickens. As a socialist, Williams is not prepared to allow (as Leavis does) 
that 'Dickens' s understanding of Victorian civilisation is adequate for its 
purpose'. He demands a more coherent socialist analysis in the novels, and 
focuses his criticisms accordingly: Dickens's emphasis on individual salvation 
. . 
is limited; his depiction of workers is patronising; and his understanding of 
Victorian capitalism confused. Further, in commending Dickens's optimistic 
humanism, Williams resists the gloomy conclusions of Leavis's (and Eliot's) 
cultural pessimism. 
The second text of direct relevance to Williams's understanding of 
literature and of Dickens is his 'Notes on English Prose 1780-1950', first 
published as the Introduction to Volume II of Pelican Book of English Prose in 
1969.0 In this article, Williams emphasises the importance of foregrounding 
the changing nature of the relation between writers and readers in the 
production of prose: 
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In its most general sense, the writing of prose is a transaction between 
discoverable numbers of writers and readers, organized in certain 
changing social relations which include education, class habits, 
distribution and publishing costs. (p. 72) 
This expanded perspective involves firstly a reconsideration of 'literature' 
and particularly the novel: Williams adjusts his earlier views on 'serious 
literature· when he argues 'there is no single tradition of fiction in the period, 
and not-even a single major tradition' (p. 80). Secondly, in applying this 
perspective to Dickens' prose specifically, he argues that: 
for expressing the actual life of a hard-pressed, hard-driven, 
excluded majority, a different prose was absolutely required; a 
different language as expressing the altered relation of writer and 
reader. (p. 90) 
In the Introduction to The English Novel, Williams sets out the main thesis 
of his study: that in the 1840 s there was a major crisis of experience in 
Britain; that the central bearing in this crisis was 'the exploration of 
community: the substance and meaning of community' (p. 11); and that the 
novel was the most important form used to realise this new and critical 
experience. 
He then not.es two important developments in the history of the novel 
during this period. The first is that by 1840 the historical novel had run its 
course. Williams cites the major achievement of the historical novel as: 'the 
establishment of a position in human experience that was capable of 
judging ... the very society that was forming and changing it' (p. 13 ). This 
126 
position was no longer available after the Industrial Revolution, because 
society became an agent in its own right: 'Society, now, was not just a code to 
measure, an institution to control, a standard to define or to change. It was a 
process that entered lives, to shape or to deform' (p. 13). 
The second development was the disappearance of 'knowable 
communities·. According to Williams, 'the novelist offers to show people and 
their relationships in essentially knowable and communicable ways· (p. 14 ). 
However., because of the rapid changes in society, 'any assumption of a 
knowable community - a whole community, wholly knowable - becomes 
harder and harder to sustain' (p. 16). He emphasizes that this is of particular 
concern for novelists, because: 
A knowable community ... is a matter of consciousness as well as of 
evident fact. Indeed it is to just this problem of knowing a 
community - of finding a position, a position convincingly experienced, 
from which community can begin t.o be known - that one of the major 
phases in the development of the novel must be related. (p. 17}_ 
He concludes that Dickens is the crucial figure in this exploration of 
community, because whereas earlier writers could refer to relatively stable 
rural communities, Dickens had to find a basis for community in the new 
experience of the city. 
The analytical limitations of 'experience' here in the context of literary 
criticism are as damaging as they were in Williams's political analysis. In the 
first chapter, we saw that 'experience' owed its prominence in Williams's 
work to the historical ascendancy of common sense empiricism; that it act.ed 
as a constant check on theoretical enquiry; and that, viewed from a 
• 
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structuralist position, 'experience' could not be the basis for anything, since it 
was the effect or result of living in and through the categories, processes and 
frameworks of the culture. In The English Novel, 'experience' is still the 
stuff of the real world, providing the basis for literature, and functioning as a 
catch-all phrase for the various economic, political and social processes that 
inform the novel. As a 'theoretical' category, it has to bear an enormous 
weight of meanings, and as a result cannot differentiate the complex of 
material and cultural for ms involved in the production of the novel. 
Williams's emphasis on the theme of 'community' is also dubious. In 
Chapter One, we saw that Williams tends to project his own {extremely 
positive) 'experience of community' beyond its historical limits, neglecting in 
the process the divisive force of the class system. In The English Novel. 
although Williams's discussion of community represents a valuable 
perspective, it is at least arguable that Williams again privileges his own 
'experience' here, and that there are other bearings in the development of 
the novel that are of equal weight: for e:xample, the emergence and fate of 
the individual protagonist; the competing claims to 'realism'; and the relation 
between the novel and other forms of cultural production. 
The third premise in Williams's thesis - that the novel {and especially the 
novels he discusses in this study) is the most important form employed in 
realising the crisis of experience - reflects strongly the influence of Leavis. 
In The Great Tradition, Leavis holds up the novels of Eliot, James and Conrad 
as the documents of cultural excellence; in so doing, he diminishes not only 
the work of other novelists, but also the work of 'lesser' cultural producers, 
like cartoonists, journalists and music-hall performers. In focusing on the 
same group of novels as Leavis, Williams therefore reproduces Leavis's map 
of English literature. Eagleton makes this point emphatically in Criticism 
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and Ideology: 
[The English Novel) is a powerful plea for the 'English tradition' - not, 
to be sure, Leavis's tradition exactly, for suppressed links are 
inserted (Hardy), lines of continuity consequently redrawn, and the 
political assumptions forcefully at odds with the Leavisian ideology. 
But for all that the book is a rewriting of the ;great tradition· from 
an alternative standpoint, rather than a total displacement of that 
critical terrain. (p. 36) 
In the chapter on Dickens, Williams first repeats his view that Dickens 
I 
was writing '.at the time of the critical remaking of the novel and of the 
critical emergence of a new urban popular culture' (p. 29) ; and then refines 
his main argument that: 
The central case we have to make is that Dickens could write a new 
kind of novel - fiction uniquely capable of realising a new kind of 
reality:-- just because he shared with the new urban popular culture 
certain decisive experiences and responses .... [He] is a new kind of 
novelist and ... his method is his experience. (p. 32) 
According to Williams the characteristic pattern of the Dickens novel is: 
first, he established a way of seeing where there is an abse~ce of connection 
and development in the relations of men and women; then, ·as the action 
develops, unknown and unacknowledged relationships, profound and 
decisive connections, definite and committing recognitions and avowals are 
as it were forced into consciousness· (p. 33). Williams concludes that. this 
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creation of consciousness, of an 'imaginative community', is the main purpose 
of Dickens's later fictional works. 
Williams then discusses another aspect of Dickens's originality, his ability 
'to dramatise those social institutions and consequences which are not 
accessible to ordinary physical observation' (p. 34). Quoting Dickens's 
descriptions of buildings and the people who live in them in Little Dorrit and 
Dombey and Son, Williams argues that Dickens's method: 'is a conscious way 
of seeing and showing. The city is shown as at once a social fact and a human 
landscape. What is dramatised in it is a very complex structure of feeling. 
(p. 37) 7 He then shows how Dickens is capable of combining his rhetorical 
external view of the city with a view of the city from the inside, from the 
perspective of the characters. This latter way of seeing is tied to Dickens' 
sense of the physical world as always being 'of [man's) making, his 
manufacture, his interpretation' (p. 40). This ability to make new worlds, 
however, is ambiguous: quoting from passages where Dickens describes the 
new railway system, Williams shows how for Dickens the railway is 'at once 
the "life blood" and "the triumphant monster, Death" · (p. 44). 
In the next step of his argument, Williams returns to his point in the 
Introduction that after 1840 'society' was conceived in a new way. Dickens, 
according to Williams, sees society as both 'a background against which the 
drama of personal virtues and vices is enacted' , and, 'the creator of virtues 
and vices' (p. 44). Williams records how in Dombey and Son it is the latter 
view of society that prevails at first : 
social institutions, particular social purposes, reshape not only the 
physical but the moral world. And the question then arises: what is 
the nature, the human nature, by which this can be judged? (p. 46) 
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At the point in the novel where the conclusion that the diseased slums of the 
city ('society') must inevitably produce vice and evil ('human nature') seems 
inescapable, Dickens the narrator intervenes, creating in the face of this 
suffering a positive social alternative. 
This is in fact the stage at which The Country and the City chapter ends, 
. and the 1964 Critical Quarterly article begins. However, Williams's argument 
is not unduly interrupted because he moves to consider more closely the 
nature of Dickens's 'creative intervention', arguing that Dickens's novels in 
fact constitute a powerful form of social criticism. 
Williams first considers the contrary argument that Dickens was in fact 
an ineffectual social critic, that 'he is curiously blind to the real forces in 
nineteenth century society' (p. 48 ). He (incorrectly) 8 sees Orwell as one of 
the chief purveyors of this argument, which he then rejects quite firmly: 
it is stupid of Orwell to dismiss Dickens as a 'change-of-heart' 
man .... To see a change of heart and a change of institutions as 
alternatives is already to ratify an alienated society, for neither can 
be separated, or ever is, from the other; simply one or other can be 
ignored. (p. 49) 
Williams argues that Dickens in fact has a sure sense of the general 
human condition, and is aware of the limits of piecemeal reform. He 
. compares Dickens's general vision to that of Marx : 
[Marx's] vision is structurally similar to that of Dickens. Absolute 
human exclusion is more important than the relative kinds of 
exclusion which can be remedied by partial and piecemeal change. 
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What Dickens saw as redemption through love and innocence Marx 
saw as revolution, and the difference is crucial. But still, [for both] 
total change is seen as the necessary response to a total condition ... 
(p. SO) 
Quoting from Nicholas Nickleby. Williams shows how in his novels Dickens 
employs deliberately generalising description to depict a general condition, 
and how within the description there is an implied determinism : 
circumstances create evil. To that condition, Dickens proposes a humane 
response. Williams summarises the pattern: 
having defined a social condition as the cause of virtue and vice, 
Dickens then produces virtue, almost magically as in Little Dorrit. 
from the same conditions which in others bred vice; or produces 
charity by making an exceptional and surprising benevolence 
flourish, overriding the determinism of the system. (p. 52) 
In an important passage, Williams approves this resolution warmly: 
There is no reason ... for love and innocence, except that almost 
obliterated by this general condition there is humanity .... The 
inexplicable quality of the indestructible innocence, of the 
miraculously intervening goodness, on which Dickens so much 
depends and which has been casually written off as sentimentality is 
genuine because it is inexplicable .... To believe that a human 
spirit exists, ultimately more powerful than even this system, is an 
act of faith but an act of faith in ourselves. (p. 53) 
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Williams then mentions how Dickens draws randomly on the ideas of 
Carlyle, Cobbett, Arnold and OWen in attacking what he saw as the evils in 
his society. Although these ideas might be contradictory, Williams insists 
that Dickens's general vision is 'deep and remarkable' (p. 57); indeed, he 
concludes that Dickens's novels: 'are more penetrating into the reality of 
nineteenth century England than any of the systems which were in fact 
made clear and consistent. (p. 57). As social criticism, his work is 
'marvellously achieved and still profoundly active' {p. 58). 
We are now finally in a position to compare the ideas of Orwell and 
Williams on the subject of 'letters·, and particularly on Dickens. However, 
before drawing together the points of similarity, it is necessary to specify the 
differences. 
The first difference is in the literary /critical contexts in which Orwell 
and Williams wrote about Dickens. The 1930 s were different to the fifties 
and sixties in several ways. Firstly, in the thirties, there were several 
competing critical discourses: the 'Scrutineers·, the English Marxists and the 
'aesthetic' critics all enjoyed a degree of influence. Second , largely as a 
result of the efforts of the English Marxists,'politics' was firmly on the 
agenda for literary critics. By the time of the Cold War, however, Scrutiny 
had achieved formidable hegemony, and 'politics' as a component of literary 
critical discourse had been shifted from chapter headings to occasional 
footnotes. Nonetheless, there was one important continuity through this 
period, namely the absence of critical theory in English literary criticism. 
This theoretical vacuum was shored up by the intellectual insularity of the 
British Left - the closely related critical work of European contemporaries 
like Georg Lukacs and Walter Benjamin only became available in the late 
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1960 s. 
A second difference is that whereas Orwell wrote as a popular essayist, 
Williams's work on Dickens is that of a professional academic. Inglis places 
Orwell's essays on popular culture as follows: 
in them Orwell is able to start from the literary provenance by 
which as a writer and bellelettriste and upperclass journalist, he was 
intellectually shaped, and then in the name of elementary radicalism, 
to turn its terms upside down. (p. 121) 
In 'Charles Dickens', Orwell was therefore subject to the demands and 
conventions of popular literary journalism, and was challenging those 
conventions by introducing political considerations .into his assessment of 
Dickens. Williams, on the other hand, was subject to the institutional 
demands of the academy: responding within a context dominated by 
Scrutiny, he was obliged to obey the rules of a discourse quite different to 
the one governing Orwell. Orwell's style is accordingly that of 'the plain 
man·, spontaneous, untheoretical and provocative, whereas Williams's prose9 
is careful, academic, and punctuated by the use of a limited 'theoretical' 
vocabulary (notably 'experience', 'form·, and 'structure of feeling'). 
The third difference relates to their respective appreciations of Dickens. 
Although they both ultimately embrace Dickens's achievement (more below), 
Orwell's praise is more strongly qualified than that of Williams. For example, 
Orwell is obedient to traditonal aesthetic criteria, and criticises Dickens's 
style as profuse, overwhelming the narrative· like a kind of weed' (p. 495). 
Williams, on the other hand, applying his categories of experience and form, 
argues that Dickens is a new kind of novelist and that his method ('style') is 
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his experience: he concludes warmly that Dickens's writing is 'uniquely 
capable of expressing the experience of living in cities' (p. 32). Second, in 
terms of Williams's analysis , Orwell's criticisms of Dickens's middle-class 
bias are beside the point: instead of judging Dickens's social attitudes 
according to twentieth century standards, Williams explains Dickens's 
inability to create a convincing worker or aristocrat by pointing to the 
'unknowable' nature of his urban experience; it would therefore have been 
impossible to expect Dickens to capture all aspects of the experience with 
equal veracity. Third, whereas Orwell criticizes Dickens's inability to 
conceptualise British capitalism as a system, Williams again tries to see 
Dickens in terms of his context rather than in terms of current levels of 
political analysis. Dickens's inconsistencies, which Orwell foregrounds and 
attributes to his 'change of heart' philosophy, are for Williams quite 
secondary because he sees Dickens's total vision 'as more penetrating into 
the reality of nineteenth- century England than any of the systems which 
were in fact made clear and consistent' (p. 57). · 
These are substantial differences, and the similarities between Orwell and 
Williams's respective understandings of 'letters' described below do not 
cancel them out. However, these differences are contained within a number 
of broad areas of overlap. 
The first point of comparison is that Orwell and Williams share a similar 
definition of 'literature'. Orwell's conception of 'art' or 'literature' as 
containing a 'residuum of something that elevates it above "lesser" forms of 
writing' corresponds to the Leavisite definition of literature assumed by 
Williams in The English Novel. Both Orwell and Williams see 'literature' as 
referring to particular privileged texts, 'superior' in some undefinable way to 
other forms of cultural production. (I refer to their implicit questioning of 
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this definition presently.) 
The second similarity is that both Orwell and William~ are centrally 
concerned with exploring the relation between 'letters' and 'politics'. This is 
the point made by Said, and quoted in the Introduction that both Orwell and 
Williams are actors: 
in a very complicated drama which is continuing to unfold. The 
drama has to do with problems of superstructure and base. Are the 
political and economic circumstances more determining than the 
ideological and cultural? What is the relationship between them? 
(p. 126) 
Orwell's enquiry into the relation between 'politics' and 'letters' in 'Charles 
Dickens' takes the form of untheoretical ad hoc digressions into the history of 
the nineteenth century: in section 2-4 of the essay, he tries to explain 
Dickens's attitudes and prejudices in the context of Victorian England. 
Williams's enquiry into this complex relationship is largely in the 
language of Leavis, who, for him, articulates the 'real relations between art 
and experience' far more clearly than Marx, with his reductionist categories 
of base and superstructure. In the chapter on Dickens, Williams writes in 
some detail about the 'crisis of experience' in the 1840 s ('politics') , and how 
it at the same time produced - and was realised in - the novels of Dickens 
('letters'). Williams's deep interest in this relationship is perhaps best 
expressed in his term 'structure of feeling' : invented by Williams in order to 
join the analysis of particular forms (structure) and a sense of inchoate 
experience (feeling), it could also be understood as another way of trying to 
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relate politics (feeling) and letters (structure). 
Implicit in their (common) e:xploration of this relation between 'politics' 
and 'letters' is a privileging of the 'real world of politics'. In Chapter One, I 
described how both Orwell and Williams rely on 'their eyes' or 'experience' 
in order to describe and analyse contemporary Britain; in writing about 
Dickens, they obviously cannot ref er to the authority of their own 
e:xperience, but they nonetheless both assume the existence of some 
objective experience of Victorian England that precedes language and which 
is subsequently reflected or distorted in the novels. In Orwell's case, this 
assumption underlies his entire discussion of Dickens and his context: for 
e:xample, he comments at one point that 'when one looks below the surf ace 
of Dickens's books, [it strikes one] that, as nineteenth century novelists go, he 
is rather ignorant' (p. 483): 'below the surface· is the·'reality' that Dickens 
sometimes captured in his novels. In Williams's case, his separation of 
'experience' and 'form' also privileges the former term: instead of seeing 'the 
crisis of experience· he describes as but one competing version of English 
nineteenth century history, Williams tends to use it as an objective reference 
point against which the literary products of the period can be measured. 
Both Orwell and Williams therefore ultimately diminish the role of language 
(including literature) in constituting reality (in this case the reality of 
Victorian England), and in the process privilege their own 'objective· versions 
of reality. 
The third point of comparison is that more than trying to articulate the 
relation between 'politics' and 'letters', both Orwell and Williams seek to use 
the study of 'letters· in the service of (socialist) 'politics': 10 both Orwell and 
Williams bring their commitment to socialism to bear in their literary 
criticism. 
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Orwell's 'socialism· is evident in the essay on Dickens in several ways: in 
the 'radical' aesthetic he proposes; in his 'sociological' interest in Dickens and 
his context; and, perhaps most importantly, in his application of 'political' 
criteria in his assessment of Dickens. Orwell criticises Dickens for failing to 
satisfy his own standards of socialist political analysis, but 'claims· him 
where he conforms to Orwell's version of socialist-humanism: socialism, 
according to Orwell in Wigan Pier. means the hatred of tyranny, and Dickens 
is accordingly embraced for realising this in memorable fashion in his novels. 
Orwell also sees in Dickens's bouyant optimism a correlative to his own 
conviction that 'people' always remain potential agents of history: 'to behave 
decently', which Orwell sees as Dickens's message, is 'not. such a platitude as 
it sounds.· 
Writing in the critical framework established by Scrutiny - a process 
described by Mulhern as quite 'disorienting for socialist cultural theory· -
Williams's. work in The English Novel does not reveal his commitment. to 
socialism in an obvious way. Nonetheless, his political values are indirectly 
evident in his aesthetic disagreements with Leavis (Hardy over James); in his 
efforts to historicise the development of the novel; in his democratising of 
'culture' in his related work; and in his interest in the problem of agency (his 
passage on Marx and Dickens is virtually a paraphrase of Orwell's passage on 
'the revolutionary· and 'the moralist'). Also, as Orwell does, he r.eads Dickens 
as a legitimate ancestor to his version of socialist-humanism: in Chapter One, 
we saw how in The Long Revolution the central core of Williams's socialism 
was a desire to establish ·a real feeling of community' (p .. 363); Dickens's 
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ability in his novels to crea~e 'imaginative communities' is therefore so 
warmly endorsed by Williams because it corresponds to his own political goal. 
Further, Williams celebrates Dickens's humanism with more enthusiasm than 
Orwell: 'To believe that a human spirit exists, ultimately more powerful than 
even this system, ... is an act of faith in ourselves' (p. 53 ). 
Thus far I have established some basis for comparing Orwell and Williams 
on 'letters'; in the next section I will consider whether the comparison can be 
extended to 'late' Williams. 
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2.3. 'The Reader in Hard Times' in Writing in Society. 
' 
After describing the conte1t in which Williams wrote 'The Reader in Hard 
Times', I then summarise Williams's contributions to the study of letters in 
the period between The English Novel and Writing in Society; having 
established the grounds of comparison between Orwell and 'early' Williams, 
this summary focuses largely on whether the comparison can be sustained 
into the 1980 s. I then analyse The Reader in Hard Times ·.and finally draw 
together the points of similarity between Orwell and 'late' Williams. 
In 'Culture is Ordinary', we read how Williams saw Leavis and Marx as his 
two great influences; in the latter part of his career WiUiams's orientation 
shifted from Leavis to Marxism, and his critical practice was revised in the 
process. 
Whereas in the 1950 sand sixties literary criticism was dominated by 
Scrutiny. the 1970 s saw the unfolding of a fresh 'crisis' in English studies. l 
In a valuable overview of the period, Alan Sinfield2 identifies several 
reasons for the crisis: the pressure exerted by students distrustful of the 
elitism in literary studies; the impact of the women's movement and its 
critique of traditional Western values as embodied in literature; and the 
development of theory. As a result of these developments, exponents of 
traditional literary/critical practices were thrown onto the defensive: Sinfield 
quotes from C. B. Cox's editorial in a Critical Quarterly of 1971: The 
traditional belief that study of great literature releases us from the debased 
myths of the present, that it ennobles and civilises, needs to be fought for' 
(p. 35). According to Sinfield, the new work challenges traditional literary 
studies on several fronts: it denies that literature expresses transcendant 
values or that it has privileged access to 'human e1perience'; it foregrounds 
the political function of literary education in society; and it insists upon the 
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political nature of all criticism - criticism claiming neutrality is in fact effacing 
its political assumptions and thus obfuscating its complicity within the 
dominant ideology. 
Dickens criticism since The English Novel reflects these rapid changes in 
critical practice. The traditional methods of novel criticism and the 
arguments about Dickens's place in the canon persist 3, but an increasing 
amount of criticism is concerned with applying the new theoretical insights to 
Dickens. Two recent works exemplary in this regard are David Simpson's 
Fetishism and Imagination , in which semiotic and psychoanalytic theory are 
employed to explain Dickens's Victorian 'world view', and Lawrence Frank's 
Charles Dickens and the Romantic Self, in whic11 Michel Foucault's theories of 
the subject, of language and of power are used as a basis for reading Dickens. 
Williams himself was deeply affected by such developments. In Marxism 
and Literature, he recalls the invigorating effect of newly-accessible 
Continental Marxist theory: 
I felt the excitement of contact with more new Marxist work: the 
later work of Lukacs, the later work of Sartre, the developing work of 
Goldmann and of Althusser, the variable and developing syntheses of 
Marxism and some forms of structuralism. At the same time, within 
this·significant new activity, there was further access to older work, 
notably that of the Frankfurt School (in its most significant period in 
the twenties and the thirties) and especially the work of Walter 
Benjamin; the extroardinarily original work of Antonio Gramsci; and, 
as a decisive element of a new sense of the tradition, newly translated 
work of Marx and especially the Grundrisse. (p. 4) 
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He goes on to contrast the situation of the socialist student of literature in 
1940 and 1970: 
I had reason to reflect on the contrast for any student of literature, 
in a situation in which an argument that had drifted into deadlock, or 
into local and partial positions, in the late thirties and forties, was 
being vigorously and significantly reopened. (p. 4) 
Reverting to Anderson's thesis, the 'absent centre· of British culture was 
therefore being rapidly filled. Whereas both Williams in the 1960 sand 
Orwell earlier had been limited by the absence of theory in their efforts to 
define literature, to articulate the relation between text and context, and to 
politicise the practice of literary criticism, in the 1970 s Williams had a 
wealth of imported theory to draw upon in continuing these enquiries. 
It should be added that for all its critical force, this body of European 
Marxist. theory also contains potentially disabling contradict.ions. Perhaps the 
most. significant is the fact. that. it was without except.ion produced in 
conditions of political def eat.. Anderson recognizes this in Considerations on 
Western Marxism: 4 
all the major departures or developments of substance within this 
tradition are distinguished from the classical heritage of historical 
materialism by the darkness of their implications or conclusions. 
(p. 88) 
In appropriating the work of these theorists, British Marxists therefore run 
the danger of unconsciously reproducing the pessimistic assumptions derived 
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in the bleak settings of Eastern and Western Europe. 5 
The first book published by Williams after The English Novel was Orwell 
( 1971 ). Although I discuss this work in the Introduction, it is worth adding 
that Orwell is significant in that the subject-matter enables Williams to 
address his interests in 'politics' and 'letters' in one text. He continues to 
employ the techniques of 'textual analysis', but provides in addition a 
substantial historical and political narrative, insisting that one of the keys to 
understanding Orwell is 'the nature of capitalist democracy in an epoch of 
socialist revolutions, of imperialism, of fascism, and of war' (p. 90 ) . 
. Williams's next work was The Country and the City ( 1973). 6 This long 
and complex work warrants more than a couple of paragraphs, but for our 
purposes it will suffice to note in what respects it represents a shift in 
Williams's critical orientation. Jn the first chapter, Williams defines his 
\ 
purpose as: to describe and analyse the images and associations of country 
and city, and 'to see them in relation to the historically varied experience' 
(p. 2). After setting out the complex relation between country and city as a 
general problem, he admits that for him it has also been a personal issue: he 
describes his personal history, his own deeply-felt experience of country and o 
city, and concludes: 
whenever I consider the relations between country and city, and 
between birth and learning, I find this history active and continuous: 
the relations are not only of ideas and experiences, but of rent and 
interest, of situation and power; a wider system. (p. 7) 
His discussion of versions of the country and the city includes an enormously 
wide range of writers: the pastoral poetry of Hesiod and Virgil; the 'country 
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house' poems of Jonson and Carew; Jacobean and Restoration dramas; the 
novels of Richardson and Fielding; the rural poetry of Goldsmith, Herrick and 
Gray; Cobbett's Rural Rides; Jane Austen's novels; the poetry of the Romantics 
(notably Clare, Wordsworth and Blake); the novels of 'the great tradition' 
(placed in a different. context here); the futuristic fictions of Wells and Huxley; 
and the 'post-colonial' literature of inter alia Chinua Achebe. Interspersed 
with the analyses of these varied forms of writing are several chapters 
describing the historical changes accompanying them (for example, Chapter 
10 describes the process of parliamentary enclosures). 
In the final chapter, Williams argues that although the contrast between 
country and city is 'one of the major forms in which we become conscious of 
our experience and of the crises of our society' (p. 289), nonetheless, these 
forms must not be abstracted and be given ·a primarily psychological or 
metaphysical status· (p. 289 }. Rather, he continues, 'we have to be able to 
explain, in related terms, both the persistence and the historicity of 
concepts' (p. 289 }. Further on, he writes that understanding this relation 
'is not, was not, a question of study alone' (p. 292). What is at issue in 
understanding all these competing images of country and city 'is a growth 
and alteration of consciousness: a history repeated in many lives and many 
places is fundamentally an alteration of perception and relationship' (p. 297). 
By grasping this relation more clearly, by in effect changing consciousness, 
we perceive a total environment, and as we register the 
consequences of so many abstracted and separated activities, we begin 
to see that all the real decisions are about modes of social interest and 
control. We begin to see, in fact, that the active powers of minority 
capital, in all its possible forms, are our most active enemies, and that 
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they will have to be not just persuaded but defeated and superseded. 
(p. 301) 
He concludes by criticising the tendency in Marxist - and other influential 
forms of socialism - to patronise the rural working-class, and cites the 
revolutions in China and Cuba as resounding refutations of this attitude: 'the 
"rural idiots" ... have been, for the last forty years, the main revolutionary 
force in the world· ( p. 304). 
Published only three years after The English Novel. The Country and the 
City indeed represents a substantial development in Williams's study of 
'letters'. Although it would still be classed as belonging to his 'pre-Marxist' 
phase, it challenges the dominant critical orthodoxy in a more fundamental 
way than any of his earlier works of literary criticism. In the first place, with 
its wide-ranging selection of subject-matter, it subv~rts the conventional 
division of literature into discreet genres; further, in foregrounding the 
political dimension of the literature reviewed, it implies an aesthetic at odds 
with the standards of the traditional canon. Williams elaborates this aesthetic 
in Politics and Letters: as a first stage, all writing should be 'restored to its 
conditions of production' (p. 306); this would reveal that the conventions 
defining the text are not merely formal devices, but have social roots. At a 
second stage, the conventions themselves must be judged, 'from a deliberate 
and declared position of interest' (p. 306 ). Although it is 'not unhelpful' to 
judge between good and bad examples within the convention, the crucial 
evaluative judgment applies to the second stage, because 'it is related to a 
much more general historical assesment.' (p. 307) which is also a political 
affiliation. The force of Williams's 'aesthetic assessment' of, for example, the 
country house poems is therefore directed not so much against the poems 
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themselves as the social relations that produced them. 
Secondly, although not conducted in a 'Marxist' or 'neo-Marxist' 
vocabulary, Williams's exploration of the relation between 'politics' and 
'letters' in The Country and the City also shows some developm.ent: no longer 
background information to the texts ( as was largely the case in The English 
Novel), historical narrative constitutes a substantial part of the discussion. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, in The Country and the City 
Williams's opposition to capitalism is no longer contained and disguised 
within the terms of a specifically 'literary· discourse. Particularly in the 
Conclusion, he expresses his commitment to socialism in the polemical 
register previously reserved only for his work on 'politics' (like May Day 
Manifesto). The result is a work of oppositional criticism that cannot be 
assimilated into the 'decent pluralism· 7 of contemporary English studies, 
since its assumptions and arguments challenge directly the parameters of 
traditional critical practices. 
Although there is a chapter in Keywords (1976) in which he traces the 
history of the word 'literature·, Williams next major work on letters was 
Marxism and Literature ( 1977). In Marxism and Literature. Williams records 
his own rapprochement with Marxism, defining and in the process 
incorporating into his own critical vocabulary a formidable set of new terms, 
including 'hegemony·, 'ideology· and 'totality'. He traces carefully the 
evolution of the meanings associated with 'literature', and argues that 
literature should be seen not as Great Works, but as a 'specialising social and 
historical category· (p. 53). He explains the persistence of the former sense 
as follows: 
It is in no way surprising that the specialized concept of 'literature·, 
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developed in precise forms of correspondence with a particular social 
class, a particular organization of learning , and the appropriate 
technology of print, should be now so often invoked in 
retrospective, nostalgic, or reactionary moods, as a form of opposition 
to what is correctly seen as a new phase of civilization. (p. 54) 
With this definition, the study of literature as an autonomous discipline 
cannot be sustained; rather, for Williams it forms but one component of a 
broader project which he calls 'cultural materialism'. He defines it thus: 'It is a 
position which can be briefly described as cultural materialism; a theory of 
t.he specificities of material cultural and literary production within historical 
materialism· (p. 5 ). 8 Certain critics have complained about the obscurity of 
Williams's language at this point, and at the vagueness that surrounds his 
definition. 9 Yet for others, the phrase 'cultural materialism' has become a 
kind of rallying point. For example, a recent coHection of essays entitled 
Political Shakespeare. 1 O to which Williams contributes an Afterword, is 
sub-titled 'New essays in cultural materialism·. In the Introduction, the 
editors provide an expanded definition: 
our belief is that a combination of historical context, theoretical 
method, political commitment and textual analysis offers the strongest 
challenge and has already contributed substantial work. Historical 
I 
context undermines the transcendent significance traditionally 
accorded to the literary text and allows us to recover its histories; 
theoretical method detaches the text. from immanent. criticism which 
seeks only to reproduce it in its own terms; socialist and feminist 
commitment confronts the conservative categories in which most. 
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criticism has hitherto been conducted; textual analysis locates the 
critique of traditional approaches where it cannot be ignored. We call 
this 'cultural materialism·. ( p. vii) 
Williams's adoption of Marxist terminology does not represent a total 
'epistemological break' with his earlier work because he also retains in 
Marxism and Literature certain key terms like 'culture', 'experience' and 
'structure of feeling'. Trying to reconcile structure of feeling with his new 
theoretical additions, according to Gallagher, results in 'certainly his most 
confused chapter· (p. 645}. According to Williams, structure of feeling 
refers to 'social experiences in solution' (p. 133 }, which have not as yet 
been incorporated into more formal concepts like 'ideology' or ·world-view·. 
He tries to define it further: 
We are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, 
and tone ... practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and 
interrelating continuity. We are then defining these elements as a 
structure: as a set, with specific internal relations, at once 
interlocking and in tension. Yet we are also defining a social 
experience which is still in process. (p. 132} 
There is a tension here between Williams's residual empiricism - which 
insists that there are authentic pre-ideological experiences that are 
expressed in emergent cultural practices - and structuralist Marxism, which 
holds that all social experience (including the experiences in solution denoted 
by structure of feeling) is represented and constituted within ideology. By 
retaining structure of feeling, and by using a limited sense of ideology, 
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Williams preserves the continuity with his early work. 
In Politics and Letters ( 1979 ), the interviewers from New Left Review 
question Williams in detail about his major works on culture (pp. 95-185) 
and literature (pp. 235-358). Since I have included several of Wi11iams's 
' 
responses in my summary thus far, I will not dwell on the detail of this 
work, but will continue to quote from it where appropriate in the balance of 
this discussion. There is, however, one particular exchange I wish to refer to, 
the discussion of the chapter on Dickens in The English Novel. In Politics and 
Letters. the interviewers criticise the 'logic of mysticism· that underlies 
Williams's arguments in The English Novel; they single out for censure the 
passage that ends: 'To believe that a human spirit exists, ultimately more 
powerful than even this system, is an act of faith but an act of faith in 
ourselves' (p. 252). Williams concedes that he 'wouldn't. want to defend the 
terms of that passage now· (p. 252), but nonetheless insists that the 
dominant system of values and meanings: 
cannot exhaust au social experience, which therefore always 
contain space for alternative acts and alternative intentions which are 
not yet. articulated as a social institution or even project. (p. 252) 
And: 'in reality there were Qther social experiences as possible sources of 
opposition or alternative direction in the society of Dickens's time' (p. 253 ). 
In the same way that certain terms like structure of feeling are retained, so 
too there is continuity from the ·early' Williams reading of Dickens (his sense 
of Dickens's inspiring faith in 'the human spirit'), to the emphasis of 'late' 
Williams on Dickens's ability to 'articulate alternative acts and alternative 
intentions·. 
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Problems in Materialism and Culture (1980) contains a number of 
essays written during the 1970 s. The essay I wish to examine, 'Base and 
Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory' was first published in 1973, and 
is an important record of Williams engagement with Marxism and also of his 
reformulation of the relation between 'politics' and 'letters'. Williams, as a 
literary critic, focuses carefully on several key Marxist terms, and in the 
process absorbs them into his (revised) critical vocabulary. He starts with 
the principle 'base determines superstructure', arguing that: 
We have to revalue 'd.etermination' towards the setting of limits and 
the exerting of pressure, and away from a predicted, prefigured and 
controlled content. We have to revalue 'superstructure' towards a 
related range of cultural practices, and away from a reflected, 
reproduced or specifically dependent content. And, crucially, we 
have to revalue 'the base' away from the notion of a fixed economic 
or technological abstraction, and towards the specific activities of men 
in real social and economic relationships, containing fundamental 
contradictions and variations and therefore always in a state of 
dynamic process. (p. 34) 
The spatial metaphor of base and superstructure therefore collapses in 
Williams's redefinition, because cultural activities conventionally located in 
the superstructure are seen by Williams to be primary social practices. The 
'base' then refers not to 'primary production within the terms of capitalist 
economic relationships', but rather to 'the primary production of society 
itself, and of men themselves, the material production and reproduction of 
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real life' (p. 35). 
Questioned about his rejection of base and superstructure in Politics and 
Letters.Williams elaborates his position: 
My aim was to emphasize that cultural practices are forms of 
material production, and that until this is understood it is impossible 
to think about them in their real social relations - there can only ever 
be a second order of correlation. But, of course, it is true that there 
are forms of material production which always and everywhere 
precede all other forms .... [T]hey are the production of food, the 
production of shelter, .and the production of the means of producing 
food and shelter. (p. 353) 
The fact that these forms of production precede all others, however, does not 
mean that they are automatically at the top of the hierarchy of cause and 
effect: 
I would not be willing to say that at the top of the hierarchy is 
productive industry, then come political institutions or means of mass 
communication, and then below them the cultural activities of 
philosophers or novelists .... The hierarchies, while in general 
following a line from activities which answer to basic physical needs 
down through to those of which you at least can state negatively that 
if they were not performed human life would not be immediately 
threatened, are not immutable. (p. 355) 
By insisting on the materiality of cultural production, and further by 
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refusing to attribute ultimate determinacy dogmatically to any particular 
. form of production, Williams thus rescues cultural practices from the 
derivative status thy occupy in crude versions of Marxism. 
In the 'Base and Superstructure' essay, Williams commences his 
alternative to the base/superstructure model by looking firstly at Lukacs' 
notion of totality. He observes: 
The totality of social practices was opposed to this layered notion of 
base and consequent superstructure. This concept of a totality of 
practices is compatible with the notion of social being determining 
consciousness, but it does not necessarily interpret this process in 
terms of a base and a superstructure. (p. 35) 
He identifies a potential weakness in the concept of totality: in defining 
society as a large number of social practices, totality might fail to explain 
processes of determination and of social intention_ I I As a result, Williams 
argues, totality should only be used when it is combined with Gramsci's 
notion of 'hegemony'. 
The meaning of 'hegemony' is controversial. I 2 Williams defines it as 
follows: 
[Hegemony] is the central, effective and dominant system of 
meanings and values, which are not merely abstract but which are 
organized and lived .... It is a whole body of practices and 
expectations; our assignments of energy, our ordinary understanding 
of the nature of man and of his world. It is a set of meanings and 
values which as they are experienced as practices appear as 
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reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most 
people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality 
beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to 
move, in most areas of their lives. (p. 38) 
Hegemony functions by a process of incorporation, and at an ideological level 
this involves the construction of a selective tradition·: 'the terms of an 
effective dominant culture are always passed off as "the tradition", 
"the significant past"· (p. 39). For Williams, a crucial part of the appeal of 
hegemony (as he understands it) is that, unlike Althusser's notion of 
ideology, it allows space for values and meanings in opposition to the 
dominant system: 
we have to recognize the alternative meanings and values, the 
alternative opinions and attitudes, even some alternative senses of 
the world, which can be accommodated and tolerated within a 
particular effective and dominant. culture. (p. 39) 
After differentiating between residual culture, which he describes as 
'experiences, meanings and values, which cannot be verified or cannot be . 
expressed in terms of t~e dominant culture, [but are] nevertheless lived and 
practised on the basis of the residue .. ·. of some previous social formation· 
. (p. 40), and emergent culture, defined as 'new meanings and values, new 
practices, new significances and experiences ... continually being created' 
(p. 41 ), Williams returns to this theme: 
no mode of production, and therefore no dominant society or 
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order of society, and therefore no dominant culture, in reality 
exhausts the full range of human practice, human energy, human 
intention . . . . I am saying then that in relation to the full range of 
· human practice at any one time, the dominant mode is a conscious 
selection and organization . . . . But there are always sources of actual 
human practice which it neglects or excludes. (p. 43) 
It is in this space neglected or excluded by the hegemonic modes that 
Williams locates his own oppositional critical practice. It is worth repeating 
that it is Williams's definition of hegemony that allows this space: there are 
interpretations of hegemony - like the one Althusser assimilates to his 
concept of ideology l 3 - which construe hegemony as more 'tot.al', thus 
diminishing drastically the potential of cultural opposition. 
Having set out the terms of his analysis, Williams returns to consider the 
relation between literature and society. He argues: 
If we are looking for the relations between literature and society, we 
cannot either separate out this one practice from a formed body of 
other practices, nor when we have identified a particular practice can 
we give it a uniform, static and ahistorical relation to some abstract 
social formation. The arts of writing and the arts of creation and 
performance, over their whole range, are parts of the cultural process 
in all the different ways, the different sectors, that I have been 
seeking to describe. They contribute to the effective dominant. 
culture and are a central articulation of it. They embody residual 
meanings and values, not all of which are incorporated, though many 
are. They express also and significantly some emergent practices 
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and meanings, yet some of these may eventually be incorporated. 
(p. 45) 
What this means for critical practice is that the work of art should be seen 
not as an object which is then related to its components, but rather as a 
practice related to its conditions. He concludes: 
' what we are actively seeking is the true practice which has been 
alienated to an object, and the true conditions of practice - whether 
as literary conventions or as social relationships - which have been 
alienated to components or to mere background. (p. 49) 
From the discussion thus far of 'late' Williams, it should be clear that the 
study of 'letters' as a separate discipline no longer forms part of his critical 
enquiry; rather, it is contained as one element within a wider study of 
'culture'. Of all the work referred to in this section, Culture ( 1981) 14 
represents the best single guide to Williams's understanding of culture, and 
by extension, of literature; it sets out in carefully-organised form the 
arguments for 'cultural materialism', and draws together Williams's interests 
in literature, the media, politics, culture and society. 
He concludes his case for cultural materialism in the final chapter of 
Culture by emphasizing the ubiquity of signifying systems: 
For a signifying system is intrinsic to any economic system, any 
political system, any generational system and, most generally, to any 
social system. Yet is also in practice distinguishable as a system in 




consciousness, or, to use that difficult alternative term, an ideology; 
and again as a body of specifically signifying works of art and 
thought. Moreover all these exist not only as institutions and works, 
and not only as systems, but necessarily as active practices and states 
of mind. (p. 208) 
The challenge of cultural materia!isi;n is to study these signifying institutions. 
practices and works (including the signifying practice of 'literature'), and 
crucially, to study the relation between these and other institutions, 
practices and work. Williams makes one important qualification: 
It would be wrong to reduce [a social system] to the signifying system 
alone, for this would make all human actions and relationships mere 
functions of signification and, in doing so, radically diminish them. 
(p. 207) 
By drawing a line between 'signifying practices' and 'other' practices, 
Williams thus retains in radically revised form the separation between 
'letters· {a signifying practice) and 'politics' (the 'other· practices that are 
·more than mere functions of signification'). 
Writing in Society ( 1983), like Problems. is a collection of essays drawn 
largely from Williams's assumption of the term 'cultural materialism'. 
Writing in Society represents an illustration of what Williams's project might 
invoJve because it includes essays on severaJ different forms of cultural 
production: he focuses on drama (section 1 ); philosophy (the essay on 
Hume); current academic politics {section 4); 'sub-literary' novels (the essays 
on 'The Ragged Arsed Philanthropists' and 'Region and Class in the Novel') ; 
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and 'literature' (the short essay on Dickens). All these different signifying 
practices or forms of cultural production are subject to the same analytical 
procedures. 
In section four, Williams examines for the first time in any detail the 
institutional reproduction of English Literature by focusing on Cambridge 
English. In 'Cambridge English, Past and Present', he traces the contributions 
of Richards, Leavis and their successors, and concludes that the combined 
effect of their work was to 'shut off or at best postpone bodies of knowledge 
and ways of seeing and thinking which could at last fully substantiate 
English studies' (p. 189 ). In 'Crisis in English Studies', he reviews current 
literary practices and distinguishes those which can be assimilated within 
the dominant paradigm, and those which 'are not so assimilable and indeed 
quite incongruent with the received definitions· (p. 196). Cultural 
materialism, radical semiotics, and the kind of political criticism practised in 
The Country and the City fall into the latter category, according to Williams. 
What these oppositional modes share is their conception of the paradigm 
itself as a central matter for analysis, rather than as defining the object of 
knowledge. And in 'Beyond Cambridge English', Williams argues that there 
are certain practices of 'traditional' English studies that should be retained 
(historical analysis of the language and conventions of past literature; close 
textual analysis; and research on the reading public); that the way forward 
for Cambridge English should be found within a strongly inter-disciplinary 
School of Humanities; and that the estranging and isolating assumptions and 
practices of modernism - which Williams sees as the major intellectual 
formation at present - should be challenged. He concludes: 'In all my work I 
have tried to be on the other side, but I say "tried" because to succeed would 
be beyond the powers of any individual or small group· (p. 225). 
Moving to 'The Reader in Hard Times·. Williams argues that the 
great interest of this novel lies in the fact that it is not coherent, that it 
articulates two incompatible ideological positions: 
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[Flirst, that environment influences and in some sense determines 
character; second, that some virtues and vices are original and both 
triumph over and in some cases can change any environment. 
(p. 169) 
According to Williams, Dickens shows that the oppressive situation in the 
novel can be overcome by developing either of these positions: by the path 
of personal virtue (as followed by Sissy jupe, Louisa, Rachel and Gradgrind), 
or by reforming the system (including 'fancy' as well as fact in the education 
system, and by moving from 'thelf-interetht' to a sense of community in the 
wider social order). In order to understand the general effect Dickens seeks 
to achieve by dramatising these alternative positions, we need to look 
beyond the text: 
This question takes from the text beyond the text: not so much into 
the,general social context or background, though in reading Hard 
Times , especially, much can be learned from that kind of sociological 
inquiry; but into the social relations of its specific composition. 
(p. 172) 
This inquiry leads Williams to the conclusion that by employing a 
( 
comprehensive strategy of composition, Dickens constitutes in the novel a 
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general reader; not, Williams emphasizes ' any general reader. Sympathy, 
indignation, concern: all these are written into the reader's characterisation· 
(p. 173). This reader is thus engaged and made responsible for the realities 
described in the novel. Williams concludes that Hard Times is: 
an unusually precise expression, not of an ideology but of a 
structure of feeling: the most generous, the most indignant, but 
because of those very qualities the most anxious, the most uncertain, 
of its divided time. (p. 174) 
In describing the literary/critical context of the 1970 sand eighties, and 
in tracing the developments in Williams's understanding of 'letters' during 
this period, I hope to have conveyed some sense of both the differences 
(most notably Williams's 'acquisition' of a Marxist vocabulary) and also the 
continuities (his retention of concepts like structure of feeling, for example) 
between 'early' and 'late' Williams in this area of his work. What now 
remains is to consider whether the differences affect the points of similarity 
between Orwell and Williams established at the end of the previous section. 
The first similarity between Orwell and 'early' Williams was their 
conception of 'literature'. In terms of Orwell's 'conservative' aesthetic and 
t.he critical framework of The English Novel, both Orwell and Williams 
perceived literature as 'Great Works of English Fiction'. 'Late' Williams, with 
his understanding of literature as but. one of many signifying practices or 
forms of cultural production, breaks entirely wit.h this traditonal notion of 
literature. But before crossing off this point of comparison, it should be 
recalled that in 'Charles Dickens' there is in tension with the 'conservative' 
aesthetic a more radical conception of literature. which is premised on the 
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assertions that 'all art is propaganda' and 'it is absurd to compare different 
. authors·. And indeed, this alternative aesthetic, with its refusal to privilege 
Literature or to slot certain authors into the category 'great', shares with 
Williams's cultural materialism a firm opposition to the definitions and 
assumptions of the dominant critical discourse. Therefore, although Orwell's 
'conservative' definition of literature corresponds to that of Williams in The 
English Novel, Orwell's 'radical' definition anticipates Williams's rejection of 
literature as a 'superior' form of writing in his later work. 
The second similarity was in their common exploration of the relation 
between 'letters· and 'politics', as well as the tendency to privilege the latter 
term by treating it as 'the stuff of the real world'. Although after The 
Country and the City. Williams's enquiry into this relation assumes a new 
(Marxist) register, the enterprise itself remains a central concern. In the 
'Base and Superstructure' essay, for example, Williams concludes his critical 
assimilation of a number of Marxist and neo-Marxist terms by considering 
how they might assist in articulating 'the relation between literature and 
society' (p. 45). What should be stressed is that the sophisticated literary 
academic plotting this relation in books like Marxism and Literature and 
Culture is an enormous distance further down the road than the plain man 
with his horror of abstract thought. As Said observes: 
[Williams) can be much more interesting on this sort of thing ... [he] 
takes in a lot more than Orwell ever took the time to do, trying 
precisely to gauge the inflection in the relationship between culture 
an~ social polity. ( p. 126) 
The question as to whether Williams continues to privilege 'politics' (or 
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'experience', 'society', 'the real world') has to be assessed in terms of his 
redefinition of literature as being but one of many signifying systems. The 
question becomes: does Williams privilege 'politics· with respect to signifying 
systems in general. The answer suggested in Marxism and Literature, in 
Writing in Society and Culture is affirmative. In Marxism and Literature. 
Williams retains the term 'structure of feeling', arguing that it refers to 
·social experiences in solution' (politics) that in some sense precede 
ideologies and world views (signifying systems). This argument is carried 
through in the essay on Hard Times. where Williams concludes that there are 
certain complex feelings and experiences that occur outside ideology and 
are then presented in the novel. In Culture. Williams insists upon the 
presence of 'other practices' that are not mere functions of signifying 
practices. (Recall too his refusal to relinquish the category 'experience· in 
Politics and Letters). This repeated insistence on ·authentic experience' 
('politics') preceding signifying systems seems to bear out Norris' general 
point that: 
the commitment to empiricism - as a mode of historical 
experience, if not a full blown ideology - continues to exercise a rival 
claim in Williams's dealings with Continental Marxism. For him, as 
for Thompson, it acts as a qualifying check on the powers of 
theoretical abstraction. ( p. 261) 
However, it should be noted that although 'politics' remains a privileged 
category, Williams does not accredit it with ultimate agency; indeed, he 
argues rather that a social system should be understood in terms of the 
relations between signifying practices themselves, as well as between 
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signifying - and 'other' - practices. 
The third ground of comparison was that both Orwell and 'early' 
Williams attempt to foreground their (similar) political values in the study of 
literature: 'letters' in the service of (socialist) 'politics'. This was done by 
challenging the definitions and judgments of the dominant. critical orthodoxy; 
by historicising the texts studied as carefully as possible; and by 'claiming' 
Dickens as an authentic ancestor of their respective versions of 
socialist-humanism. This desire to politicise literary criticism remains 
central to Williams's work: his project of cultural materialism represents for 
him the culmination of his wanting to be 'on the other side'; together with 
radical semiotics and the political criticism practised in The Country and the 
City. he sees it as being in fundamental opposition to dominant critical 
practice. Further, he demonstrates the political nature of all writing and 
criticism with greater force by establishing the relation between context. and 
text in the more sophisticated vocabulary of Marxism. 
As to Dickens criticism, both Orwell in his essay and Williams in The 
English Novel perceive Dickens in a similarly positive way: for Orwell, 
Dickens confirms that to 'behave decently' is not a platitude and that 'hatred 
of tyranny' is an emotion to value, and for Williams, Dickens reinforces the 
truth that 'there is a human spirit more powerful than the system· and that 
the ideal of 'community' should not be forsaken. In Politics and Letters. 
Williams rejects the terms of the passages in The English Novel, but. 
·nonetheless re-affirms his belief in Dickens' capacity to exploit in his novels 
'the space for alternative acts and alternative intentions' . And in 'The 
Reader in Hard Times', Williams reverses his earlier ideas on Dickens in 
Culture and Sodety. and approves Dickens' creation in the novel of-two 
alternative routes to change (personal virtue/reform the system), and of a 
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sympathetic general reader. Recalling Williams's argument in 'Base and 
Superstructure' that 'we have to recognise the alternative meanings and 
values ... tolerated within a particular and effective dominant culture' 
(p. 39 ), and recalling the way in which Williams locates his own 
oppositional critical practice within the space neglected by the hegemonic 
mode, his approval of Dickens can again be seen as based on a sense of 
kinship: in realising 'alternative meanings to the dominant culture' , Dickens' 
novels have achieved what Williams hopes his own cultural criticism might 
achieve. 
In this chapter, perhaps even more so than was the case in the chapter of 
politics, the difference between Orwell the essayist and Williams the scholar 
represents a substantial check on the extent to which they can be compared. 
Nonetheless, I have established what I take to be three fundamental 
similarities, and in the final chapter I will examine whether these can be 
added to in comparing their respective views on language. 
ti 
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Chapter Three: Language. 
Both Orwell and Williams neglect to analyse their assumptions about 
language until relatively late in their respective careers, but having done so, 
they attach central importance in their work to the nature and role of 
language. 
The texts I have selected are: 'Politics and the English Language' by 
Orwell, and the chapter on language in Marxism and Literature by Williams. 
The structure of the discussion follows the pattern established in the first 
two chapters: the broader intellectual contexts of the selected texts will be 
described, concentrating here on the dominant theories of language; second, 
the texts are located more clearly in the contexts of their work as a whole (I 
will also look at their undeveloped early ideas about language); third, a close 
analysis of the texts will be undertaken, attempting to draw out their 
assumptions about language and style; and fourth,the common ground 
between Orwell's and Williams's ideas about language is delineated. 
.J 
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3.1. 'Politics.and the English Language·. 
The value of Orwell's writings about language has long been debated. In the 
editorial of History Workshop Journal 10, which focuses on language and 
history, the editors confess that 'disagreements centred especially on the 
paragraph on plain speaking and Orwell'; and, · (i)n spite of going through 
four drafts we were not able to reach unanimity' (p. S ). In writing about 
'Politics and the English Language' I will accordingly obey the spirit of 
Williams's argument expressed in Orwell that · (i]nstead of flattening out the 
contradictions by choosing this or that as the "real" Orwell ... we ought to say 
that it is the paradoxes which are finally significant' (p. 87). In other 
words, it is the contradictions in Orwell's assumptions and arguments about 
language that I hope to foreground. 
Orwell's intellectual context 1 can be extrapolated from the opening 
paragraph of the essay: 
Most people who bother with the matter at all would admit that the 
English language is in a bad way, but it is generally assumed that we 
cannot by conscious action do anything about it. Our civilisation is 
decadent, and our language - so the argument runs - must inevitably 
share in the general collapse . . . . Underneath this lies the 
half-conscious belief that language is a natural growth and not an 
instrument which we shape for our own purposes. (p. 156) 
Firstly, Orwell is correct that 'most people ... think that the English language 
is in a bad way·. Bob Hodge and Roger Fowler in 'Orwellian Linguistics' 
identify the wide currency of similarly gloomy views in the 1930s and 
1940s by referring to the arguments of C. K. Odgen, I. A. Richards, Count 
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Korzybski and Stuart Chase. F. R. Leavis and T. S. Eliot are further names 
that might be added to their list. In 'Mass Civilisation and Minority Cult.ure',2 
Leavis describes the cultural disorientation caused by the industrialisation 
of twentieth century Britain, and quotes with approval Eliot's percept.ion of 
the confused intellectual situation: 
When there is so much to be known, when there are so many fields of 
knowledge in which the same words are used with different 
meanings, when every one knows a little about a great many things, 
it becomes increasingly difficult for anyone to know whether he 
knows what he is talking about or not. (p. 31) 
In addressing the 'deplorable condition of the English language' Orwell 
therefore joins a diverse group of intellectuals who in fact 'bother with the 
matter' a great deal. Indeed, it is the very diversity of the group, and also of 
those in the past who have concerned themselves with this issue, that 
suggests the basis for the first contradiction in Orwell's essay. On one 
reading, 'Politics and the English Language' reads like a letter from an old 
Etonian t.o the Daily Telegraph, bewailing the state of English. As Hodge and 
Fowler point out, his pedantic objections to the use of foreign phrases and 
the influence of 'American English': 
sound as if they belong to a familiar conservative, purist and 
chauvinistic tradition which stretches back to Sir john Choke's 
condemnation of 'inkhorn terms' in the sixteenth century. (p. 7) 
Leavis's efforts to preserve the language register of the embattled 'minority 
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culture' fit (if slightly uncomfortably) in this tradition. 
On another reading however, Orwell's criticisms are directed primarily at 
the obtuse language used by the leaders and representatives of the English 
ruling class, the same people broadly who would concur with the letters (and 
editorials) in the Telegraph . And with this emphasis, Orwell's insistence on 
correet usage, on 'plain-speaking', might be traced to quite different roots. 
Christopher Hill 3 points out that the idea of plain-speaking has an 
honourable lineage on the English Left, going back to the Puritan 
revolutionaries of the seventeenth century and their opposition of 
plain-preaching. to the baroque mystifications of High Church theology. 
Orwell's socialist values ensure that his assault on 'bad' English builds upon 
this authentic radical tradition. 
In the second sentence, Orwell reinforces the ubiquity of the argument 
that there is a causal chain binding the state of the language to the state of 
the civilisation. It is. an argument that might come from English Marxism or 
from Leavis. In the crude terms of the English Marxists, language would be 
seen as part of the 'superstructure' and as such a reflection of the 'base'.4 . 
In Leavis's terms, language would be seen as integral to the declining culture 
of the minority: 
when we used the metaphor of 'language· in defining culture we 
were using more than a metaphor. The most important part. of this 
'language' is actually a matt.er of the use of words. Without the living 
subtlety of the finest idiom (which is dependent upon use) the 
heritage dies. ( p. 44) 
He then in an important footnote quotes from Richards's Practical Criticism: 
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From the beginning civilisation has been dependent upon speech, for 
words are our chief link with the past and with one another and the 
channel of our spiritual inheritance. As the other vehicles of 
tradition, the family and the community, for example, are dissolved, 
we are forced more and more to rely upon language. (p. 44) 
Orwell's response to this argument is contained in the final sentence. 
Although he concedes in the next paragraph that 'the decline of a language 
must have political and economic causes· (p. 156 ), he resists the pessimistic 
conclusions that Richards and Leavis pursue: language is not for Orwell 'a 
natural growth', but rather 'an instrument which we shape for our own 
purposes'.· In this phrase, Orwell articulates two deeply embedded 
ideological assumptions. The first i:5 the conception of language as an 
instrument, and in order to contextualise this we need to refer once again to 
E. H. Carr's discussion of British empiricism in the nineteenth century. Carr 
defines this vulgar strain of empiricism as presupposing ·a complete 
separation of subject and object, and facts, like sense-impressions impinge 
on the observer from outside and are independent of his consciousness· 
( p. 9). Securely grounded on the economic supremacy of the Empire, the 
subject (an upperclass Englishman) observed whatever object, and remained 
serenely untroubled that the object - whether history, society or language -
might determine his way of seeing. In this scheme, language was considered 
as object, and its funtion was purely instrumental - to convey thoughts from 
one inviolable subject to another. In seeing language as an instrument, a 
medium of communication, Orwell reproduces this limited theory of 
language and in the process represses the possibility that language might 
have some central constitutive function. 
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The second assumption is intrinsic to this form of empiricism, i.e. that 'we 
shape language for our own purposes'. This form of humanism, also with 
deep roots in English culture, is based on the conviction that the unified 
individual subject, distinct from the objective world, has the power to shape 
and reshape that world, including language. What this means is that all 
agency and ultimately all meaning lies with the individual subject; any 
constitutive role for the 'object' is denied, and the individual actors hold the 
key to understanding the social order. In Orwell's case, this enables him to 
privilege his narrative persona, the plain man, as the one with direct and 
unmediated access t.o the objective truth, which would include the 'truth' 
about what form the instrument of communication should take. 
Orwell's opening paragraph therefore expresses in compressed form the 
dominant themes in English linguistic 'theory' of the time: the conviction that 
language is in a state of decline; the idea that there is some kind of relation 
between language and the political 'reality' ; the conception of language as 
primarily an instrument of communication; and finally, the belief that 'we· 
ultimately control language. Before looking more closely at how he tries to 
reconcile these themes, I wish to trace briefly the development of his 
interest in language. 
In 'Why I Write', Orwell describes how at a young age it was the 
\ 
decorative, expressive capacity of language that appealed to him: 'When I 
was about sixteen I discovered the joy of mere words i.e. the sounds and 
associations of words. (I, p. 24) And: 
I wanted to write enormous naturalistic novels with unhappy 
endings, full of detailed descriptions and arresting similes, and also 
full of purple passages in which words were used partly for the sake 
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of their sound. (p. 25) 
However, he goes on, it was impossible to do this because the political 
realities of his age demanded a more engaged response. Instead of following 
his true nature and writing 'ornate or merely descriptive books' (p. 26), he 
was 'forced into becoming a sort of pamphleteer' (p. 26 ). This means for 
Orwell that the decorative function of language had to be ignored in favour 
• 
of using language as a means of fighting oppression. To this end, he 
concludes 'of later years I have tried to write less picturesquely and more 
exactly' (p. 29 ). 
What alerted Orwell to the political nature of language and convinced 
him to shun its decorative appeal were the spectacular media distortions 
perpetrated during the Spanish Civil War. In 'Looking Back on the Spanish 
War'(II, pp. 286-306), he records his feelings of alarm: 
This kind of thing is frightening to me, because it often gives me the 
feeling that the very concept of objective truth is fading out of the 
world. After all, the chances are that those lies, or at any rate similar 
lies, will pass into history. (p. 295) 
According to Orwell, there are only two factors that can secure the survival 
of objective truth: 
One is that however much you deny the truth, the truth goes on 
existing, as it were, behind your back ... The other is that so long as 
some parts of the earth remain unconquered, the liberal tradition can 
be kept alive. (p. 297) 
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Orwell thus establishes an indivisible bond between 'objective truth' and 'the 
liberal tradition'; by undermining the former, the latter is placed in grave 
jeopardy. The crucial insight is that language has the power to subvert the 
'objective truth' and by implication the liberal tradition. 
In one of his 'As I Please' columns for the Tribune in 1944 (III, 
pp. 232-5), Orwell takes the argument one step further. With the evidence 
of Nazi propaganda and the Stalinist purges reinforcing his memories of 
Spain, he writes: 
By shooting at your enemy you are not in the deepest sense wronging 
him. But by hating him, by inventing lies about him and bringing 
children up to believe them ... you are striking not at one perishable 
generation, but at humanity itself. (p. 233) 
The fear that 'humanity itself' might be annihilated by language in the 
service of totalitarianism is one that haunts Orwell's later writings; we will 
return to it in analysing 'Politics and the English Language'. 
Another basis for Orwell's interest in language is evident in 'New Words' 
(II, pp. 17-27), where he argues that on the level of personal exchange, 
language is incapable of communicating certain feelings and ideas. What he 
proposes is: 'to invest a vocabulary, perhaps amounting to several thousands 
of words, which would deal with .parts of our experience now practically 
unamenable to language' (p. 17). These new words are needed 
particularly to describe the 'inner life', and the need is most apparent in 
literature, where Orwell observes that words often fail to serve ·their 
supposed function as vehicles of thought' (p. 21 ). He compares inventing 
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words to 'invent[ing] new parts for a motor car engine' (p. 21 ), insisting 
further: 'Aeroplanes and bicycles are invented, and we invent names for 
them, which is the natural thing to do. It is only a step to coining names for 
the now unnamed things that exist in the mind' (p. 22). The main obstacle 
to such a programme is people's conservatism, the argument being that 
because a language grows slowly and haphazardly, 'therefore language 
cannot grow otherwise' (p. 22). All that is wanted ·to counter this: 'is 
several thousands of gifted but normal people who would give themselves to 
word-invention as seriously as people now give themselves to Shakespeare 
research' (pp. 23-4). In the process of inventing words, the two main 
considerations would be the appropriateness of the sound and the exactness 
of the meaning (p. 25 ). Orwell concludes: 
To most people in any case the whole idea of reforming language 
would seem either dilettantish or crankish. Yet it is worth 
considering what utter incomprehension exists between human 
beings - at least between those who are not deeply intimate .... It 
need not be so if our language were more adequate. (pp. 26-7) 
What is striking about this argument. is that it assumes a quite different 
relation between language and 'humanity' to the passages on language and . 
politics. Whereas in the 'political' passages, Orwell stresses the potential of 
language to destroy 'humanity', here there is a confidence in the individual 
language user's capacity to subdue language and fashion it into a more 
efficient 'vehicle' for conveying thought. The residue of nineteenth century 
humanism and common sense empiricism is therefore especially prominent. 
here; language is seen in the same context as motor cars - as part of the 
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objective world 'out there' ; the feelings of the individual are privileged -
they have a pre_-linguistic identity, and the problem for Orwell is simply to 
find the right words to describe them; and there is Orwell's naive trust in the 
ability of 'several thousands of gifted but normal people' to invent these new 
words and ensure their introduction into general usage. Writ.ten in 1940, 
Orwell in'New Words' does not discuss the primacy of the relation between 
language and power: he does not consider that language is more likely to be 
created by the Ministry of Truth than by 'gifted but normal people'. 
In a long essay on 'The English People', Orwell writes a short section on 
'The English Language' (III, pp. 40-6), in which he develops these ideas. He 
starts off adapting the stance of a comparative linguist, with some 
commonplace observations about the English language's large vocabulary, its 
simple grammar and its range of tone. He then returns to the argument that 
English can fail to effect an accurate transfer of thought if it is used badly. 
He sets down the general principle 'that concrete words are better than 
abstract ones, and that the shortest way of saying anything is always the 
best' (p. 42). He argues further: 
Whoever writes English is involved in a struggle that never lets up 
even for a sentence. He is struggling against vagueness, against 
obscurity, against the lure of the decorative adjective, against the 
encroachment of Latin and Greek, and, above all, against the 
worn- out phrases and dead metaphors with which the language is 
cluttered up. (p. 42) 
He blames the disappearance of clear English on the proliferation of official 
jargon: 'the language of leading articles, White Papers, political speeches, and 
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B. B. C. news bulletins' (p 43). He concludes that the deeper cause for the 
decadence of the language lies with the class system: 'Language ought to be 
the joint creation of poets and manual workers, and in modern England it is 
difficult for these two classes to meet' (p. 46 ). 
The contradictions which are at the centre of 'Politics and the English 
Language' are present in undeveloped form in this piece. On the one hand, 
Orwell repeats his instrumental view of language, with the added argument 
that language can best convey thought when concrete words are used and 
the message kept brief. On the other hand, he suggests that language is the 
product of the class system, which calls into question the causal primacy of 
the individual i.e. to what extent can individual language users control 
language if it is the product of the class system. 
'Politics and the English Language' was published in 1946, and 
represents the culmination of Orwell's thoughts on language and politics. It 
draws together - as the title suggests - his fears about the political 
manipulation of language (registered in 'Looking Back on the Spanish War') 
and his concern about the declining standard of English (registered in 'The 
English Language'). According to George Woodcock ( p. 262), it was written 
at the end of a period during which Orwell himself had been working 
consciously on his own style to achieve the spare and direct form of Animal 
Farm. 
Orwell argues that 'the decline of a language must ultimately have 
political and economic causes' (p. 156), but insists that: 
the process is reversible. Modern English, especially writ.ten 
English, is full of bad habits which spread by imitation and which can 
be avoided if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If one gets 
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rid of these habits one can think more clearly, and to think clearly is 
a necessary first step towards political regeneration. (p. 157) 
In the remainder of the essay, he suggests ways in which the English 
language might be saved, focusing on examples of bad prose and offering 
rules and guidelines which might help to overcome the staleness and 
imprecision of modern English. The basic principle underlying Orwell's 
prescriptions is that the particular should always be pref erred to the general 
(repeating his insistence on the concrete and brevity in 'The English 
Language'). He lists a number of categories of words he considers to be too 
vague and general. These include: philosophical terms like 'phenomenon', 
'objective·, 'primary·, and 'basic' (classed as 'pretentious diction'); Latinate 
words which have practical Anglo Saxon equivalents; terms of literary 
criticism like 'romantic', 'sentimental' or 'vitality' - these 'are strictly 
meaningless, in the sense that they . . . do not point to any discoverable 
object' (p. 161); and political words like 'socialism·, 'democracy' and 
'freedom· - the manipulation of these terms, instead of extending their 
range of meanings, has stripped them of all meaning. His quest for 
simplicity extends to grammatical constructions: the passive voice should be 
avoided (!)where possible, and clauses and sentences should always be as 
short as possible - wordiness is always indicative of slovenly thought. These 
suggestions ta.ken together produce Orwell's plain style, which, according to 
him, might show the way to linguistic - and ultimately political regeneration. 
Towards the end of the essay, he re-affirms the value of his project: 
I said earlier that the decadence of our language is probably curable. 
Those who deny this would argue, if they produced any argument at 
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all, that language merely reflects existing social conditions, and that 
we cannot influence its development by any direct tinkering with 
words and constructions. So far as the general tone or spirit of a 
language goes, this may be true, but it is not true in detail. 
(pp. 167-8) 
Two cqntradictory lines of argument can be identified. The first is based 
on Orwell's belief that 'the decadence of our language is curable', that 'the 
process (of decline) is reversible'. On this assumption, the thoughts of the 
pre-linguistic rational individual precede and therefore determine language: 
What is above all needed is to let the meaning choose the word, and 
not the other way about .... When you think of a concrete object, 
you think wordlessly, and then, if you want to describe the thing you 
·have been visualizing, you probably hunt about till you find the exact 
words that seem t.o fit it. (p. 168) 
This perception of language as a reflection of conscious thought means that it 
is limited to being a means of communication, an instrument used by the 
rational individual to convey his/her thoughts to another individual; t.o quote 
again, 'it is not a natural growth (but) an instrument which we shape for our 
own purposes' (p. 156). The challenge then is to ensure that language acts 
as an efficient instrument, that it effects accurate thought transfer. Where 
language fails to do this, 'we· still are able to take steps to make it a reliable 
instrument once again. 
What allows language to become a faulty communication system, 
according to Orwell, is the conventional nature of the relation between the 
176 
word and its meaning. Orwell never articulates this assumption, but it is 
. 
evident in his enthusiasm for inventing riew words - in order to invent a 
new word, all that is necessary to fix the word/concept bond is the 
co-operation of the language - users. In 'Politics and the English Language', 
it is the negative side of this relation that concerns Orwell: existing words -
like 'democracy' - can lose all meaning if powerful interest groups exploit the 
conventional nature of the word/concept relation by. attaching conflicting or 
opposing meanings to the word. In the resulting confusion, the original 
meaning is displaced, and the word can no longer be used to tr an sf er 
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thoughts accurately from one speaker to another. In terms of Orwell's 
project, such words would either have their range of meanings curtailed or 
would be dispensed with entirely. 
The second line of argument exists in unresolved tension with Orwell's 
dominant set of assumptions. It is built upon Orwell's undeveloped 
observations that 'the decline of a language must have economic and political 
causes', and that ·as far as the general tone or spirit of a language goes ... 
language merely reflects existing social conditions'. This line of argument 
shares the perception of language as conventional, but sees the struggle to 
control language in a pessimistic light. There is diminished faith in the 
capacity of the rational pre-linguistic individual to make language an 
effective instrument of communication; what is stressed instead is the 
determining force of language and society. 
If language is determined by external fact.ors to an extent that virtually 
negates the conscious efforts of rational individuals, then it is even more 
important to treat language with circumspection. Orwell prescribes an 
urgent duty to exercise care when using language, but observes, 
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You can shirk it by simply throwing your mind open and letting the 
ready- made phrases come crowding in. They will construct your 
sentences for you - even think your thoughts for you, t.o a certain 
extent - and at need will perform the important service of partially 
concealing your meaning even from yourself. (p. 165) 
The price of insufficient vigilance is particularly high in a society where both 
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the external factors determining the language and the language itself are 
manipulated by power-hungry and dishonest elites. 
Language, on this second reading, is more than a troublesome instrument 
for thought tr an sf er; it actually has the power to invade and pervert the 
rational 'wordless' thought processes of the individual. For the unwary, 'bad' 
language habits will 'come crowding in' and impose certain ways of seeing 
and thinking. The essential reliable nature of the conscious individual is 
thus in grave danger of being changed: corrupted language has the capacity 
to reconstitute the individual in a way quite compatible with totalitarian 
patterns in society generally. This fear is expressed vividly in Orwell's 
satirical invention Newspeak: S . 
The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of 
expression for the world view and mental habits proper to the 
devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other forms of thought impossible. 
(p. 917) 
As a result of the limited linguistic alternatives provided by Newspeak, 
humankind loses its desire for democracy, justice and individual freedom, 
desires axiomatic in Orwell's conception of what it is to be human. The novel 
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was meant as a warning, and the grim scenario it sketches, or something very 
like it, can only be fore stalled by ensuring that these concepts do not lose all 
their meaning. 
It is significant that Orwell sees only 'bad' language as having the power 
to invade consciousness and do your thinking for you. There is no suggestion 
that his own celebrated 'plain style· might also have this power: the plain 
style will simply reflect the ideas of the rational human essence Orwell 
assumes as the source of meaning. His failure to extend this constitutive 
faculty t.o the plain style explains his inability to reconcile two conflicting 
conceptions of language in the essay: on the one hand, the notion of language 
as merely the instrument of the rational individual, and on the other hand, 
the perception of language as playing a central role in the constitution of any 
individual. Orwell ultimately resists the radical possibilities of the latter 
emphasis, and proceeds on the basis that rational individuals acting in concert 
could yet make language an obedient instrument of communication. 
In addition to being based upon a limited conception of language, the 
plain style fails to meet the claims Orwell makes for it. In the first place, 
there is no necessary correlation between the plain style and radical criticism. 
This is brought out very clearly by Carl Freedman's astute observation in 
'Writing, Ideology and Politics' (pp. 332-3) that the description of Newspeak 
in Nineteen Eighty-Four conforms in many respects to the rules laid down in 
'Politics and the English Language'. Consider the following similarities: 
Newspeak has no difficulty with concrete terms like 'tree' and 'dog'; it seeks 
to exclude meaningless abstractions like 'freedom· and 'democracy'; it 
elevates brevity to an orthodoxy: 'reduction of vocabulary was regarded as an 
end in itself' ( p. 918); and it strives to exclude ambiguities and subtleties of 
meaning in order to destroy the possibility of philosophical discussion. The 
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point is not that obedience to Orwell's language rules would lead inexorably 
to Newspeak; it is simply that the hegemony he seeks for this plain style 
would impose severe limitations, which are obvious when satirised as 
Newspeak, but more insidious when presented in the compelling mode of the 
'reasonable man· explaining all. 
In its denial of recourse to generalisation and 'pretentious diction·, the 
plain style inhibits dialectical and philosophieal thought processes. This in 
fact amounts to an anti-radical bias: social events are automatically presented 
and interpreted without historical or sociological contextualisation because 
the terminology of such analysis is seen as too vague/general/ intellectual. It 
is therefore hardly surprising that despite its radical pedigree, plain speaking 
has been appropriated within the dominant ideology in much the same way 
as 'common-sense·. The plain style has been influential as a convention well 
beyond the scope of literature: it has become a reportorial format and a 
television style, and is the preferred register in quarters ·as diverse as the 
Pentagon and university classrooms. 6 
This brings us to a second problem with the plain style. In 'On Not 
Teaching Orwell', Cleo McNelly argues that Orwell's language rules assume 
that the reader has already been taught how to write (badly), and, as a result: 
For students, coming from a different class to Orwell's prose, 
reading his work may be rather like pressing themselves against this 
invisible glass barrier: 'it is so easy to pretend that it. isn't there, and 
so impossible to get through it.' (p. 559) 
In other words, Orwell's plain style involves a set. of pre-suppositions about 
class, race and language and it. therefore functions as an exclusionary code all 
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the more subtle for its claims to 'plainness'; Orwell's attempt to privilege his 
own plain style ignores the fact that all language exists in a context involving 
elaborate social and linguistic codes.7 As a result, the plain style cannot 
substantially improve the ability of language to fulfil the instrumental 
function Orwell ascribes it. 
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3.2. The Chapter 'Language' in Marxism and Literature. 
Williams in his early critical writings inhabits a similar intellectual context to 
· the one in which Orwell wrote 'Politics and the English Language', and his 
assumptions about language are as a result similar to Orwell's. Two 
contradictory sets of assumptions can also be found in 'early' Williams. The 
first is evident in Reading and Criticism. where Williams reproduces the 
definition of language assumed by Richards and Leavis: 'Automatic writing is 
subsidised by automatic reading. Neither has anything to do with literature or 
with language as a living means of communication' (p. 14). And: 'Literature 
is communication in written language' (p. 107). The role of the critic is as 'a 
mediator between the artist and the serious reading-public; his criticism is 
the articulation of adequate response and trained evaluation' (p. 21 ). 
Williams thus assumes that language is quite simply a means of 
communication and that the role of the critic is to facilitate the process of 
communication in the context of literature. This instrumental view of 
language, with its implied faith in the capacity of the conscious individual (in 
this case the critic) to control language, is very close to Orwell's main 
argument in 'Politics and the English Language', namely that 'the process (of 
linguistic decline] is reversible'. 
In Culture and Society 1780-1950, however, Williams introduces a more 
sociological understanding of language. Instead of seeing language as simply 
an obedient servant of the skilful language-user, Williams emphasizes in the 
Introduction that language is also in some sense a product or reflection of 
society. He identifies five key words: industry, democracy, class, art a.nd 
culture, and argues: 
The changes in their use, at this critical period, bear witness to a 
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general change in' our characteristic ways of thinking about our 
common life: about our social, political, and economic institutions; 
' 
about the purposes which these institutions are designed to embody; 
and about the relations t.o these institutions and purposes of our 
activities in learning, education, and the arts. (p. 13) 
He then traces the evolution of these words' meanings, and concludes: 'My 
terms of reference then are not only to distinguish the meanings, but to relate 
them to their sources and effects' (p. 18 ). Williams's emphasis here 
conforms broadly with Orwell's belief that 'the general tone or spirit of a 
language' is impervious to the efforts of individual language-users, that 
language might in fact play a more constitutive - rather than purely 
instrumental - function. 
In Keywords ( 1976 ), Williams extends his enquiry into words and the 
history of their meanings. In the Introduction, he presents the central thesis 
of this study: 
This is not a neutral review of meanings. It is an exploration of the 
vocabulary of a crucial area of social and cultural discussion, which 
has been inherited within precise historical and social conditions and 
which has to be made at once conscious and critical - subject to change 
as well as to continuity - if the millions of people in whom it is active 
are t.o see it as active: not a tradition t.o be learned, nor a consensus 
to be accepted, not. a set of meanings which, because it is 'our 
language', has a natural authority; but as a shaping and reshaping, in 
real circumstances and from profoundly different. and important. 
points of view: a vocabulary to use, to find our own ways in, to change 
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as we find it necessary to change it., as we go on making our own 
language and history. (p. 24-5) 
In this passage, Williams's fai.th in the capacity of 'people' to shape language 
is to the fore, alt.hough he continues to recognise the deep imprint of 'history' 
or 'society' on the development of language. However, whereas in Reading 
and Criticism (and in Orwell's prescriptions) this faith was located in 
individual language-users working consciously to communicate effectively, 
here Williams's faith is expressly social: 'we go on making our language'. 
From the late 1960 s, the intellectual climate in Britain changed swiftly, 
and with the influx of theory the ideologies of vulgar empiricism and 
humanism which circumscribed Orwell's efforts to understand language were 
exposed. I Williams records in Politics and Letters the prominence of language 
theory in this changing cont.ext.: 
Much of the new emphasis was sharpened up by work on language in 
the years immediately before writing [Marxism and Literature] -
which came out. of discussions with people I'm close to about. 
structuralist. theories of language, which at that. time were the 
dominant Marxist. current. in literary studies and I suppose to an 
extent st.ill are. (p. 324) 
Williams insists that. Marxism and Literature is a response to this cont.ext.: 
'my thrust was much more against. the limits of the newly dominant. mode of 
critical structuralism' (p. 339); it. is not. merely a continuation of the 
Scrutiny/English Marxism polemic. 
With this dominant mode of structuralism foregrounding (its version of) 
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language theory, it is therefore not surprising that Williams in responding to 
it regards his chapter on language in Marxism and Literature as 'the most 
pivotal', and in Politics and Letters argues that, 'I don't think any of the rest 
can be sustained unless that position is seen as the basis' ( p. 324). Before 
analysing the chapter, it is therefore necessary to indicate briefly the position 
of language within Williams's project of cultural materialism. 
Williams defines cultural materialism in Writing .in Society as: 'the 
analysis of all for ms of signification, including centrally writing, within the 
means and conditions of their production' ( p. 210 ). As the most pervasive 
'form of signification', language is therefore the central focus rather than 
merely part of the superstructure, a second-order derivative of the economic 
base. Recall in Culture how Williams argues that each activity within the total 
social process has its own signifying system: 'For a signifying system is 
intrinsic to any economic system, any political system, any generational 
system and, most generally, to any social system· (p. 207). On this basis, a 
close analysis of language and particularly different forms of language lies at 
the core of Williams's critical enquiry. 
In 'The Uses of Cultural Theory', Williams continues to emphasize the 
study of language as central in realising 'useful' forms cultural theory. He 
argues that: 'the "language paradigm" remains a key point of entry' (p. 29 ), 
and that: 
It is then precisely in this real work on language, including the 
language of works marked as temporarily independent and 
autonomous, that modern cultural theory can be centred: a systematic 
and dynamic social language, as distinct from the 'language 
paradigm.' (p. 29) 
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Williams's intention in his chapter on language in Marxism and 
Literature is to trace the uneven development of the relationship between 
Marxism and language theory, exploring in the process an appropriate 
theoretical basis for his own critical practice. He starts with a summary of 
the major historical phases in language theory. 2 He identifies firstly the 
Platonic separation of language and reality: this model dominated for 
centuries, effectively discouraging theoretical enquiry into the nature of 
language until the late seventeenth century; its most valuable legacy has 
been studies on the uses of language carried out within the disciplines of 
rhetoric, logic and grammar. 
The break with this limiting concept.ion of language occurred in the 
eighteenth century, and was expressed in two radical new emphases. The 
first was the idea of language as activity: this emerged as a necessary part of 
the insistence expressed by Vico that men make their own society - an active 
sense of language was the natural correlative to this active sense of the social 
process. The second was the idea of language as constitutive: more than an 
instrument added to man to facilitate communication, language was seen as a 
distinctly human faculty, 'an indissoluble element of human self-creation· 
(p. 29). According to Williams, this emphasis on language as constitutive 
should be seen as an at.tempt to maintain a sense of the uniquely human in 
the context of the rapidly expanding empirical procedures of the natural 
sciences - 'humanity' was in danger of becoming an undifferentiated area for 
study. 
These valuable emphases were deflected by two distinct notions of 
language that developed subsequently. The first was the idea of language as 
a system. Williams attributes this to the extraordinary advance in the 
-----------------
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empirical knowledges that accompanied the exp!l-nding colonialism of the 
West. In the earlier 'classical' stage of language studies, language had been 
studied as a body of records; this relationship of privileged (scientific) 
observer to a body of alien written material was powerfully reinforced by 
this subsequent encounter. As a consequence of this relationship, language 
was seen as a fixed, objective philological system, and actual speech was seen 
as derived from that given system. Williams concludes: 'the living speech of 
human beings in their specific social relationships in the world was 
theoretically reduced to instances and examples of a system which lay 
beyond them· {p. 27}. 
The emphasis on language as a constitutive activity was lost in a second 
parallel development. Vico's stress on language as activity was taken up by 
William von Humboldt in a way that denied its full radical potential. Instead 
of emphasizing the crucial social aspect of language, the idea of language as 
activity was projected into specific idealist forms. In other words, the active 
creative faculty was located not within actual social relations, but rather 
within a specific abstracted form - 'the nation', 'the collective unconscious' or' 
the creative individual'. Orwell's 'gifted but normal people' might be seen as 
another such abstracted form. 
Wi!liams also summarises what for him are the most important Marxist 
forays into language theory. He mentions Marxism for the first time in his 
discussion of how language is perceived as a system: both this conception of 
language and Marxism assert a controlling system which is inaccessible to 
individual acts of will and intelligence. This affinity is the basis of 
Althusser's structuralist Marxism. Williams resists this rapprochement 
between structural linguistics and Marxism because, firstly, history 
disappears from the resulting account of language and society, and, secondly, 
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because the dominant bourgeois categories of 'society' and the 'individual' are 
uncritically adopted. 
Further on Williams explores Marx's own undeveloped ideas about 
language. In Marx's writings he locates a strong sense of language as 
constitutive, as an 'indissoluble totality of development' (p. 30 ). Williams 
stresses this sense of constitutive as indissoluble: by breaking the idea of 
'constitutive' into elements and ordering them, a kind of reduction is 
inevitable. In the writings of Vico and Herder, there was the danger that the 
primary constitutive nature of language they proclaimed would be 
interpreted as meaning that language preceded and determined all other 
connected activities. In Marx's case, his emphasis on an indissoluble 
constitutive role for language was displaced by the extension of simple 
materialist maxims - like 'the base determines the superstructure· - with the 
result that certain elements within the concept ·constitutive· were privileged; 
language on this construction was seen as part of the ·superstructure', and as 
such merely a reflection of the ultimately determining material production. 
In reviewing the work of several 'Stalinist' linguistic theorists, Williams 
finds them to be constrained in this way by the dogmatic application of 
materialist truisms. Instead of seeing language and material production as 
connected practices playing constitutive roles in a total social process, both 
are abstracted as discrete stimuli acting on the human brain, with 'labour' 
preceding 'language· as the single effective origin. Furthermore, he argues, 
the reflection theory upheld in these versions of Marxism to explain the 
connection between the abstract categories of 'language' and 'reality' is 
unable to account for t.he active and constitutive faculties of language. 
The next stage of Williams's examination focuses on the contributions of 
V. N. Volosinov and M. M. Bakhtin. whose work strongly influences his own 
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understanding of language. There are several related aspects of VoJosinov's 
work that Williams describes with approval. The first is Volosinov's 
insistence that language involves the active creation of meanings, an 
emphasis that had been lost in the objectivist assumption of language as a 
closed formal system. Further, by stressing that the creation of meaning was 
a social action, he avoided the limitations of idealist projections of language 
as activity. 
The second aspect Williams embraces is Volosinov·s redefinition of the 
sign. Volosinov agrees with Saussure insofar as he argues that the relation 
between the formal element (signifier) and the meaning of the word 
(signified) is conventional, but he differs in that he does not see the relation 
as arbitrary or as fixed. He conceives the fusion of formal element and 
meaning rather as the result of an active social process, 'this product of 
continuing speech-activity bet.ween real individuals who are in some 
continuing social relationship' (p. 37). Two immediate conclusions are 
derived from this: firstly, individuals are born into - and shaped by - this 
continuing process, but they are also able to contribute to it; it is their ability 
to contribute to the process that guarantees that the signifier/signified 
relation is not arbitrary. Secondly, this new conceptualisation of the sign 
demands an appropriately adjusted conception of language itself: 'language' 
can no longer be construed as a category separate from 'society' or ·reality'. 
Instead, following Volosinov, Williams sees language as 'the articulation of 
this active and changing experience; a dynamic and articulated social 
presence in the world' (p. 38). 
The third aspect of Volosinov's work that Williams describes is closely 
related. It is the perception firstly that signs exist as part of material reality, 
and secondly, that signs are the reflection and refraction of other categories 
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of material reality. This second distinguishing quality of a sign, the 
· articulation of meaning by a process of representation, was recognised in 
formalist linguistics, but was characterised as a process occurring within the 
separated sphere of 'language' or 'consciousness·. In other words, meaning 
was seen as articulated in language only, and this process of articulation was 
independent of social material activity. Volosinov expands this conception, 
emphasizing that 'the process of articulation is necessarily also a material 
process, and ... the sign itself becomes part of a (socially created) physical 
and material world' (p. 38). The conclusion Williams draws from this is of 
central importance to his own project of cultural materialism: 'Signification, 
the social creation of meanings through the use of formal signs, is then a 
practical material activity; it is indeed, literally, a means of production' 
p. 38). For Williams then, the creation of meaning with signs is emphatically 
a material process that has to be seen as a crucial part of alJ human, sodal 
and material activity. 
The fourth aspect Williams discusses also relates to the nature of the sign . . 
Volosinov distinguishes signs from signals: both contain a fusion of signifier 
and signified, and both are effective in communication. But whereas signals 
have fixed invariant. meaning, signs are capable of modification and 
development. The sign must have a nucleus of meaning, but in practice the 
meaning will vary to suit the situation in which the sign is actively used; this 
variation is not random, but is rather ·a necessary element of practical 
consciousness' (p. 40 ). This quality of active variation means that 
individuals can use signs of their own initiative in acts of social 
communication which are personal, as well as in acts which are manifestly 
social. By contrast, the signal with its fixed meaning is generally confined to 
the social: it must be recognised in social practice, but it need not be 
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internalised. Only the sign has the capacity to be internalised, to become part 
of a verbally constituted practical consciousness. 
Finally, what Volosinov's analysis of the sign confirms for Williams is the 
inadequacy of the dominant accounts of language as eithe(derived from a 
given sign system, or as the product of an idealised form. His concluding 
assessment of Volosinov is revealing: 
This view (Volosinov's] is then radically opposed to the construction of 
all acts of communication from predetermined objective relationships 
and properties, within which no individual initiative, of a creative or 
self-generating kind, would be possible. It is thus a decisive rejection 
of mechanical, behaviourist, or Saussurean versions of an objective 
system which is beyond individual initiative or creative use. But it is 
also a theoretical rejection of subjectivist theories of language as 
individual expression, since what is internally constituted is the social 
fact of the sign, bearing a definite though never fixed or invariant 
social meaning and relationship. (p. 40) 
Williams's own emphasis on language as a dynamic social activity comes 
through strongly. ' 
The adjustments to Volosinov's theory that Williams suggests are in effect 
logical extensions of the not.ion of language as constitutive activity. Firstly, 
Williams endorses L. S. Vygotsky's argument that 'inner speech' is itself 
constitutive rather than merely transferred; both 'inner' and 'outer· speech 
should be seen as intrinsic to the active constitution of practical social 
consciousness. Second. Williams criticizes Volosinov·s insufficiently -
modified conception of the sign-system: according to Williams, 'sign· must be 
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defined in terms of its endless variability, and 'system· must be revalued as 
referring to active social process rather than an abstracted sociality. Abstract 
definition of the sign (or system) as an analytical procedure requires a 
theoretical freezing of language, but it can easily be extrapolated in a way 
that curtails a sense of language as a profoundly dynamic process. Finally, 
Williams clarifies what is meant when language is described as constitutive: 
the first sense is of language as a distinctly human faculty,··exerting 
pressures and setting limits, in determinate ways, to human development 
itself' (p. 41 ) ; the second sense is derived again from Vygotsky: 'constitutive· 
also describes the role language plays in the historical and social process by 
which practical consciousness is constituted. 
Having analysed 'Politics and the English Language· and now summarised 
Williams's chapter on language in Marxism and Literature. it might appear 
difficult to see what they have in common. They are written in quite 
different intellectual contexts. They are written in different registers -
Orwell in the casual style of the popular essayist, Williams in closely argued 
academic discourse. Orwell and Williams also write about language for 
different reasons: Orwell to expose the verbosity and vagueness of politicians 
and intellectuals; Williams to explore the relation between Marxism and 
linguistic theory. In the texts themselves, there are important differences of 
emphasis: Orwe11 focuses on the responsibilities of the individual 
language-user and tries to install the plain style as the sole means to 
successful communication, whereas Wi11iams consistently insists on the social 
nature of language and describes style elsewhere 3 as a quality inseparable 
from both the ideas and feelings expressed and the context in which they are 
expressed. In Politics and Letters he refutes the claims of Orwell's plain style, 
arguing his stance towards the social situation he is observing 'is simply the 
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popular journalistic e:xpressiOn of the whole mode of obj_ectivist social study' 
(p. 388 ). 
Notwithstanding these import.ant differences, there are certain 
assumptions at. t.he centre of Williams's language theory which have some 
correspondence in Orwell's understanding of language. The first. is t.he 
assumption of a 'unified subject' which precedes language as the source of 
meaning. Orwell's essay reflects t.his assumption most. obviously where he 
describes the need t.o 'think wordlessly . . . t.o let. the meaning choose the 
word, and not. t.he other way about.' (p. 168 ). For Orwell therefore, the 
thoughts of the individual language-user can be protected from language; 
language is seen as something external to the language-user, as something to 
be shaped according to the subject's needs. Williams expresses a similar 
convict.ion when he argues t.hat. 'men relate and continue to relate before any 
system which is their product. can ... exercise its determination' (p. 42). For 
Williams too, the language system is ultimately a product. of 'men relating· 
~at.her than 'men relating' being a derivative or product. of language. 
The second assumption they share is anticipated in the first. It. is the 
belief that. 'people' have some capacity to control and change language. In 
Orwell, this belief takes a volunt.arist. and individualist. form: he argues that 
'several thousand gifted but. normal people' could make a decisive impression 
on the language system; for Orwell, t.he rehabilitation of English even 
represents a viable strategy for improving political conditions.· Williams, on 
the other hand, goes no further than a theoretical defence of human agency 
vis a vis systems of determination, specifically that. of language. In his 
comparison of object.ivist. linguist.ics and Marxism, he argues that. both assert 
(wrongly) 'a cont.rolling social system which is a priori inaccessible to 
"individual" acts of will and intelligence' (p. 28 ); and he objects to 
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'mechanical, behaviourist or Saussurean. versions of an objective system 
[because they are} beyond individual initiative or creative use' (p. 40). 
Therefore, although Williams does not entertain any voluntarist schemes of 
Janguage regeneration, like Orwell he insists upon a space for human agency 
by consistently attacking the idea of humanity being enslaved to a 
determining system, be it 'language', 'society', 'the economy', or any abstract 
combination of the above. 
The third assumption they share relates to the nature of the sign. Orwell 
sees the designation of meaning as the result of people deciding what 
particular words should mean (recall in particular 'New Words'. where he 
proposes the conscious creation of words to embody as yet inchoate 
meanings). Like Orwell, Williams sees the relation between the word and its 
meaning as conventional, and also like Orwell, he argues (in more 
sophisticated terms) that the relation is settled by conscious individuals in an 
active social process: 'The re lat.ion within the sign bet.ween the formal 
element and the meaning which this element carries is thus inevitably 
conventional ... but it is not arbitrary and, crucially, it is not fixed' (p. 37). 
Also, like Orwell, Williams argues the existence of a relation between signifier 
and signified, that words reflect or refract other categories of reality. For 
Orwell, this conviction is registered in the strict language/reality separation 
of common sense empiricism: there is the real world and then there are 
words that correspond to parts of it. In 'Politics and the English Language' he 
applies this distinction when he argues that words in art criticism ·are strictly 
meaningless, in the sense that they . . . do not point to any discoverable 
object.' (p. 161 ». Williams resists this dichotomy, arguing that language 
should not be construed as a category separate from 'reality', but should be 
seen rather as an articulation of reality, 'a dynamic and articulated social 
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presence in the world' (p. 38). Notwithstanding these efforts to unite these 
categories of language and reality, Williams continues to insist that there is a 
material reality to which language refers, and which is in some sense 
independent of language. Recall his observatfon in Culture that: 
It would be wrong to reduce [reality, society} to the signifying system 
alone, for this would make all human actions and relationships mere 
functions of signification and, in doing so, radically diminjsh them. 
(p. 207) 
He re-iterates this fundamental empiricist assumption in Politics and Letters: 
we are in danger of reaching the opposite point in which t.he 
epistemological wholly absorbs the ontological: it is only in the ways of 
knowing that we exist. at all ... it is necessary to recall an absolutely 
founding presumption of materialism: namely that t.he natural world 
exists whether anyone signifies it or not. (p. 167) 
Orwell and Williams therefore share a sense of some pre-linguistic 'reality': a 
'signified'; 'the natural world'; 'discoverable objects'; ·experience·. 
The fourth assumption they share is that language is in some sense 
constitutive. In Orwell, this percept.ion is expressed in the fear that language 
in the service of totalitarianism might reconstitute 'humanity' devoid of 
liberal virtues. Williams approaches the quest.ion of language's constitutive 
function by stressing firslly the inadequacy of seeing language as only an 
I 
instrument of communication: 
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[language] became a tool or an instrument or a medium talten up by 
individuals when they had something to communicate, as distinct from 
the faculty which made them, from the beginning, not only able to 
relate and communicate1 but in real terms to be practically conscious 
and so to possess the active practice of language. (p. 32) 
By this argument, Williams confronts the tension unresolved in Orwell's essay 
between language as obedient instrument of the rational individual, and 
language as irresistible determining force. While retaining a theoretical space 
for individuals to consciously create meaning in language, Williams at the 
same time defines the constitutive faculty more broadly. For Orwell, only 
'bad' language could 'come crowding in and do your thinking for you· i.e. play 
a constitutive function; plain speech reflected quite accurately the wordless 
ideas of the individual, and therefore played no more than an instrumental 
function. Williams rejects this spurious distinction in his extended 
understanding of constitutive as referring to both the biological pressures and 
limits exerted by language on human development, and to the 
historical-social process defining 'the changing practical consciousness of 
human beings· (p. 44). The sense of language as constitutive represents a 
potential threat. to the first. three assumptions shared by Orwell and Williams 
in that if extended it might insist upon language as the source of all meaning, 
with individual language-users determined by language, and the 'material 
reality' existing only through language. Both Orwell and Williams in different 
ways seek to qualify this constitutive function so that human actors preserve 
some 'agency· with respect. to the language system. 
That Orwell and Williams share significant. assumptions about language is 
brought home more clearly if one ·compares their ideas to those of someone 
·--..... J 
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employing a quite different problematic. Jacques Lacan, 4 for example, 
' 
constructs his theories of language and the subject on different assumptions, 
and although far more than a paragraph is needed to convey the subtlety and 
range of Lacan's thought, two or three points of comparison can be identified. 
In the first place, whereas Orwell and Williams insist upon the existence of a 
signified, Lacan re-defines the relation between the signifier and signified by 
arguing that it is not the relation between the signifier and signified that 
determines the meaning of the sign, but rather the relation of signifiers. 
Coward and Ellis quote Lacan: 'it is in the chain of the signifier that meaning 
insists, but none of its elements 'consists' in the meaning of which it is at that 
moment capable' (p. 97). The signifier is therefore the crucial conceptual 
category in Lacan's theory as it provides the means by which identities and 
differences can be established. Secondly, whereas Orwell and Williams 
conceive a unified subject preceding and in some sense controlling language, 
Lacan argues that language precedes the subject; he assumes that each 
individual enters into a pre-existent linguistic world. As a result, the 
subject's own identity, rat.her than being innate, is achieved by a process of 
differentiation in which it marks out separations between itself and its own 
surroundings in order that it may establish a place for itself in the signifying 
chain. The assumption of that place is only possible after the 'splitting' of the 
subject, a complex process in which the subject forms itself distinct from an 
outside. The conscious subject that emerges ensures communication and the 
creation of meaning, but it remains an effect of the signifying process, a kind 
of linguistically constructed mirage which is reified within the social and 
ideological matrix. 
There is a fifth similarity in Orwell and Williams's ideas about language 
that is not so much a common assumption as a common evasion. I noted 
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.above Williams's argument that Orwell's plain style 'cancels the social 
situation of the writer and his stance towards the social situation he is 
observing'; and also McNelly's argument that the plain style functions as an 
exclusionary code all the more subtle for its claims to 'plainness·. Although 
Williams employs what might. be termed 'academic discourse· rather than the 
plain style, there is a sense in which he too represses his social situation in 
the text, and employs an exclusionary code to conduct his arguments: 
Williams in Marxism and Literature is silent about. 'the reasonable socialist's' 
class, race, gender and educational background in much the same way as 
Orwell represses the plain man's history in 'Politics and the English Language'; 
and furthermore, Williams's ·academic discourse·- is, if anything, a more 
powerful exclusionary code than the plain style in that it is conceived for a 
far narrower audience. 
Finally, the relation between Orwell and Williams's ideas about language 
and the rest of their work should again be stressed. The idea that -
not.withstanding extensive qualification - 'people' have the capacity to control 
language provides a theoretical justification for both the humanism informing 
their socialist commitment, and their related efforts to politicise the reading 
(and teaching) of literature. 
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Conclusion. . 
The general conclusion to be drawn from this study is that there are areas of 
significant overlap between the ideas of George Orwell and Raymond 
Williams. 
In the chapter on 'politics', we noted a number of similarities: both Orwell 
and Williams occupy a privileged position-as-observer within the texts ('the 
' 
plain man' and 'the reasonable socialist'); they both rely on 'experience' as a 
touchstone for political analysis (Orwell 'uses his eyes' and Williams is 'only 
interested in the evidence available where one lives'); and they both, in their 
respective images of the family and the community, represent Britain as a 
society governed ultimately by feelings of common interest rather than of 
irreconcilable class conflict. Finally, they are both committed to forms of 
socialism in which (bourgeois) democratic freedoms are preserved; 'reformist' 
measures are pursued as legitimate steps in the journey towards socialism; 
change of consciousness (achieved by reasonable argument and cultural 
intervention) is seen as essential; and 'people' (an alliance of worker and 
petit-bourgeois) are the agents of socialism. 
In the chapter on 'letters', we noted that they shared a sense of the 
importance of literature; that they both .resisted the definition of literature 
imposed by the dominant critical orthodoxy; that they both explored the 
relation between 'politics· and 'letters' ; and that they both privileged 'politics' 
as 'the real world of authentic experience·, with literature a reflection or 
distortion of that world. (I make the qualifications·about Williams's more 
sophisticated formulations presently). Finally, they both seek to use 'letters· 
in the service of (socialist) 'politics': indeed they both see their work on 
letters as part of the struggle to effect the change of consciousness central to 
socialist transformation. This desire is evident (sometimes indirectly) in their 
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literary and cultural criticism in several (similar) ways: in their challenging of 
the assumptions and practices of traditional critical discourse; in their 
attempts to historicise the reading of literature; in their use of explicitly 
'socialist' standards of judgement in assessing literature (which includes, for 
example, their attempts to read Dickens as expressing their own values of 
socialist humanism). 
We also noted that Orwell and Williams share certain assumptions about 
language: t.hey both assume a 'unified subject.' which precedes language as t.he 
source of meaning; they both see 'people' as having some capacity to control 
and change language; they both share a sense of some pre-linguistic 'reality', 
described variously as 'the signified' , 'the natural world' , 'discoverable 
objects' , and 'experience' ; and they both see language as in some way 
constituting that reality. Further, both Orwell and Williams in their actual use 
of language practise discursive modes which repress their personal histories 
and exclude a wide audience of readers. 
The extent. and nature of these similarities lead me t.o conclude t.hat. 
Orwell and Williams, for all the differences between them I will enumerate 
below, inhabit the .same problematic. 1 In their pronouncements (and silences) 
about politics, letters and language, t.hey develop their ideas from the same 
intellectual heritage, they make the, same fundamental assu mpt.ions, and they 
pursue the same ends. 
However, and t.he qualifications to follow are as import.ant as t.he general 
conclusion, they (to sustain the spatial metaphor) inhabit very different 
regions of that. same problematic. The differences between them which I 
draw together below confirm this. 
Int.he first place, Orwell and Williams belong t.o different generations and 
write in different. contexts. Although they bot.h live and write in Britain in 
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the twentieth century, the economic, political and ideological configuration of 
the Britain in which Orwell writes is quite distinct from the Britain in which 
Williams produced his major work. That. they employ the same problematic 
at different times in British history affects the extent to which their ideas can 
be identified as similar because as the context changes, so the words used to 
discuss issues arising in those contexts acquire new and different 
connotations (Williams d~monstrates this point in 'Notes on British Marxism' 
where he traces the changing meanings of 'Communism'). 
Secondly, in the context of politics Orwell and Williams in fact represent 
two different constituencies of British socialism. Orwell typifies the 
middle-class socialist motivated by an ethic of service and pursuing 
humanitarian ends., whereas Williams represents the working-class socialist 
inspired by the values of com munit.y and solidarity. 2 Further, Williams·s 
commitment to socialist-humanism is not supplemented by emotions of 
English nationalism; nor is it. subject to any serious doubts as to the ability of 
'people' to continue the journey to socialism. 3 
Thirdly, Orwell and Williams operate in different discourses. Orwell 
writes in the informal, often polemical register of the popular essayist, 
whereas Williams writ.es in the precise and carefully qualified language of the 
literary scholar. This difference is particularly evident in their work on 
letters and language, where Orwell's common sense formulations are refined 
almost. beyond recognition in Williams's arguments, and we are left 
identifying very basic common assumptions and goals. 
The difference also points to another deeper difference between Orwell 
and Williams. The plain style employed by Orwell places substant_ial limits 
upon the extent to which he is able to identify and question the terms of his 
own formation and problematic, whereas Williams's 'academic discourse' 
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affords a vocabulary (which Williams uses extensively) in order to pursue 
such enquiries. As a result, Orwell continues complacently within the 
boundaries of the problematic, indulging and at the same time exemplifying 
'the English horror of abstract thought', whereas Williams constantly explores 
those boundaries, re-defining and extending them, but still ultimately never 
moving out.side those boundaries into a different problematic.4 
There are several areas of comparison between Orwell and Williams I 
have not explored (most notably the fact that they both wrote novels) and 
~here are also further differences I have not mentioned (for example, the fact 
Williams's extensive research in the field of drama has no correspondence in 
Orwell). However, I hope that in this study I have clarified their central 
pre-occupations by focusing on their ideas on politics, letters and language; 
and also, that in the process, I have shed some light on the important and 
difficult. issues they spent their lives investigating. 
Notes 
Introduction 
1 Thomas traces Williams's attitude to Orwell (pp. 433-5), 
emphasizing Williams's rejection of Orwell in Politics and Letters. 
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2 In Towards 2000 , Williams repeats in abridged form what he 
writes about Nineteen Eighty-Four in the second edition of Orwell: that 
Orwell's projections of three super-states and of brutal internal repression 
within each state, contain a strong element of truth, but that they ultimately 
belong t.o a 'pre-nuclear period, and above all to the experience of int.er-war 
fascism and of Stalinism · (p. 224). 
3 This kind of judgment has been widely repeated. For a wider 
selection of opinion, see the tributes to Williams listed by Robin Blackburn in 
his article 'Raymond Williams and the Politics of a New Left' (p. 13). 
4 For a more complex range of Left-wing attitudes to Orwell, see 
Christopher Norris (ed), Inside the Myth. 
Chapter One : Politics. 
1 Wherever possible, I have drawn on Sonia Onvell and Angus, The 
Collected Essays. Journalism and Letters of George Orwell. References will be 
to volumes and page numbers. 
1 .1 The Lion and the Unicorn 
1 For a discussion of the cultural context of wartime Britain, see Angus 
Calder, The People's War pp. 501-23. and Correlli Barnett pp. 11-37. 
Calder's discussion ranges more widely and is forgiving, whereas Barnett 
launches a scathing attack on the political theorists of the time, 'the seekers 
for a New jerusaJem · as he terms them. 
2 Crick in his biography of Orwell ( pp. 278-96) describes how the 
work was commissioned, and traces Orwell's experiences during its 
production. 
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. 3 · E. P. Thompson in 'Outside the Whale', The Poverty of Theory and 
Other Essays, pp. 211-43, assesses the damage caused by Orwell's abuse: 
It is true that specious apologetics and romantic attitudes were 
t.o be found amongst the Left intelligentsia in the thirties. Orwell 
succeeds in pinpointing those which most irritated him. What. he 
does not. do is suggest that any other, more honourable, 
motivations might have coexisted with the trivia. And in this he 
falsifies the record .... Popular Front, Left Book Club and the 
rest are seen, not as a political response within a definite 
political context, but as the projection of the neuroses and petty 
motives of a section of the English middle class . . . Socialist 
idealism was not discounted, it was explained away, as the 
function of middle-class guilt, frustration and ennui. 
(pp. 227-8) 
4 Not in Sonia Orwell and Angus ; discussed by Jennie Calder, who 
writes that Orwell draws together in this essay all the elements of his 
socialism, which she sums up as: 
his belief in democracy, and his longing for physical revolution, 
his respect. for tradition, particularly English tradition, his 
abhorrence of Marxist dogma, his reliance on ordinary people, 
his admiration of the short-lived revolution in Spain. (p. 174) 
S Alex Zwerdling discusses these writers' influence on Orwell: 
!Orwell} lists a group of books written by what. he calls 
'The Pessimists': Voigt's Unto Caeser , Russell's Power, Hayek's 
Road to Serfdom , Burnham 's Managerial Revolution , and a 
number of others. Such studies 'deny that. a planned society 
can lead either to happiness or to true progress.· Alt.hough 
Orwell's attitude t.o these writers is critical, he concludes 'that 
they and other writers of kindred tendency have uttered much 
useful criticism oft.he folly and wickedness of the Totalitarian 
Age' (p. 85) 
6 Zwerdling concludes his chapter on this final stage of Orwell's career 
as follows: 
we must distinguish between his political ideals and his 
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sense of political realities. The ideals remained those of a 
democratic socialist .... He was unlike 'other socialists in that 
he finally did not believe his ideals would be, or could be 
realized.(p. 112-3) 
Stuart Hall's essay 'Conjuring Leviathan: Orwell on the St.ate' is a useful 
summary of Orwell's ideas on the state as reflected in his final works. Hall 
concludes: 
Orwell may not have been correct t.o follow the line of 
thought which traced all these divergent paths to the same 
mono-causal point of origin - totalitarianism; but. at a less 
literal level he was not wrong in what. he glimpses of certain 
historical tendencies in the advanced societies of the world. 
(p. 240) 
7 Besides Carr's valuable discussion, British common sense empiricism 
is described by Perry Anderson in 'Origins of the Present Crisis' and . 
'Components of the National Culture'; and Gareth Stedman Jones in 'History: 
The Poverty of Empiricism~. 
8 Williams sets out this posit.ion in more detail in Orwell. (p. 26) 
9 A much more detailed analysis of the British ruling class, which 
traces the family and kinship networks, is Noel Annan·s 'The Intellectual 
Aristocracy·. 
10 Discussed by john Westergaard, 'The Withering Away of Class: A 
Contemporary Myth'; Williams et. al. May Day Manifesto pp. 18-39; 
Williams, Politics and Letters, pp. 391-2. 
11 See, for example, Williams's discussion of Rudolf Bahro's The 
Alternative in Eastern Europe in 'Beyond Actually Existing Socialism· in 
Problems in Materialism and Culture , pp. 252-73. Another clear critique of 
centralised economies (described as 'et.at.ism') is Branko Horvat's 
Self-Governing Socialism . 
12 I will refer in more detail to the major critiques of the pluralist 
conception of the state in sect.ion 1.3. 
205 
1 .2. Britain in the 1 960s 
I This discussion of the historical context of the 1950s is drawn from 
the following sources: Colin Leys pp. 60-3; Perry Anderson, 'The Figures of 
Descent' pp. 20-77, especially pp 52-7; James Cronin, PP. 146 ff; David 
Coates. pp. 75-96; and C. B. Cox and A. E. Dyson (eds), PP. 1-57. 
2 Anderson, 'The Left in the Fifties·. There is useful discussion of the 
extra- Parliamentary Left and especially of the 'New Left' during this period 
in: Peter Sedgwick, 'The Two New Lefts'; E. P. Thompson. 'The Peculiarities of 
the English' in The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays , pp. 245-30 I; and 
Williams. Politics and Letters PP. 361-8. 
3 These inc~ude: E.P.Thompson·s 'Peculiarities of the English'. 
Thompson accuses Anderson of practising a kind of 'inverted Podsnappery·: 
'There is, indeed, throughout their analysis an undisclosed model of Other 
Countries. whose typological symmetry offers a reproach to Bdt.ish 
exceptionalism· (p. 24'(). (Thompson's essay is in fact an attack on an earlier 
piece of Anderson's namely, 'Origins of the Present Crisis', but his objections 
apply equally to ·components'). Richard Johnson's essay 'Moore. Anderson 
and English social development', stresses the undue pessimism of 
Anderson's analysis: 
The theory of failure, indeed, coexists throughout the 
Anderson/Nairn early project with a contradictory 
half-recognition of the ideological and political resources of 
the dominant classes in England, a powerful defence in depth. 
Viewed differently, each of the Anderson/Nairn failures can 
also be read as assets, as symptoms of strength , as a large 
but. finite repertoire of solutions . (p. 61) 
4 Anderson in 'Origins· offers the following trenchant criticism of 
Williams·s argument: 
the weakness of Williams·s argument is that it fails to make a 
distinction between corporate and hegemonic inst.it utional forms. 
The very density and specificity of English working-class culture 
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has limited its political range and checked the emergence of a 
hegemonic socialism in England. Wi11iams's attempt t.o solve the 
difficulty by attributing an ndefinite extendibility to 
working-class but not to bourgeois institutions, besides its factual 
weaknesses, rests on an evacuation of conflict concepts from his 
.whole idiom. The truth seems to be that the nature of 
working-class culture is as he describes it, but that the will to 
universalize it.. to make it the general model of society , which he 
tacitly assumes to be a concomitant, has only rarely existed. 
(pp. 38-9). 
S Leys sets out these statistics in detail. (p. 62) 
6 I will discuss the influence of Althusser in the next section. 
7 Michael Green in 'Raymond Williams and Cultural Studies', writes: 
His theoretical concepts, especially in his best-known though 
often difficult The Long Revolution. embody an oscillation 
between a liberal pluralist. and a Marxist conception of history 
and :mcicty, though in later work the Marxi:5t model i:5 explicit. 
(p. 32) 
Peter Sedgwick in 'The Two New Lefts' emphasizes the ascendancy of the 
consensual model in Wi11iams's early work: 
What Williams finally offered was the replacement of a 
conflict model of society (oft.he sort.'which has been 
traditional among socialists and even radical reformers) with a 
communications model, in which the unity of humankind is 
primordially broken, not. by t.he clash of rival social interests, 
but by blockages and faulty linkages in moral per.ception. 
Society is conceived as a kind of mental organism whose 
warring f acult.ies, in t.he shape of sectional or partial value 
systems, eventually, if effort.fully, knit together in a single 
communications net or 'common culture.' (p. 137) 
8 Francis Mulhern, Towards 2000 or News - From You-Know-Where' 
,especially pp. 23-6. analyses in greater detail the problems with Williams's 
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use of community. 
9 The main thrust of Anthony Barnett's critique of Williams is 
concerned with this privileging of the cultural in Williams's early work: 
For despite the emphasis laid on the constraints of the 
capitalist economy and the incomplete character of liberal 
democracy in the West, he valorized cultural change 
(communication, understanding, art) at the expense of 
industrial, and, above all, political struggle by the 
working-class ~gainst bourgeois society. (p. 56) 
1 O However, the similarities in political thinking between Orwell and 
Williams described below would seem to reinforce Stedman Jones's argument 
that the working-class (Williams) and middle-class (Orwell) components of 
the British labour movement were united by a single socialist 'language· of 
reform. 
11 Williams's peers in the British Left have also contributed 
substantially to the creation of 'Williams', the unwavering working-class 
socialist unbroken by the gloomy Thatcher years. The obituaries on .his death 
apply more gilt to this venerated figure. 
12 Although Williams never became an English nationalist like Orwell, 
J. P. Ward, in his short study Raymond Williams. stresses his rejection of 
Wales in his early work, and his immersion in the English cultural tradition. 
Ward emphasizes the liberating effect on Williams of Welsh nationalism when 
he returned to study Wales anew in his thirties: 'It. seems fair to say that this 
experience of Wales has been genuinely allied by Raymond Williams to the 
sense of a new tangible social vision' (p. 10 ). 
13 Recall Anthony Barnett's argument quoted in the introduction that 
Orwell and Williams are alike in their identification of democratic freedoms 
and the bourgeois state. 
14 Looking onJy at. this final part of The Long Revolution. it is therefore 
difficult to understand E. P. Thompson's charge in his review that Williams 
has given ·a record of impersonal forces at work and not a record of struggle' 
(p. 26 ). Williams's humanism seems to be merely a less strident version of 
Thompson's. But what Thompson's criticism draws attention to is the 
• 
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difference between Part I I - the history of cultural institutions - and 'Britain 
in the 1960 s' : in the former, Williams indeed emphasizes the abstract social 
forces at the expense of human agents, whereas - as we have seen - the 
tendency is reversed in the latter. 
1.3. Towards 2000 
1 Williams also discusses Communications in Politics and Letters , 
pp.· 369-70. 
2 'Means of Communication as Means of Production', reprinted in 
Problems in Materialism and Culture , pp. 50-63 
3 Another important essay dealing with Williams·s engagement with 
Marxism is 'Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory' in Problems. 
pp. 31-49. I deal with it in detail in the next chapter. 
4 See, for example, Anthony Barnett, pp. 55-6, and Terry Eagleton, 
Criticism and Ideology. pp. 28-32. 
5 It should be added that in the discourse of Western Marxism 
generally, 'totality· has proved to be an elusive concept. A central theme of 
Martin jay·s Marxism and Totality is that 'the initial Western Marxist 
attempts at a viable concept of totality miscarried' (p. 20). He nonetheless 
argues in his conclusion that the·search for some notion of totality should 
continue: 
The search for a viable concept of totality, which we have 
seen animating Western Marxism, should not therefore be 
written off as no more than a benighted exercise in nostalgia 
for a past plenitude or the ideology of intellectuals bent on 
legitimating their domination of the rest of mankind. For if 
the human race is to avoid the negative totality of nuclear 
catastrophe, we may well need to find some positive 
alternative. (pp. 536-7) . 
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6 This synthesis of Britain in the 1980 s is drawn from the following 
sources: James Curran; Eric Hobsbawm et al; Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques 
(eds), The Politics of Thatcherism; Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain 
pp. 365-404; Leys pp. 89-100; Anderson, 'Figures· pp. 66-77; Micha.el 
Barratt Brown; and Alex Callinicos. 
7 In the Introduction to Marxism and Literature, Wi11iams writes that 
in the early seventies 'my own long and often intern.al and solitary debate 
with what I had known as Marxism now took its place in a serious and 
extending international inquiry· (p. 4). In the context of political analysis, 
Williams will have been aided and influenced by the new Marxist. work on 
the nature of the British state by Nicos Poulantzas and Tom Nairn. Leys 
summarizes these important contributions (pp. 227-33). 
8 Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology . Eagleton's assessment of 
Williams is mqre generous in his later work. See The Function of Criticism 
pp. 108-15 ; his int~rview with Williams, 'The Practice of Possibility' ; and 
'Resources for a journey of Hope: The Significance of Raymond Williams'. 
9 Stuart Hall. 'Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms.' Further detail on the 
culturalist/structuralist debate can be found in Richard Johnson, 'Histories of 
Culture/Theories of Ideology· and ·Three Problematics'; E. P. Thompson, 
The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays ; Perry Anderson, Arguments 
Within English Marxism ; Paul Hirst, Marxism and Historical Writing ; 
Raphael Samuel, pp. 376 -408. 
10 Denis Donoghue in his review 'Examples' makes this point. 
Chapter Two - Letters 
2.1 'Charles Dickens· 
1 For further detail on this transition, see: Chris Baldick, pp. 86-106 
and pp. 134-161; Francis Mulhern, The Moment of Scrutiny pp. 19-28; 
Terry Eagleton, The Function of Criticism pp. 64-70. 
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2 There are useful summaries of Eliot's work on culture and criticism 
in Lesley Johnson, pp. 122-29; Baldick, pp. · 109-133; and Frank 
Gloversmit.h, pp. 1 S-44. 
3 Not in Sonia Orwell and Angus; see Malcolm Evans, pp. 12-38. For 
more detail on the Leavises' work during this period, see: A. R. Jones, 
pp. 457-73 (for a generous judgement of Eliot, Richards and the Leavises); 
Lesley Johnson, pp. 93-115; Mulhern, The Moment of Scrutiny, 
especially pp. 325-31; and Eagleton, The Function of Criticism pp. 70-84. 
I return to Leavis and Scrutiny in more detail in the discussion of Williams. 
4 Orwell's description of his critical essays in a letter to Geoffrey Gorer: 
I, p. 579. 
S George Woodcock, pp. 229-79 provides a more detailed summary 
of Orwell's interest in literature. 
6 Orwell's efforts to place Dickens in his historical context are repeated 
in most of his essays on literary figures. In the essay on Gissing, for 
example, he distinguishes Gissing's London from the London of 1948: 
It is the fog-bound, gas-lit London of the eighties, a city of 
drunken puritans, where clot.hes, architecture and furniture 
had reached their rock-bottom of ugliness and where it. was 
almost normal for a working-class family of ten persons to 
inhabit a single room. (p. 48_5) 
7 A valuable summary of the important shifts in Dickens's political 
understanding is provided by Michael Goldberg, 'From Bentham to Carlyle: 
Dickens· Political Development..' Goldberg concludes: 
If Dickens' earlier radicalism is attributable to Bentham ... 
his later political attitudes demonstrably owe a great deal 
more to Carlyle .... What he gained from Carlyle was a vision 
of Victorian society far more radical and pessimistic than 
anything he had entertained as a young novelist. attacking 
the hydra of social abuses. He came to recognise the evil 
inherent in the social system and to know that it was far 
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more intractable than he had previously thought. (p. 76) 
8 In "Tolstoy and Shakespeare' (II, pp 153-7), Orwell makes these 
points more explictly: 
Every piece of writing has its propaganda aspect, and yet in 
any book or play or poem or what not that is to endure there 
has to be a residuum of something that. simply is not 
affected by its moral or meaning - a residuum of something 
we can only call art. Within certain limits, bad thought and 
bad morals can be good literature. (p. 157) 
9 In his essays of literary criticism, Orwell often concludes by 
considering how the particular figure reviewed might fare in the 1930 sand 
1940 s. Of jack London, for example, he speculates: 
if one imagines him living on into our own day, instead of 
dying in 1915, it is very hard to be sure where his political 
allegiance would have lain. One can imagine him in the 
Communist Party, one can imagine him falling a victim to Nazi 
racial theory, and one can imagine him the quixotic 
champion of some Trotskyist or Anarchist sect. (p. 48) 
2.2 Chapter One of the English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence. 
1 The chapter on Dickens is in fact made up of two separate essays: 
pp. 28-48 are repeated in chapter 15 of The Country and the City, and 
pp. 48-59 are an abbreviated version of 'Social Criticism in Dickens'. 
2 What Williams describes here is akin t.o I. A. Richards's 'practical 
criticism', which Bowen summarises as follows: 
Practical Criticism is a technique that involves the production of 
two things - what could be called a 'naked reader', and a 'naked 
text'. The text is isolated from its conditions of production, its· 
genre, its history, its cont.ext, wrested from those 
laboriously-constructed unities of place, time and interpretation. 
And equally the reader is isolated, called upon to respond out of· 
history and in general, removed under the command of the 
'personal response' from the social production 
of cultural meaning. (p. 85) 
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3 The contradictory pressures of 'personal response' and the demands 
for 'an organic body of judgement.' are summed up by Bowen as follows: 
What is exemplary about Richards is the explicitness with 
which he seeks to produce an impossible, impossibly sincere 
'personal response' and equally an impossible consensus of 
socially produced evaluations. It is bet~een these two poles, 
these t.wo impossible demands, that. students of English have 
had t.o pick their way ever since condemned to a plausible 
ventriloquism. (p. 91) 
4 In 'Culture is Ordinary· , Wi11iams makes clear his preference for 
Leavis's formulations in describing the relation between 'literature' and 
'society' : 
Leavis has never liked Marxists, which is in one way a pity, for 
they know more than he does about modern English society, 
and about its immediate history. He, on the other" hand, knows 
more t.han any Marxist I have met. about. the real relations 
bet.ween art and experience. (p. 81) 
In a hostile review of Williams's work, Garry Watson emphasizes Williams's 
debt. to the Leavises. He sees W il!iams as, among other things, "grossly 
misrepresenting the Leavises" (p. 482) in.an attempt. to disguise his own 
enormous debt tot.hem. 
S In Politics and Letters , for example, Williams points out t.hat. he 
thought that he was providing some cha11enge to the critical orthodoxy by 
showing that the merit. of novelists (George Eliot and Lawrence in hi_s 
example) cannot be measured by comparing selected passages of their work 
(p. 237). 
6 The references below are to the reprint of the articles in Writing in 
Society.pp. 67-120. 
7 'Structure of feeling' is an important term in Williams's work. It is a 
difficult concept to grasp because it is partly made up of the undefined, and, 
furthermore, with each use it acquires slightly different connotations. The 
meaning of 'structure of feeling' in The English Novel is perhaps best 
conveyed in ~he definition offered in Preface to Film : 
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In the study of a period, we may be able to reconstruct, with 
more or less accuracy, the material life, the social organisation, 
and, to a large extent, the dominant ideas .... To relate a work 
of art to any part of that observed reality may, in varying 
degrees, be useful, but is a common experience, in analysis, to 
realize that when one has measured the work against the 
separable parts, there yet remains some.element for which 
there is no external counterpart. This element, I believe, is 
what I have named the structure of feeling of a period and 
it is only realizable through the experience of the work of art 
itself, as a whole. (pp. 21-2) 
The term 'structure of feeling' has been subjected to intense criticism: 
Terry Eagleton (Criticism and Ideology) commends Williams's use of the term 
in The English Novel, but argues that it is ultimately limited: 'he lacks the 
theoretical terms which might specify the precise articulations of that 
structure· (p. 34). Catherine Gallagher describes structure of feeling as a 
category both 'reductive' and 'exasperatingly vague' (p. 44). 
8 Although Orwell might see Dickens as a 'change-of-heart' man, he 
does not dismiss him as such. On the contrary, he endorses Dickens's moral 
criticism: · "If men would behave decently the world would be decent" is not 
such a platitude as it sounds' (p. 469 ). In other words, to try and change 
people's hearts, as Dickens does, is for Orwell an 'honourable path to take'. 
Further, although Orwell might neglect Dickens's sense of the 'total condition', 
Orwell's grasp of how that condition might be changed is more subtle than 
Williams allows. Indeed Orwell's questions 'How can you improve human 
nature until you have changed the system?' and 'what is the use of changing 
the system before you have improved human nature?' ( p. 469) anticipate in 
every sense Williams·s argument that to hold up change of structure and 
change of spirit as alternatives 'is already to ratify an alienated society; for 
neither can be separated, or ever is, from the other; simply one or other can 
be ignored' (p. 49). Williams in fact concedes he was 'rough on Orwell' in a 
subsequent. exchange with]. C. Maxwell; it is strange he makes no 
adjustment in The English Novel. 
9 The quality of Williams's prose is debated. Watson quot.es several 
opinions (E. P. Thompson, Terry Eagleton and Anthony Barnett), and 
concludes: 
As their ingenious efforts at providing rationalisations and 
justifications clearly show, even Williams admirers are 
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. perfectly aware of the fact that he is a lousy writer. 'What 
appears at first. glance the inert language of academicism is in 
fact' - yes, it is. Reading Williams ... induces stupor. (p. 471) 
This judgment seems overly harsh. I would ascribe the relative difficulty of 
Williams's prose not as much to a wilful obscurity on his part. as to the 
discursive pressures of the academy. 
14 This point is made by john Dunn in his review of Politics and 
Letters. 
2.3. 'The Reader in Hard Times' in Writing in Societ)~ 
1 Chris Baldick writes : 
In recent years much ink has been shed to the effect that a 'crisis' 
is beset.ting the study of English literature, particularly in higher 
education. As the following chapters may help to show, this is 
nothing new: from the very beginning, English Literature as a 
·subject" has been founded upon a series of uncertainties and 
conflicts. (p. 1) 
Acknowledging this. the ·crisis' took on a new form in the 1970 s. 
2 Williams too has written on the subject; see Writing in Society 
pp. 192-211. I will discuss his perceptions presently. 
3 See, for example. the Leavises· Dickens the Novelist . where The 
Great Tradition assessment is modified: ·our purpose is to enforce as 
unanswerably as possible the conviction that Dickens was one of the greatest 
of creative writers· (p. ix). A useful bibliography of recent Dickens criticism 
is provided by Barbara Hardy, Charles Dickens: The Writer and His Work. 
4 Perry Anderson. Considerations on Western Marxism Anderson 
takes up this discussion in In The Tracks of Historical Materialism where he 
reviews the failure (in his opinion) of post-structuralist versions of Marxism 
to break out of this impasse. Also useful on the political implications of 
European Marxist theory is the editorial in History Workshop Journal 6. 
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S An excellent essay on the migration of a 'Western Marxist' concept 
(totality) from Hungary to France and then to Britain is Edward Said's 
Travelling Theory' in The World. the Text. and the Critic pp. 226-247 
6 There is a favourable review of The Country and the City by 
E. P. Thompson : in 'A Nice Place to Visit', Thompson emphasizes Williams's 
political commitment, and notes with approval that 'this book is angrier, more 
impatient of academic evasion, more plain-spoken than some of Williams's 
earlier works' (p. 34). 
7 A phrase used by Williams in Writing in Society (p. 196 ). 
8 He defines cultural materialism in Writing in Society in more detail: 
'Cultural materialism is the analysis of all forms of signification, including 
quite centrally writing, within the means and conditions of their production·. 
(p. 210). 
9 See, for example, Catherine Gallagher's article, where she argues: 
Two further short.comings of Williams's method are its 
(paradoxical) reduct.iveness and its vagueness. In their very 
at.tempts to capture the fluidity, complexity and variety of 
cultural production, chapter after chapter returns, with 
wearisome regularity, t.o the one certain truth: cultural 
production is a social, material process. There is, however, little 
discussion of just what this phrase means .... [WJe learn a great 
deal about the concepts Williams rejects and amends, but this 
central notion of 'cultural materialism· remains elusive. (p. 641) 
Patrick Parrinderwrit.es in similar vein: 'the book [Marxism and Literature) 
offers no clear framework - only vague directions and a radical doubt as to 
how this is to be done' (p. SS). 
1 O A similarly positive use of the term is employed in t.he Foreword to 
john Barrell's Poetry. language and politics : 
our belief is that. a combination of historical and cultural 
context, theoretical met.hod, political commitment and textual 
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analysis offers the strongest challenge .... We call this cultural 
materialism. 
11 Williams writes in greater detail about the limits of totality in 
Problems, pp . .i 9-22. See also Said's discussion of Williams's use of totality 
in 'Travelling Theory'. 
12 Anderson provides an excellent. analysis of t.he available meanings 
of hegemony in The Prison Notebooks in 'The Antimonies of Antonio Gramsci.' 
13 Anderson discusses t.his version of hegemony at. pp. 33-9. 
14 Williams develops his arguments about culture in 'The Uses of 
Cultural Theory.' He argues t.hat: 
cultural theory is at its most significant when it is concerned 
precisely with t.he relations between the many and diverse 
human activities which have been historically and theoretically 
grouped in these ways, and especially when it explores these 
relations as at once dynamic and specific within describably 
whole historical situations which are also, as practice, changing 
and, in the present, changeable. It is then in this emphasis on a 
theory of such specific and changing relationships that cultural 
theory becomes appropriate and useful. (p. 20) 
Taking the work of P. M. Medvedev, V. N. Volosinov and M. M. Bakhtin in 
Russia during the 1920 s as a paradigm case of what cultural theory might 
achieve, he reviews t.he role of theory in Britain from the 19 50 s to the 
1980 s. He describes t.he variety of leftist cultural theory, and then relates it 
t.o the changes in the educational and cultural format.ions: 
Yet the key task of all theoretical analysis is the identification 
of the matrix of any formation, and here the affiliation is clear: 
there were texts because there were syllabuses and there 
were syllabuses because there were institutions and there 
were institutions of that. only marginally open kind because 
the drive for a majority public education of the most serious 
sort., as part of a more general democratization oft.he culture 
and the society, had been first halted, leaving an expanded 
but. still privileged and relatively enclosed space, and then in 
the counterrevolution of the last ten years - from Callaghan to 
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Joseph and Thatcher - pushed back, spreadfog unemployment 
and frustration among a generation which was still, on the 
whole, theoretically contained by the protected and 
self-protected modernisms of the intermediate stage. (pp. 27-8) 
Williams argues that the way out of this stasis will be through agencies other 
than cultural theory, but that it remains important that 'at least theory does 
not hinder anyone' ( p. 28). He concludes that theory can only become 
useful 'at that point where it identifies key linkages and key gaps wihin a 
real social history' (p. 28). 
Chapter Three . Language 
3. I . Politics and the English Language. 
1 For an overview of the philosophical context, including the main 
arguments in linguistic philosophy, see Cox and Dyson, Vol. II. pp. 106-145. 
Although Orwell was unaware of the developments in philosophy, his ideas 
about language reflect similar assumptions and pre-occupations: for example, 
Orwell's suspicion of theoretical terms and preference for 'concrete' words is 
not unlike Wittgenstein's disdain for metaphysics and his desire to reduce 
reality to 'simple facts' as expressed in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (see 
pp. 108-13 of Cox and Dyson). 
2 See For Continuity pp. 13-46. Mulhern in The Moment of Scrutiny 
paraphrases the Scrutiny arguments about the debased state of language in 
the following terms: 'the modern English language was the carrier of feelings, 
perceptions and ideas acceptable to the devitalised products of a machine 
economy' (p. 8). 
3 In 'Robinson Crusoe·. Hill's argument. is referred to with reference 
to Orwell in the editorial of History Workshop Journal 10, p. 4. 
4 Williams explores this version of Marxist linguistic theory in Marxism 
and Literature, pp. 33-5. I return to this in the next section. 
5 Nineteen Eighty-Four , in The Penguin Complete Novels of George 
Orwell . Paul Chilton summarises the main academic readings of Newspeak. 
His own conclusion is that: 
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There are family resemblances between Utopian language 
schemes (like Newspeak), the ideal language movement in 
philosophy, and technical sublanguages. Orwell's novel relates 
such language theories and practices to social and political 
cont.ext. (p. 144) 
6 See Freedman, p. 338 and Williams in Politics and Letters, p. 385. 
7 Hugh Rank also criticizes Orwell's failure to foreground the context in 
which language manipulation occurs. 
3.2. Chapter 1 ( 2) of MarXis1n and Literature 
1 Particularly influential were Althusser's attacks on humanism in For 
Marx pp. 221-247, and on empiricism in Reading Capital pp. 34-46. Roger 
Fowler, pp. 200-24, provides a useful summary of the main contributions to 
linguistic theory in the twentieth century. He discusses Saussure, Chomsky, 
Jakobson and Bloomfield, but does not focus on 'Marxist' theories of language 
specifically. 
2 Charles Taylor in Chapter 9 of Human Agency and Language 
provides a more detailed synopsis of the area covered by Williams. Taylor 
distinguishes between ·designative· and ·expressive· theories of language, 
arguing that the latter provide a more sophisticated understanding of 
language. Expressive theories insist that ·meaning cannot be fully separated 
from the medium. because it is only manifest in it. The meaning of an 
expression cannot be explained by its being related to something else, but 
only by another expression· (p. 221) ; designative theories, on the other 
hand, account Tor meaning by correlating signs to bits of the world. and these 
can in principle be identified objectively' (p. 221 ). Taylor sees empiricist 
theories of language as designative, but although both Orwel1 and to a lesser 
extent Williams display the designative propensity for seeing language as 
reflecting ·reality·, there are aspects of their work which contradict 
designative assumptions: notably Orwell's fears that (bad) language might 
create a totalitarian reality, and Williams·s sense of language as constitutive 
rather than as merely an instrument. 
3 The essay, 'Notes on English Prose·. discussed in Chapter Two, 
contains Williams's ideas on the question of style; see especially pp. 73-S. 
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4 For useful introductions to Lacan, see Coward, R and Ellis, j Language 
and Materialism pp. 93-121, and Fredric )a meson 'Imaginary and Symbolic 
in Lacan.' 
ConcluSion 
1 Ben Brewster in the Glossary to Althusser·s For Marx defines 
·problematic' as follows: 
IThe problematic) is not the essence of the thought of an 
individual or epoch which can be deduced from a body of 
texts by an empirical, generalizing reading; it is centred on 
the absence of problems and concepts within the 
problematic as much as their presence (pp. 253-4). 
In using Althusserian terminology, I do not mean to privilege the 
Althusserian critique of Williams; Althusser inhabits a 'problematic' (albeit a 
different one) as subject to silences and fault lines as that of Williams. 
2 Williams's identity as ·working-class intellectual' obviously wears a 
little thin once he establishes.himself as a teacher and academic. 
3 In the interview with Eagleton in response t.o the quest.ion, ·could I 
ask you, then, whether aft.er so long a struggle you now feel in any sense 
disillusioned?', Williams replies: 
Disillusionment, not at all; disappointment, of course. Yet 
looking back it seems to me I absorbed some of these 
disappointments quite early on, so the recent ones didn't 
come as so much of a surprise. (p. 19) 
4 john Higgins encapsulates this difference when he argues that there 
are two kinds of empiricism: 
Vulgar empiricism takes for granted the existence of the 
knowing subject with an unmediated access to experience; 
its idea of language is language as a transparent means of 
communication which has no need of any epistemological 




empiricism questions the terms of the construction of that 
knowing subject and interrogates in particular the semantics 
of natural languages in relation to questions of human 
sociality. (p. 152) 
Orwell exemplifies the former kind of empiricism, and Williams the latter. 
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